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Alan Keyes is Making Sense
Alan KeyesMay 28, 2002
ALAN KEYES, HOST: Welcome to MAKING SENSE. I am Alan Keyes.
Up front tonight, we'll be talking about the internal furor at the FBI over the bureau's mishandling of pre-9/11 intelligence. Major mistakes have apparently plagued the FBI, specifically in the handling of information received before 9/11 that some say might have prevented the terrible tragedy.
The latest bombshell, a scathing memo written by a Minneapolis FBI agent to Director Mueller, the topic of which is the cover story in this week's “Time” magazine. Now, before we get to a chat with one of the authors of that story, here is some background from MSNBC's Norah O'Donnell.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
NORAH O'DONNELL, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): New details about a major shake-up inside the FBI, after this 21-year FBI veteran and mother of four puts her career on the line to blow the whistle, accusing headquarters of obstructing an investigation into the so-called 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, that she argues could have disrupted the 9/11 attacks.
In a scorching 13-page letter obtained by “Time” magazine, FBI lawyer Colleen Rowley says an FBI supervisor “undercut an agent's request for a search warrant” for Moussaoui's computer in August. And now, that Washington supervisor has been promoted. Rowley tells FBI Director Robert Mueller, “I'm not suggesting that headquarters personnel in question be burned at the stake, but we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes.”
REP. PORTER GOSS (R-FL), INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: Clearly, there are some statements in there that are consistent with some of the concerns we have had for a long time about the culture of the FBI.
O'DONNELL: Rowley also takes on her own boss, saying he, “omitted, downplayed, glossed over and mischaracterized what happened.” Mueller last month.
ROBERT MUELLER, FBI DIRECTOR: Did we discern from that that there was a plot that would have led us to the September 11? No. Could we have? I rather doubt it.
O'DONNELL: But Rowley disagrees, writing, “It is at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training school prior to September 11. There is at least some chance that may have limited the September 11 attacks and resulting loss of life.”
Mueller now plans a massive overhaul of the FBI. According to the “Washington Post,” CIA agents will help refocus the FBI's counterterrorism efforts and establish a new super squad to act as a clearinghouse for all terrorism intelligence.
SEN. TOM DASCHLE (D-SD), MAJORITY LEADER: I am very concerned about the incompetence demonstrated on so many occasions within the FBI over the course of the last year.
O'DONNELL (on camera): As Congress prepares to begin closed-door investigations into the 9/11 attack, the Senate leader is setting up a confrontation with the White House. Senator Daschle wants an independent commission to investigate and plans to force the issue with a Senate vote despite the objections of the president.
Norah O'Donnell, NBC News, the White House.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
KEYES: Now tomorrow, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller will tell America their plans to restructure the bureau. We have heard already from the director of ideas about consolidating and having a super squad that brings greater control and oversight to Washington.
But, of course, the kinds of things that have been coming up have actually been coming out of the field, suggesting that there was inside creativity in the field at the level outside of Washington. And that, of course, is one of the things that comes out in Rowley's memo.
She says, for example, “The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's flight training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point. Yet even after the attacks had begun, a supervisor at FBI headquarters was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence.”
She goes on to say, “Everyone's first question was why. Why would an FBI agent deliberately sabotage a case. Jokes were actually made that the key personnel had to be spies or moles, like Robert Hanssen, who were actually working for Osama bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis effort.”
Now, obviously, some of that may be a little facetious, a little bit extreme. But people in the field should have felt this way. Obviously, it raises serious concerns, concerns that are not about what we had heard about or what some wanted us to believe over the course of these months since 9/11, that there was no capability of foreseeing anything like these events, that nobody saw it and nobody could have done anything about it.
Things have emerged that suggest that bits and pieces were there, but what is even more disturbing now as a result of the Rowley memo, the suggestion that obstruction stood in the way of having that picture drawn together more effectively.
Rowley goes on to add: “I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle shading or skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of FBI management has occurred and is occurring. The term cover-up would be too strong a characterization. I think your statements demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all costs. I think the only fair response to this type of question would be that no one can pretend to know one way or another.”
She is referring there, of course, to the question of whether or not something could have been done beforehand, whether or not any of this amounts to enough to have prevented the September 11 attacks. Obviously, that's speculation. Obviously, no one could know. But I think what Rowley is pointing out is that the facile conclusion, nothing could have been done, nobody could have known, nothing that we're seeing could have made any difference, is deeply premature.
What she is suggesting is that it's just as wrong to rush to judgment about what was impossible as it is to rush to judgment about what could have been done. It also, of course, raises another question we'll be talking about in the course of this half hour, the question of whether or not you can hope to improve matters if all you do is consolidate control in the same, shall we call them, incompetent hands that led to this kind of neglect in the first place?
Well, to start off our discussion today, we have with us Michael Weisskopf, who co-wrote “Time” magazine's cover story, the one that just hit the newsstands. It's called “How The FBI Blew The Case,” referring to the Moussaoui case. And it goes into both the memo and a lot of the issues that are raised in it. Michael, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, “TIME”: Nice to be here.
KEYES: Good to have you with us. Now, from your pursuit of this story, one of the things that seems to come through crystal clear in Rowley's memo is a sense that we actually had the people in the field who were looking at things and reporting on things that might have made a difference, but that a lot of this did not come together because of blockages at the top, at the management level. Is that a fair characterization of what she's saying?
WEISSKOPF: That's right. This was an example of the field being more prescient and sensitive to potential terrorism than the central headquarters of the FBI.
KEYES: Now in the work that you were doing, did you come to a sense as you went over the materials and talked to people as to why there was this difference in approach between the field and the higher-ups?
WEISSKOPF: We have to emphasize here that we've only heard one side of this story. However, agent Rowley in her memo suggests that that the — or sort of echoes some of the reasoning.
Her superior did not think that there was probable cause, which is a kind of bar you've got to cross before you can get a search warrant to look into the laptop computer of Moussaoui and his personal possessions. As a result of it, she kept digging deeper and found some French intelligence which linked Moussaoui to international terrorists. And she passed that up the chain, and that still was not persuasive enough.
But finally, her superior was willing to take the next step and at least report to the legal department, which grants search warrants. And in the process, according to Rowley, he did not include in his report the full evidence she presented, so as to affect the outcome. This is why she says he apparently deliberately thwarted this effort to pursue Moussaoui.
KEYES: Now, what you have just described seems to be an illustration of a mentality that people have talked about. The FBI quite legitimately, I would have to say, gets preoccupied with catching criminals and bringing them to trial and making sure you haven't taken steps that would destroy your ability to get a conviction.
Now, that is perfectly appropriate in certain circumstances, but it seems to be an utterly wrong mindset when you're dealing with an effort to understand intelligence information aimed at trying to forestall or deal with a terrorist threat. Is that right?
WEISSKOPF: That's right. And let's remember the FBI cut its teeth on Bonnie and Clyde and Jack Dillinger. Over the years, it shifted, of course, into more sophisticated investigations. But still the culture of it is very much rooted in the kind of street police, to a large extent.
Louie Freeh, who proceeded Mueller in that job, didn't take advantage of modern technology, the most advanced technology, to break into the more difficult areas, so that they use very archaic computers, for instance. Freeh himself did not believe in e-mail.
KEYES: Well, looking at it though from the point of view of this mentality, one of the things — and we'll be talking about this I think a little bit later in the show in the course of the show — that has jumped out at me is that there does seem to be a disconnect between what's required for intelligence work in a preemptive and preventive fashion and what's required in order to pursue criminals and get the kind of prosecutions that put them behind bars.
If we go headlong down a road that pushes the FBI into giving priority to these intelligence matters, is that going to destroy its effectiveness as a law enforcement agency?
WEISSKOPF: Well, of course, what you just described is a form of law enforcement. What you're talking about, I guess, is domestic crime, whether it be organized crime...
KEYES: Well, no, I would differ a little bit...
WEISSKOPF: ... or bank robbery.
KEYES: Terrorism is war. War is not law enforcement. War is defeating the enemy, finding the enemy, eliminating the enemy. It's a very different mindset than law enforcement. And I guess what worries me is that the requirements of that mindset don't seem to be the same of the requirements of preparing a case that's going to stand up in court.
WEISSKOPF: Call it whatever you want, but the answer to your question is yes. There is limited manpower and resources at the FBI, and this will certainly divert those resources and manpower away from bank robberies and street crime, things of that nature.
KEYES: Do you think that they are going to be able to make this transition, given the fact that a lot of the same people whose mindset may have been responsible for the problems — remain in place and may be in charge of making the change?
WEISSKOPF: Well, we'll have to find out. Of course, these are capable people well intended, as well. However, this is more complicated than just a matter of shifting priorities. She describes — Rowley describes a climate of fear at the FBI, not unlike many high-bound bureaucracies filled with conservative agents who are watching their backside, very careful not to make mistakes for fear of suffering penalty. And it's made up of careerists, as she called it, people who are there just to punch their ticket for 18 months. They don't learn much on that job and they move on. In both cases, it frustrates, in her view, real thorough investigation.
KEYES: Michael, thank you. Appreciate your insight into these matters. Obviously, this is going to become a subject of both contention and great interest in the Congress and around the country. Thanks for the start that you all have made.
Next, we get to the heart of the matter with two retired FBI agents who will debate who is to blame for the bureau's crisis and what can be done to fix it.
Then, we'll look at the implications of the India/Pakistan conflict in the next half-hour. Is nuclear war imminent? Stay tuned. You're watching America's news channel, MSNBC.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: There's no question but that they have the capability of waging a nuclear war. And, needless to say, countries that are interested in that not happening think about those things.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: That's Donald Rumsfeld talking about the rising tension between India and Pakistan, two neighbors, bitter enemies with weapons pointing at each other. In the next half-hour, we'll discuss the possibility of nuclear war and how the once inconceivable is now in south Asia a real possibility. Also, a reminder, the chat room is cooking tonight. And you can join in right now at CHAT.MSNBC.COM.
Now, let's get back to our discussion of the FBI and the problems that have surfaced and the kinds of issues that are involved in an effort to try to reform the bureau in light of the requirements of a new situation, a new anti-terror priority.
Joining us to get to the heart of the matter, Rick Hahn, a retired FBI supervisor and MSNBC terrorism analyst; and Candice DeLong, a retired FBI special agent and author of the book “Special Agent: My Life on the Frontlines as a Woman in the FBI.” Both of you, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CANDICE DELONG, RETIRED FBI AGENT: Thank you.
KEYES: I want to share with you another quote from the Rowley memo where she said, quote: “A climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement decisions, FBI headquarters is staffed with a number of short-term careerists. There is unevenness in competency among headquarters personnel. The ranks of FBI management are filled with many who were failures as street agents.”
Now, those are a number of the comments that she made in the course of her memo, talking about the mindset and mentality the people in management at the FBI. Candice DeLong, in the face of the kind of challenge that is now out there and the priority on terrorism and things of that kind, and also the difference I was raising in the first section between the requirements of law enforcement aiming at a court case and the requirements of intelligence aiming at effective action to preempt terrorism, do you think that Rowley is correct and that the kind of culture and mindset at the FBI is really an obstacle to getting this job done effectively?
DELONG: Yes, I do. I think she is correct, and I think it — and the obstacles, Alan, aren't just at headquarters. We see this in the field offices as well. Not all of the supervisors are afflicted by this fear of making a decision that might hurt their career, but many of them are.
KEYES: Now, when you say a fear that would hurt their career, it's — what kind of criteria are they using to make judgments about that in terms of the kinds of things that they have come to feel in the course of their career are healthy and the kinds of things that are not healthy for their advancement?
DELONG: Convictions are healthy. Cases with no problems are healthy. Cases that — and Rick Hahn can speak to this. He worked a case for four years, cases that have problems come up that can cause a supervisor to think, gee, if I make this decision and it's wrong, that could hurt my upwardly movement in the FBI.
KEYES: Now, Rick, Candice has emphasized there, I think, cases and the focus on cases. I gathered both from the reading of the “Time” article, other things that have come forward that when they were looking at some of these reports, there really was a kind of case-oriented mindset.
But isn't that a problem in the context of intelligence work where at the end of the day, your aim is not to make a case but to stop or eliminate a terrorist asset?
RICK HAHN, RETIRED FBI SUPERVISOR: Well, in the case of terrorism, usually it's both. You not only want to stop the crime from occurring, but you also want to be able to prosecute them. And that's a difficult balance to strike.
In any case, what you do want to do is make sure that you're not violating the law or not overreaching in any way, shape or form. And, again, in the September 10 sort of mindset that we're in, where no one could believe that something as horrendous as September 11 could occur, I think there is a lot more reluctance to go with something like the Moussaoui case.
KEYES: Well, see, this is part of my problem though, Rick. Even in what you just said, I sense a problem. We declared a war on terrorism. We didn't declare law enforcement on terrorism. And war is different than law enforcement. A policeman acts under certain constraints to go out, capture the criminal so they can be brought whole, safe and healthy into a court of law where the law will deal with them.
A soldier goes out to eliminate the enemy. And that's a different mentality. And what I'm wondering about here is whether or not, even with all their talk of reform, we are really seeing and understanding that part of what is now required is an intelligence capability capable of a war-fighting mentality. Is that compatible with a law enforcement understanding?
HAHN: No, it is not. And I don't think you're going to see that inside this country, Alan, because of the protections that we have in this free society. That's the reason why someone like John Walker Lindh is charged formally with certain particular crimes as a U.S. citizen as opposed to being locked up at Guantanamo.
KEYES: Now, Candice, the problem does seem to be, if it's mentality as was described in the Rowley memo, a culture of fear and so forth, isn't that also then partly a personnel problem? I mean, are you just going to be able to wave a magic wand and change the mindset of people who have operated in a certain mold for 15 and 20 years?
DELONG: Well, I think that's correct, Alan. It is a problem of you're not going to be able to change your mindset. I think there's a lot wrong with FBI management that it's quite probable that Director Mueller is not even aware of.
I saw repeatedly in my 20 years in the FBI something that Colleen mentions in her memo, that an individual might be a manager promoted after being involved in something that was a questionable decision. I saw that happen more than once, and I saw the individual promoted to terrorism. That has to stop.
Again, another thing that the FBI does, is people are promoted — can put their hat in the ring to be a manager after only three years. That's ridiculous, I think. It takes a lot longer than that to learn how to work a case and how the FBI works. And another thing I think it's one of the real failings and possibly where these incompetent things come up is that the FBI doesn't seem to put a benefit on an agent being promoted that actually knows that violation. If an agent maybe has worked in the field of white-collar crime for 10 years and he or she wants to be a manager and they may put in for a desk, what it's called, be promoted to a supervisory desk that is in drugs or terrorism and they very well may be awarded that desk when they have absolutely no background in that field whatsoever. And I think that's a huge problem.
KEYES: Well, that doesn't seem to make any sense at all. But is part of what I understood you to say then was that some folks who were not doing a satisfactory job would be put into areas of lower priority, and that, in fact, counterterrorism was one of these areas? Is that what you said?
DELONG: What I'm saying is that I saw more than once in my 20 years on the job — the expression is screw up, go up, and the — if a manager screwed up, they would go up the ladder, but that would get them out of the area where they screwed up.
KEYES: Rick Hahn, is that a true observation? And was counterterrorism such a low priority that it absorbed some of this incompetence?
HAHN: Well, I disagree entirely with the characterization of counterterrorism that way. Certainly, the bureau is not immune to the Peter principle any more than any other organization, and certainly we do have people that are incompetent that do rise.
But I don't think that's representative of the majority of management. And I certainly know that it's not the case in the field of terrorism. Terrorism people have been doing proactive things for 20 years in the FBI. Twenty years ago, Candice and I were involved in a case where we penetrated an active terrorist safehouse and substituted their weapons and explosives. I mean, this stuff went on, and we went on to prosecute that case, I would add.
There's a whole culture of counterterrorism people, primarily based on the East Coast. But nonetheless, it's nationwide in the big offices, and it's not filled with your sad sacks of the FBI by any stretch of the imagination.
DELONG: Oh, but, Rick, you're talking about the field agents and I completely agree. And it was the field agents and the terrorism task force in New York City that stopped the bombing of the Holland and Lincoln Tunnel. It was...
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Go ahead. I'm sorry.
HAHN: I'm talking about the management as well. I mean, you know a lot of the top managers in terrorism. These are very competent people. And these are people, many of whom came up through the terrorism ranks through the exchanges you're well aware between New York, where they gained a great deal of experience in terrorism, and shuttling back and forth to D.C. But they've gone up in ranks. They've become SACs and supervisors of various levels at FBI headquarters.
DELONG: Well, perhaps you've seen some things that I haven't seen, and I've seen some things you haven't seen.
KEYES: Yes, you all do seem to have a fundamental difference of perspective here. But I have got to tell you at the moment, Rick, every time I hear somebody tell me how good somebody in this area of the government is, I get this serious problem, because I see the Twin Towers collapsing and I see a gaping hole in the major symbol of American security. This is not a good day. This is not great job performance.
I can't stand it that we're getting into a situation where the American people are supposed to lower the bar and accept the notion that September 11 was kind of an inevitable day at work for our national security establishment. If that's the case, then we ought to all of us roll over, because we won't just be playing dead. We'll be really dead.
Why should we accept this lack of accountability from the FBI or anybody else?
HAHN: Well, I think the FBI is in the throes of accountability for this in determining exactly what happened. And certainly the allegation made by Rowley to the effect that the FBI supervisor at headquarters may have watered down the affidavit or altered the affidavit in some way is a very serious allegation and should be looked at and that individual should, in fact, be disciplined if in fact he did that.
But aside from that, I think the FBI from the onset has recognized that they didn't connect the dots. They recognized that they did, in fact, have some intelligence that may have been indicative of this, and that they want to do a better job. And that's the whole reason behind the reorganization, behind the forming of the super squad.
KEYES: One last set of questions. Often in these matters, the pendulum swings one way and you get all the way over somewhere else and another problem is caused by that very fact. Are we going to see a development here of such enthusiasm, for the counterterrorism, intelligence kind of work that the law enforcement role of the FBI suffers and organized crime and other nasty folks who operate across state boundaries on a national and even international level, then find they have a freer hand?
Is the pendulum going to swing in such a way that we suffer when it comes to vital areas of law enforcement that obviously are going to continue to be a challenge, Rick?
HAHN: Well, I think certainly you're going to see a diminished emphasis on that certainly coming from the FBI. And it's a question of whether or not state and local agencies can pick it up or other agencies can pick up the slack.
KEYES: Well, see, I don't understand people when they talk this way though, Rick. The FBI came into existence in this country because when you're dealing with a criminal entities and operations and activities that cross state boundaries and jurisdiction, you've got to have people who can follow them in a coherent way. That's why the FBI exists.
That reality isn't going anywhere, is it? It's still going to be with us. How can state and local governments take over that function.
HAHN: The FBI plans to continue to have agents assigned to that. However, the number of man hours spent each year on that, those particular violations is going to be greatly diminished. And we have to prioritize things.
KEYES: Based on that though, see, because this is what I worry about. Are we going to see the pendulum swing so that a little while from now, we'll be dealing with terrorism and meanwhile have an upwelling of all kinds of nasty crimes on our streets and in our neighborhoods because we have lost an effective law enforcement role of the FBI?
DELONG: I don't think so, Alan.
HAHN: Well, the local...
KEYES: No. Candice, Go ahead.
DELONG: I don't think so, Alan. The FBI constantly, every field division, has their finger on the pulse of crime in the area that they are responsible for, state, local and of course federal. And so, it's not like we're going to put all our eggs in the terrorism basket and then suddenly be looking at a tremendous rise in street crime and gang crime and organized crime. We're always going to know what's going on there and hopefully managers of the individual field offices will allocate their personnel appropriately.
KEYES: Well, that would suggest though to me that maybe some of the formulations being used by folks outside the FBI, including people on Capitol Hill and so forth are a little bit exaggerated, because they're talking about the need for the FBI to focus on counterterrorism, revamp its culture so that it's intelligence and terrorism. I mean, the FBI needs to add to and strengthen that dimension of its work. But at the same time it has to maintain a balance with its law enforcement role, which isn't going to go away. Is that what I hear you both saying here?
DELONG: Yes.
KEYES: Candice? Rick?
HAHN: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. As you said, even the head of the International Association Chiefs of Police has said that the FBI cannot let go of those responsibilities to other crimes.
KEYES: Well, it's going to be an interesting road ahead, I think. And I think all of this has shaken people right to the core. Sometimes that actually produces a positive outcome in Washington. We'll just have to wait and see.
Thanks, Rick and Candice.
DELONG: You're welcome.
HAHN: You're welcome.
KEYES: Appreciate your being with us tonight.
Next, the standoff between India and Pakistan is heating up. Is nuclear war imminent between these two nuclear armed powers. Two journalists, one from an Indian newspaper, one from a leading Pakistani newspaper, face off next. You're watching America's news channel, MSNBC.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
Now, we live in an era when it seemed as if the shadow of potential nuclear holocaust had receded from the world, demise of the Soviet empire, retreat from the terrible confrontations of the Cold War period. But tonight, relations between two of the world's nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, are at a boiling point again, with India rejecting Pakistan's call for talks in their fight over Kashmir.
As MSNBC's Jim Miklaszewski reports, with both countries pointing nukes at each other and given the context of America's war on terror, this is much more than a regional dispute.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
JIM MIKLASZEWSKI, NBC CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): They were shots heard round the world, Pakistan test fires three ballistic missiles, raising new fears Pakistan and India are inching closer to nuclear war. The cost would be catastrophic.
New U.S. intelligence estimates predict 12 million people would be killed instantly. A U.S. Air Force study says 100 million could ultimately die. But the rising tensions could also blow apart the U.S. war on terrorism. Pentagon officials report Pakistan is preparing to withdraw many of its troops from the Afghan border to face off against India's forces.
VICTORIA CLARKE, PENTAGON SPOKESWOMAN: That's a concern for us because we need as much assistance as possible in guarding that very porous border.
MIKLASZEWSKI: That's where as many as 1,000 al Qaeda fighters, perhaps Osama bin Laden himself, are believed to be hiding. The U.S. is counting heavily on Pakistan to help track down those al Qaeda forces.
(on camera): But officials here report Pakistan is already so distracted by the standoff with India, their efforts to round up al Qaeda are temporarily dead.
Jim Miklaszewski, NBC News, the Pentagon.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
KEYES: Twelve million, possibly 100 million dead? These are numbers that's hard to get your mind around. There are already an estimated one million troops massed along the India/Pakistan border; 750,000 Indian troops and 250,000 or so Pakistani troops. One recent estimate suggests that India has 25 to 40 nuclear weapons in its arsenal and that Pakistan has 15 to 20.
Obviously an ability to do a tremendous amount of damage with results that boggle the mind and challenge our ability even to imagine the consequences. All in the context of our effort to track down al Qaeda, deal with the consequences of the war on terror, while Pakistan obviously is distracted from making that a priority. And at the same time, I have to say, we face the possibility that the government in Pakistan may in fact have taken advantage of this complex situation to stir the pot.
Joining us now from Washington to discuss this are Chidu Rajghatta, a foreign editor for the “Times of India.” Also with us, Nayyar Zaidi, chief Washington correspondent for “Daily Jang,” Pakistan's largest circulation daily newspaper. Welcome to MAKING SENSE, gentlemen. Appreciate your being with us tonight.
Let me start with you, Chidu, from the point of view of the Indians and how they are looking now at Musharraf over the weekend. He gave a speech saying he wanted talks, and yet I gathered that that has not been well received in India. Why not?
CHIDU RAJGHATTA, “TIMES OF INDIA”: Well, simply because he wants talks or else. And that's not a good message. Essentially, what he did in his speech was to say come out wagging the nuclear finger and say, I have nukes. Here I am conducting three tests, so you guys better talk to me or else. And that's not something the Indians received happily, and that's not something the world should receive happily because it sets a terrible precedent.
And tomorrow you could have anybody, you could have Saddam Hussein, you could have any of the usual suspects coming out and saying, we've got nukes, so we're going to hold the world to ransom. “Fortune” magazine called Pakistan “Problem-istan” and, in fact, were very prescient in suggesting that things were going terribly wrong with this country, and that that's actually now come to pass now. This is something scary for the rest of world.
KEYES: Now, Nayyar Zaidi, one of the questions that has been going through my mind continually as I watch this is a question of why now are we watching this come to a boiling point? The uncharitable might suggest that Musharraf has actually stirred this pot because of the existing situation and the feeling that somehow or another he could get something out of the situation, making use of American influence somehow, our unwillingness to see harm done that would distract from the war on terrorism. Do you think that this is emboldened him to take steps that have aggravated tension in the area?
NAYYAR ZAIDI, “DAILY JANG” NEWSPAPER: No. I disagree, because I think this thing has been going out — you know, with India and Pakistan and with Indian threats to attack Pakistan since 1990.
You will remember that the director of CIA, Robert Gates, had to rush to Pakistan and India in April 1990 when neither country had experimented with nuclear weapons. And I don't think that Mr. Musharraf is stirring the pot. Mr. Musharraf had committed when he came into power that he will reduce tensions and close down whatever training camps or jihadi camps there are.
I think India is taking advantage of the situation, and it is actually trying to distract the U.S./international effort to combat terrorism because Indians have always been allies of Russians. And who does it serve right now? The Russians. And I think if Pakistan is distracted from Afghanistan or helping the U.S., who benefits? The sponsors of terrorism benefit, I believe.
KEYES: The great problem I have though is I know that sometimes these things have long histories and so forth. But just focusing on the existing situation, wasn't the immediate problem here caused by extremist attacks that were directed against India? Did the Indians sponsor attacks against the Pakistanis?
ZAIDI: No. Let me explain to you. The attacks that happened Pakistan has disowned and Pakistan did not sponsor those attacks. But look at the convenient pattern. The first attack took place in Indian occupied Kashmir when President Clinton was in Delhi. Some 36 were massacred.
Now why would the Pakistanis massacred the six? If they had to massacre somebody, they would have massacred the Hindu pundits. The second attack took place when Mr. Joswonsing (ph) (UNINTELLIGIBLE) the state department, sitting with Mr. Colin Powell, and the Indian parliament is attacked. And that gives him ammunition for propaganda.
The third attack in Jammu happens when assistant secretary of state Christina Rocca is in New Delhi. I mean, why would Pakistanis would be so dumb if they were sponsoring these attacks to precisely do them at a point which will give ammunition and propaganda stuff to India? These attacks have not been sponsored by Pakistan, were not done with their consent or knowledge, and President Musharraf and his government have denied it.
I think these attacks probably are sponsored by somebody in India or some agency. I'm not accusing the government of India. But then these help India. And through these attacks, they are building the pretext of war. India has decided to attack Pakistan, and it's just going through the steps to find the justification. And you can't accuse Mr. Musharraf of that.
KEYES: Chidu Rajghatta, how do you respond to the idea that these attacks are actually engendered from the Indian side to provoke this crisis?
RAJGHATTA: Well, actually, when the camera wasn't on me, I was laughing into my coat sleeve because this is the kind of, you know, errant nonsense we have heard time and again. We heard it with 9/11, too. We didn't do it. It was the Mossad which did it. It was the CIA which did it. It was, you know, some American extremist.
This is the kind of nonsense which would just be laughed out of court. I mean, why would the Indians kill their own people? I mean, that's ridiculous and it's beneath my dignity to even talk about it. The fact of the matter is universally, everybody over the last week, starting with President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, the prime ministers of Japan, prime minister of Britain, have said that there is unremitting terrorist activity by the Pakistani army, by the Pakistani military regime against India and that should be stopped.
And instead of doing that, Musharraf comes out with his, you know, nuclear guns blazing in his speech yesterday and says, terrorism? What terrorism? Infiltration? What infiltration? I mean, somebody has got to tell this man the truth.
KEYES: Now do you think, Nayyar Zaidi, that again, I mean, I don't want to seem uncharitable here. And I know that America is trying to work with Pakistan, but that has also caused Musharraf some problems in terms of the perception of fundamentalists and other extremists that he's selling out.
Is it possible that he rattles the saber and causes this kind of difficulty in order — in a sense to prove his political manhood to those who are questioning his close cooperation with the United States?
ZAIDI: Once again, I disagree. I don't think General Musharraf is rattling sabers or nuclear sabers. He has said clearly in his speech that he would do whatever he can to satisfy the complaints. But he also has to address the Pakistani nation and reassure the people of Pakistan that if they are attacked, the Pakistani armed forces will fully defend Pakistan, including the use of nuclear weapons, which was the position of the United States and NATO.
KEYES: Why the reference to nuclear weapons though in this context?
ZAIDI: Well, because Pakistan is the smaller country. And, you know, you had a doctrine in NATO which said, you know, if the Russians attack western Europe, we are not going to sit there and fight tank by tank and soldier by soldier. That was the NATO doctrine. So the smaller countries always have to say, gee, if you attack me, then I'm going to use all the weapons at my disposal. But I do not think that leaders of India and Pakistan will be that irresponsible.
KEYES: We will see. I am going to have to stop here, gentleman. Thank you both for coming with us tonight. We — oh, I am sorry. We will in fact be coming back with our guests. I forgot that. And we will continue our discussion of the Indo-Pakistan situation and whether on not in fact this is going to undermine America's ability to pursue the war on terror.
Later we'll have my outrage of the day. We're going to look at some shocking X-rays from suicide bombings in Israel.
You're watching America's news channel, MSNBC.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: See, I was right, we are back with Chidu Rajghatta, foreign editor of the “Times of India,” and Nayyar Zaidi, chief Washington correspondent for the “Jang.”
And we're talking, of course, about the intensifying confrontation between India and Pakistan — two nuclear armed powers in the South Asia region — looming over them, the possibility of a nuclear exchange that could claim 12 million lives, as many as 100 million, according to some estimates.
Seems unimaginable. Chidu Rajghatta, it does seem unimaginable to most Americans, both in terms of the huge numbers that would be involved in such an exchange. Why would India want to risk that kind of a war at this juncture?
RAJGHATTA: Alan, India is not the country which is risking a nuclear war. Just remember, the fundamental point here is that India has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, which means India is not going to start a nuclear war. It's stated — it's a stated policy. So there's only one country which can start a nuclear war, and the Indian policy is one of retaliation.
So, like Nayyar Zaidi said, because they are a smaller country, they think that when they're getting licked, pull out the nukes. Yes, it's not going to be pretty, but, hey, India is not going to start this.
ZAIDI: Can I...
KEYES: Yes, go ahead.
ZAIDI: One thing I want to address here is that we are talking like India and Pakistan will start the war with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons will be used within 24 or 48 hours. That's not going to happen. I think it will start with a limited war and it might escalate on the international borders.
But the international community, in my opinion, will have plenty of time to manage this crisis and make sure that it does not escalate into a nuclear war. But like Rajghatta cited the statements of United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, and if all these nations continue to back Indian positions, then they are inviting war.
RAJGHATTA: I hope that — I mean, we don't go by this premise that, all right, let's start a limited war and somebody will step in. I think we shouldn't even go down this...
ZAIDI: No, India has stated that they had are going to attack Pakistan and go for a decisive victory. It is not General Musharraf, it is Prime Minister Vajpayee...
RAJGHATTA: The fact of the matter is for 20 years, Pakistan has already been fighting a war against India. It's a proxy war, and it's very important to note that Nayyar mentioned the year 1990. That's a very important year for two reasons. One is, that was the year when Pakistan...
ZAIDI: Well, how do you calculate 20 years? That goes through 1982. It's 1989.
RAJGHATTA: When Pakistan went...
ZAIDI: 1982, there was no activity in Kashmir.
RAJGHATTA: Nayyar, let me finish.
ZAIDI: Yes.
RAJGHATTA: 1989, '90 was the years that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan...
ZAIDI: That's 13 years.
RAJGHATTA: And there was this large freelance mujahedeen which was usefully employed in Kashmir, and that was also the time the Pakistanis went covertly nuclear. That's when the whole trouble in Kashmir began, and for all these — for the entire '90s decade, Pakistan has used this nuclear power to foment terrorism in Pakistan. That's a universally acknowledged fact.
ZAIDI: But...
RAJGHATTA: Over the past week, every world leader has accused Pakistan of terrorism. Every world leader has asked Musharraf: back down. Withdraw. Stop the infiltration.
KEYES: Gentlemen, gentlemen, I have to interrupt here, because this time we really are out of time. I do want to leave you both with one thought, possibly a little bit prejudicial from the point of view of Pakistan.
But my question, as I listened to your debate about why this is occurring now and even, Nayyar Zaidi, what you were saying about somebody stepping in, I hope that Musharraf is not miscalculating here in the belief that he can stir this pot, cause some trouble, get something he wants out of this situation because of the situation America is in, because I think he's pushing the region in an extremely dangerous direction and that's going to prove to be a very dangerous miscalculation that will hurt the region and the overall effort we all should have against terror very badly.
I want to thank you both for joining us today. Really appreciate it.
Next, my outrage of the day, where we'll take a look at some of the less focused on but very real consequences of these terrible suicide bombings.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: As the end of Israel's major action on the West Bank, we have seen a stepping up of suicide bombs. Now we should know that these bombs are packed with nails, screws, and bolts to maximize injurious effects. Dr. Michael L. Messing of Chicago, Illinois was in Israel working with the victims of suicide bombers.
He sent us these X-rays of the victims. You can see that this is intended to inflict even life with cruelty. That's my sense of it. Thanks. “THE NEWS WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS” is up next. See you tomorrow.
Up front tonight, we'll be talking about the internal furor at the FBI over the bureau's mishandling of pre-9/11 intelligence. Major mistakes have apparently plagued the FBI, specifically in the handling of information received before 9/11 that some say might have prevented the terrible tragedy.
The latest bombshell, a scathing memo written by a Minneapolis FBI agent to Director Mueller, the topic of which is the cover story in this week's “Time” magazine. Now, before we get to a chat with one of the authors of that story, here is some background from MSNBC's Norah O'Donnell.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
NORAH O'DONNELL, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): New details about a major shake-up inside the FBI, after this 21-year FBI veteran and mother of four puts her career on the line to blow the whistle, accusing headquarters of obstructing an investigation into the so-called 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, that she argues could have disrupted the 9/11 attacks.
In a scorching 13-page letter obtained by “Time” magazine, FBI lawyer Colleen Rowley says an FBI supervisor “undercut an agent's request for a search warrant” for Moussaoui's computer in August. And now, that Washington supervisor has been promoted. Rowley tells FBI Director Robert Mueller, “I'm not suggesting that headquarters personnel in question be burned at the stake, but we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes.”
REP. PORTER GOSS (R-FL), INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: Clearly, there are some statements in there that are consistent with some of the concerns we have had for a long time about the culture of the FBI.
O'DONNELL: Rowley also takes on her own boss, saying he, “omitted, downplayed, glossed over and mischaracterized what happened.” Mueller last month.
ROBERT MUELLER, FBI DIRECTOR: Did we discern from that that there was a plot that would have led us to the September 11? No. Could we have? I rather doubt it.
O'DONNELL: But Rowley disagrees, writing, “It is at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training school prior to September 11. There is at least some chance that may have limited the September 11 attacks and resulting loss of life.”
Mueller now plans a massive overhaul of the FBI. According to the “Washington Post,” CIA agents will help refocus the FBI's counterterrorism efforts and establish a new super squad to act as a clearinghouse for all terrorism intelligence.
SEN. TOM DASCHLE (D-SD), MAJORITY LEADER: I am very concerned about the incompetence demonstrated on so many occasions within the FBI over the course of the last year.
O'DONNELL (on camera): As Congress prepares to begin closed-door investigations into the 9/11 attack, the Senate leader is setting up a confrontation with the White House. Senator Daschle wants an independent commission to investigate and plans to force the issue with a Senate vote despite the objections of the president.
Norah O'Donnell, NBC News, the White House.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
KEYES: Now tomorrow, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller will tell America their plans to restructure the bureau. We have heard already from the director of ideas about consolidating and having a super squad that brings greater control and oversight to Washington.
But, of course, the kinds of things that have been coming up have actually been coming out of the field, suggesting that there was inside creativity in the field at the level outside of Washington. And that, of course, is one of the things that comes out in Rowley's memo.
She says, for example, “The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's flight training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point. Yet even after the attacks had begun, a supervisor at FBI headquarters was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence.”
She goes on to say, “Everyone's first question was why. Why would an FBI agent deliberately sabotage a case. Jokes were actually made that the key personnel had to be spies or moles, like Robert Hanssen, who were actually working for Osama bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis effort.”
Now, obviously, some of that may be a little facetious, a little bit extreme. But people in the field should have felt this way. Obviously, it raises serious concerns, concerns that are not about what we had heard about or what some wanted us to believe over the course of these months since 9/11, that there was no capability of foreseeing anything like these events, that nobody saw it and nobody could have done anything about it.
Things have emerged that suggest that bits and pieces were there, but what is even more disturbing now as a result of the Rowley memo, the suggestion that obstruction stood in the way of having that picture drawn together more effectively.
Rowley goes on to add: “I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle shading or skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of FBI management has occurred and is occurring. The term cover-up would be too strong a characterization. I think your statements demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all costs. I think the only fair response to this type of question would be that no one can pretend to know one way or another.”
She is referring there, of course, to the question of whether or not something could have been done beforehand, whether or not any of this amounts to enough to have prevented the September 11 attacks. Obviously, that's speculation. Obviously, no one could know. But I think what Rowley is pointing out is that the facile conclusion, nothing could have been done, nobody could have known, nothing that we're seeing could have made any difference, is deeply premature.
What she is suggesting is that it's just as wrong to rush to judgment about what was impossible as it is to rush to judgment about what could have been done. It also, of course, raises another question we'll be talking about in the course of this half hour, the question of whether or not you can hope to improve matters if all you do is consolidate control in the same, shall we call them, incompetent hands that led to this kind of neglect in the first place?
Well, to start off our discussion today, we have with us Michael Weisskopf, who co-wrote “Time” magazine's cover story, the one that just hit the newsstands. It's called “How The FBI Blew The Case,” referring to the Moussaoui case. And it goes into both the memo and a lot of the issues that are raised in it. Michael, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, “TIME”: Nice to be here.
KEYES: Good to have you with us. Now, from your pursuit of this story, one of the things that seems to come through crystal clear in Rowley's memo is a sense that we actually had the people in the field who were looking at things and reporting on things that might have made a difference, but that a lot of this did not come together because of blockages at the top, at the management level. Is that a fair characterization of what she's saying?
WEISSKOPF: That's right. This was an example of the field being more prescient and sensitive to potential terrorism than the central headquarters of the FBI.
KEYES: Now in the work that you were doing, did you come to a sense as you went over the materials and talked to people as to why there was this difference in approach between the field and the higher-ups?
WEISSKOPF: We have to emphasize here that we've only heard one side of this story. However, agent Rowley in her memo suggests that that the — or sort of echoes some of the reasoning.
Her superior did not think that there was probable cause, which is a kind of bar you've got to cross before you can get a search warrant to look into the laptop computer of Moussaoui and his personal possessions. As a result of it, she kept digging deeper and found some French intelligence which linked Moussaoui to international terrorists. And she passed that up the chain, and that still was not persuasive enough.
But finally, her superior was willing to take the next step and at least report to the legal department, which grants search warrants. And in the process, according to Rowley, he did not include in his report the full evidence she presented, so as to affect the outcome. This is why she says he apparently deliberately thwarted this effort to pursue Moussaoui.
KEYES: Now, what you have just described seems to be an illustration of a mentality that people have talked about. The FBI quite legitimately, I would have to say, gets preoccupied with catching criminals and bringing them to trial and making sure you haven't taken steps that would destroy your ability to get a conviction.
Now, that is perfectly appropriate in certain circumstances, but it seems to be an utterly wrong mindset when you're dealing with an effort to understand intelligence information aimed at trying to forestall or deal with a terrorist threat. Is that right?
WEISSKOPF: That's right. And let's remember the FBI cut its teeth on Bonnie and Clyde and Jack Dillinger. Over the years, it shifted, of course, into more sophisticated investigations. But still the culture of it is very much rooted in the kind of street police, to a large extent.
Louie Freeh, who proceeded Mueller in that job, didn't take advantage of modern technology, the most advanced technology, to break into the more difficult areas, so that they use very archaic computers, for instance. Freeh himself did not believe in e-mail.
KEYES: Well, looking at it though from the point of view of this mentality, one of the things — and we'll be talking about this I think a little bit later in the show in the course of the show — that has jumped out at me is that there does seem to be a disconnect between what's required for intelligence work in a preemptive and preventive fashion and what's required in order to pursue criminals and get the kind of prosecutions that put them behind bars.
If we go headlong down a road that pushes the FBI into giving priority to these intelligence matters, is that going to destroy its effectiveness as a law enforcement agency?
WEISSKOPF: Well, of course, what you just described is a form of law enforcement. What you're talking about, I guess, is domestic crime, whether it be organized crime...
KEYES: Well, no, I would differ a little bit...
WEISSKOPF: ... or bank robbery.
KEYES: Terrorism is war. War is not law enforcement. War is defeating the enemy, finding the enemy, eliminating the enemy. It's a very different mindset than law enforcement. And I guess what worries me is that the requirements of that mindset don't seem to be the same of the requirements of preparing a case that's going to stand up in court.
WEISSKOPF: Call it whatever you want, but the answer to your question is yes. There is limited manpower and resources at the FBI, and this will certainly divert those resources and manpower away from bank robberies and street crime, things of that nature.
KEYES: Do you think that they are going to be able to make this transition, given the fact that a lot of the same people whose mindset may have been responsible for the problems — remain in place and may be in charge of making the change?
WEISSKOPF: Well, we'll have to find out. Of course, these are capable people well intended, as well. However, this is more complicated than just a matter of shifting priorities. She describes — Rowley describes a climate of fear at the FBI, not unlike many high-bound bureaucracies filled with conservative agents who are watching their backside, very careful not to make mistakes for fear of suffering penalty. And it's made up of careerists, as she called it, people who are there just to punch their ticket for 18 months. They don't learn much on that job and they move on. In both cases, it frustrates, in her view, real thorough investigation.
KEYES: Michael, thank you. Appreciate your insight into these matters. Obviously, this is going to become a subject of both contention and great interest in the Congress and around the country. Thanks for the start that you all have made.
Next, we get to the heart of the matter with two retired FBI agents who will debate who is to blame for the bureau's crisis and what can be done to fix it.
Then, we'll look at the implications of the India/Pakistan conflict in the next half-hour. Is nuclear war imminent? Stay tuned. You're watching America's news channel, MSNBC.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: There's no question but that they have the capability of waging a nuclear war. And, needless to say, countries that are interested in that not happening think about those things.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: That's Donald Rumsfeld talking about the rising tension between India and Pakistan, two neighbors, bitter enemies with weapons pointing at each other. In the next half-hour, we'll discuss the possibility of nuclear war and how the once inconceivable is now in south Asia a real possibility. Also, a reminder, the chat room is cooking tonight. And you can join in right now at CHAT.MSNBC.COM.
Now, let's get back to our discussion of the FBI and the problems that have surfaced and the kinds of issues that are involved in an effort to try to reform the bureau in light of the requirements of a new situation, a new anti-terror priority.
Joining us to get to the heart of the matter, Rick Hahn, a retired FBI supervisor and MSNBC terrorism analyst; and Candice DeLong, a retired FBI special agent and author of the book “Special Agent: My Life on the Frontlines as a Woman in the FBI.” Both of you, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CANDICE DELONG, RETIRED FBI AGENT: Thank you.
KEYES: I want to share with you another quote from the Rowley memo where she said, quote: “A climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement decisions, FBI headquarters is staffed with a number of short-term careerists. There is unevenness in competency among headquarters personnel. The ranks of FBI management are filled with many who were failures as street agents.”
Now, those are a number of the comments that she made in the course of her memo, talking about the mindset and mentality the people in management at the FBI. Candice DeLong, in the face of the kind of challenge that is now out there and the priority on terrorism and things of that kind, and also the difference I was raising in the first section between the requirements of law enforcement aiming at a court case and the requirements of intelligence aiming at effective action to preempt terrorism, do you think that Rowley is correct and that the kind of culture and mindset at the FBI is really an obstacle to getting this job done effectively?
DELONG: Yes, I do. I think she is correct, and I think it — and the obstacles, Alan, aren't just at headquarters. We see this in the field offices as well. Not all of the supervisors are afflicted by this fear of making a decision that might hurt their career, but many of them are.
KEYES: Now, when you say a fear that would hurt their career, it's — what kind of criteria are they using to make judgments about that in terms of the kinds of things that they have come to feel in the course of their career are healthy and the kinds of things that are not healthy for their advancement?
DELONG: Convictions are healthy. Cases with no problems are healthy. Cases that — and Rick Hahn can speak to this. He worked a case for four years, cases that have problems come up that can cause a supervisor to think, gee, if I make this decision and it's wrong, that could hurt my upwardly movement in the FBI.
KEYES: Now, Rick, Candice has emphasized there, I think, cases and the focus on cases. I gathered both from the reading of the “Time” article, other things that have come forward that when they were looking at some of these reports, there really was a kind of case-oriented mindset.
But isn't that a problem in the context of intelligence work where at the end of the day, your aim is not to make a case but to stop or eliminate a terrorist asset?
RICK HAHN, RETIRED FBI SUPERVISOR: Well, in the case of terrorism, usually it's both. You not only want to stop the crime from occurring, but you also want to be able to prosecute them. And that's a difficult balance to strike.
In any case, what you do want to do is make sure that you're not violating the law or not overreaching in any way, shape or form. And, again, in the September 10 sort of mindset that we're in, where no one could believe that something as horrendous as September 11 could occur, I think there is a lot more reluctance to go with something like the Moussaoui case.
KEYES: Well, see, this is part of my problem though, Rick. Even in what you just said, I sense a problem. We declared a war on terrorism. We didn't declare law enforcement on terrorism. And war is different than law enforcement. A policeman acts under certain constraints to go out, capture the criminal so they can be brought whole, safe and healthy into a court of law where the law will deal with them.
A soldier goes out to eliminate the enemy. And that's a different mentality. And what I'm wondering about here is whether or not, even with all their talk of reform, we are really seeing and understanding that part of what is now required is an intelligence capability capable of a war-fighting mentality. Is that compatible with a law enforcement understanding?
HAHN: No, it is not. And I don't think you're going to see that inside this country, Alan, because of the protections that we have in this free society. That's the reason why someone like John Walker Lindh is charged formally with certain particular crimes as a U.S. citizen as opposed to being locked up at Guantanamo.
KEYES: Now, Candice, the problem does seem to be, if it's mentality as was described in the Rowley memo, a culture of fear and so forth, isn't that also then partly a personnel problem? I mean, are you just going to be able to wave a magic wand and change the mindset of people who have operated in a certain mold for 15 and 20 years?
DELONG: Well, I think that's correct, Alan. It is a problem of you're not going to be able to change your mindset. I think there's a lot wrong with FBI management that it's quite probable that Director Mueller is not even aware of.
I saw repeatedly in my 20 years in the FBI something that Colleen mentions in her memo, that an individual might be a manager promoted after being involved in something that was a questionable decision. I saw that happen more than once, and I saw the individual promoted to terrorism. That has to stop.
Again, another thing that the FBI does, is people are promoted — can put their hat in the ring to be a manager after only three years. That's ridiculous, I think. It takes a lot longer than that to learn how to work a case and how the FBI works. And another thing I think it's one of the real failings and possibly where these incompetent things come up is that the FBI doesn't seem to put a benefit on an agent being promoted that actually knows that violation. If an agent maybe has worked in the field of white-collar crime for 10 years and he or she wants to be a manager and they may put in for a desk, what it's called, be promoted to a supervisory desk that is in drugs or terrorism and they very well may be awarded that desk when they have absolutely no background in that field whatsoever. And I think that's a huge problem.
KEYES: Well, that doesn't seem to make any sense at all. But is part of what I understood you to say then was that some folks who were not doing a satisfactory job would be put into areas of lower priority, and that, in fact, counterterrorism was one of these areas? Is that what you said?
DELONG: What I'm saying is that I saw more than once in my 20 years on the job — the expression is screw up, go up, and the — if a manager screwed up, they would go up the ladder, but that would get them out of the area where they screwed up.
KEYES: Rick Hahn, is that a true observation? And was counterterrorism such a low priority that it absorbed some of this incompetence?
HAHN: Well, I disagree entirely with the characterization of counterterrorism that way. Certainly, the bureau is not immune to the Peter principle any more than any other organization, and certainly we do have people that are incompetent that do rise.
But I don't think that's representative of the majority of management. And I certainly know that it's not the case in the field of terrorism. Terrorism people have been doing proactive things for 20 years in the FBI. Twenty years ago, Candice and I were involved in a case where we penetrated an active terrorist safehouse and substituted their weapons and explosives. I mean, this stuff went on, and we went on to prosecute that case, I would add.
There's a whole culture of counterterrorism people, primarily based on the East Coast. But nonetheless, it's nationwide in the big offices, and it's not filled with your sad sacks of the FBI by any stretch of the imagination.
DELONG: Oh, but, Rick, you're talking about the field agents and I completely agree. And it was the field agents and the terrorism task force in New York City that stopped the bombing of the Holland and Lincoln Tunnel. It was...
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Go ahead. I'm sorry.
HAHN: I'm talking about the management as well. I mean, you know a lot of the top managers in terrorism. These are very competent people. And these are people, many of whom came up through the terrorism ranks through the exchanges you're well aware between New York, where they gained a great deal of experience in terrorism, and shuttling back and forth to D.C. But they've gone up in ranks. They've become SACs and supervisors of various levels at FBI headquarters.
DELONG: Well, perhaps you've seen some things that I haven't seen, and I've seen some things you haven't seen.
KEYES: Yes, you all do seem to have a fundamental difference of perspective here. But I have got to tell you at the moment, Rick, every time I hear somebody tell me how good somebody in this area of the government is, I get this serious problem, because I see the Twin Towers collapsing and I see a gaping hole in the major symbol of American security. This is not a good day. This is not great job performance.
I can't stand it that we're getting into a situation where the American people are supposed to lower the bar and accept the notion that September 11 was kind of an inevitable day at work for our national security establishment. If that's the case, then we ought to all of us roll over, because we won't just be playing dead. We'll be really dead.
Why should we accept this lack of accountability from the FBI or anybody else?
HAHN: Well, I think the FBI is in the throes of accountability for this in determining exactly what happened. And certainly the allegation made by Rowley to the effect that the FBI supervisor at headquarters may have watered down the affidavit or altered the affidavit in some way is a very serious allegation and should be looked at and that individual should, in fact, be disciplined if in fact he did that.
But aside from that, I think the FBI from the onset has recognized that they didn't connect the dots. They recognized that they did, in fact, have some intelligence that may have been indicative of this, and that they want to do a better job. And that's the whole reason behind the reorganization, behind the forming of the super squad.
KEYES: One last set of questions. Often in these matters, the pendulum swings one way and you get all the way over somewhere else and another problem is caused by that very fact. Are we going to see a development here of such enthusiasm, for the counterterrorism, intelligence kind of work that the law enforcement role of the FBI suffers and organized crime and other nasty folks who operate across state boundaries on a national and even international level, then find they have a freer hand?
Is the pendulum going to swing in such a way that we suffer when it comes to vital areas of law enforcement that obviously are going to continue to be a challenge, Rick?
HAHN: Well, I think certainly you're going to see a diminished emphasis on that certainly coming from the FBI. And it's a question of whether or not state and local agencies can pick it up or other agencies can pick up the slack.
KEYES: Well, see, I don't understand people when they talk this way though, Rick. The FBI came into existence in this country because when you're dealing with a criminal entities and operations and activities that cross state boundaries and jurisdiction, you've got to have people who can follow them in a coherent way. That's why the FBI exists.
That reality isn't going anywhere, is it? It's still going to be with us. How can state and local governments take over that function.
HAHN: The FBI plans to continue to have agents assigned to that. However, the number of man hours spent each year on that, those particular violations is going to be greatly diminished. And we have to prioritize things.
KEYES: Based on that though, see, because this is what I worry about. Are we going to see the pendulum swing so that a little while from now, we'll be dealing with terrorism and meanwhile have an upwelling of all kinds of nasty crimes on our streets and in our neighborhoods because we have lost an effective law enforcement role of the FBI?
DELONG: I don't think so, Alan.
HAHN: Well, the local...
KEYES: No. Candice, Go ahead.
DELONG: I don't think so, Alan. The FBI constantly, every field division, has their finger on the pulse of crime in the area that they are responsible for, state, local and of course federal. And so, it's not like we're going to put all our eggs in the terrorism basket and then suddenly be looking at a tremendous rise in street crime and gang crime and organized crime. We're always going to know what's going on there and hopefully managers of the individual field offices will allocate their personnel appropriately.
KEYES: Well, that would suggest though to me that maybe some of the formulations being used by folks outside the FBI, including people on Capitol Hill and so forth are a little bit exaggerated, because they're talking about the need for the FBI to focus on counterterrorism, revamp its culture so that it's intelligence and terrorism. I mean, the FBI needs to add to and strengthen that dimension of its work. But at the same time it has to maintain a balance with its law enforcement role, which isn't going to go away. Is that what I hear you both saying here?
DELONG: Yes.
KEYES: Candice? Rick?
HAHN: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. As you said, even the head of the International Association Chiefs of Police has said that the FBI cannot let go of those responsibilities to other crimes.
KEYES: Well, it's going to be an interesting road ahead, I think. And I think all of this has shaken people right to the core. Sometimes that actually produces a positive outcome in Washington. We'll just have to wait and see.
Thanks, Rick and Candice.
DELONG: You're welcome.
HAHN: You're welcome.
KEYES: Appreciate your being with us tonight.
Next, the standoff between India and Pakistan is heating up. Is nuclear war imminent between these two nuclear armed powers. Two journalists, one from an Indian newspaper, one from a leading Pakistani newspaper, face off next. You're watching America's news channel, MSNBC.
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KEYES: Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
Now, we live in an era when it seemed as if the shadow of potential nuclear holocaust had receded from the world, demise of the Soviet empire, retreat from the terrible confrontations of the Cold War period. But tonight, relations between two of the world's nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, are at a boiling point again, with India rejecting Pakistan's call for talks in their fight over Kashmir.
As MSNBC's Jim Miklaszewski reports, with both countries pointing nukes at each other and given the context of America's war on terror, this is much more than a regional dispute.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
JIM MIKLASZEWSKI, NBC CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): They were shots heard round the world, Pakistan test fires three ballistic missiles, raising new fears Pakistan and India are inching closer to nuclear war. The cost would be catastrophic.
New U.S. intelligence estimates predict 12 million people would be killed instantly. A U.S. Air Force study says 100 million could ultimately die. But the rising tensions could also blow apart the U.S. war on terrorism. Pentagon officials report Pakistan is preparing to withdraw many of its troops from the Afghan border to face off against India's forces.
VICTORIA CLARKE, PENTAGON SPOKESWOMAN: That's a concern for us because we need as much assistance as possible in guarding that very porous border.
MIKLASZEWSKI: That's where as many as 1,000 al Qaeda fighters, perhaps Osama bin Laden himself, are believed to be hiding. The U.S. is counting heavily on Pakistan to help track down those al Qaeda forces.
(on camera): But officials here report Pakistan is already so distracted by the standoff with India, their efforts to round up al Qaeda are temporarily dead.
Jim Miklaszewski, NBC News, the Pentagon.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
KEYES: Twelve million, possibly 100 million dead? These are numbers that's hard to get your mind around. There are already an estimated one million troops massed along the India/Pakistan border; 750,000 Indian troops and 250,000 or so Pakistani troops. One recent estimate suggests that India has 25 to 40 nuclear weapons in its arsenal and that Pakistan has 15 to 20.
Obviously an ability to do a tremendous amount of damage with results that boggle the mind and challenge our ability even to imagine the consequences. All in the context of our effort to track down al Qaeda, deal with the consequences of the war on terror, while Pakistan obviously is distracted from making that a priority. And at the same time, I have to say, we face the possibility that the government in Pakistan may in fact have taken advantage of this complex situation to stir the pot.
Joining us now from Washington to discuss this are Chidu Rajghatta, a foreign editor for the “Times of India.” Also with us, Nayyar Zaidi, chief Washington correspondent for “Daily Jang,” Pakistan's largest circulation daily newspaper. Welcome to MAKING SENSE, gentlemen. Appreciate your being with us tonight.
Let me start with you, Chidu, from the point of view of the Indians and how they are looking now at Musharraf over the weekend. He gave a speech saying he wanted talks, and yet I gathered that that has not been well received in India. Why not?
CHIDU RAJGHATTA, “TIMES OF INDIA”: Well, simply because he wants talks or else. And that's not a good message. Essentially, what he did in his speech was to say come out wagging the nuclear finger and say, I have nukes. Here I am conducting three tests, so you guys better talk to me or else. And that's not something the Indians received happily, and that's not something the world should receive happily because it sets a terrible precedent.
And tomorrow you could have anybody, you could have Saddam Hussein, you could have any of the usual suspects coming out and saying, we've got nukes, so we're going to hold the world to ransom. “Fortune” magazine called Pakistan “Problem-istan” and, in fact, were very prescient in suggesting that things were going terribly wrong with this country, and that that's actually now come to pass now. This is something scary for the rest of world.
KEYES: Now, Nayyar Zaidi, one of the questions that has been going through my mind continually as I watch this is a question of why now are we watching this come to a boiling point? The uncharitable might suggest that Musharraf has actually stirred this pot because of the existing situation and the feeling that somehow or another he could get something out of the situation, making use of American influence somehow, our unwillingness to see harm done that would distract from the war on terrorism. Do you think that this is emboldened him to take steps that have aggravated tension in the area?
NAYYAR ZAIDI, “DAILY JANG” NEWSPAPER: No. I disagree, because I think this thing has been going out — you know, with India and Pakistan and with Indian threats to attack Pakistan since 1990.
You will remember that the director of CIA, Robert Gates, had to rush to Pakistan and India in April 1990 when neither country had experimented with nuclear weapons. And I don't think that Mr. Musharraf is stirring the pot. Mr. Musharraf had committed when he came into power that he will reduce tensions and close down whatever training camps or jihadi camps there are.
I think India is taking advantage of the situation, and it is actually trying to distract the U.S./international effort to combat terrorism because Indians have always been allies of Russians. And who does it serve right now? The Russians. And I think if Pakistan is distracted from Afghanistan or helping the U.S., who benefits? The sponsors of terrorism benefit, I believe.
KEYES: The great problem I have though is I know that sometimes these things have long histories and so forth. But just focusing on the existing situation, wasn't the immediate problem here caused by extremist attacks that were directed against India? Did the Indians sponsor attacks against the Pakistanis?
ZAIDI: No. Let me explain to you. The attacks that happened Pakistan has disowned and Pakistan did not sponsor those attacks. But look at the convenient pattern. The first attack took place in Indian occupied Kashmir when President Clinton was in Delhi. Some 36 were massacred.
Now why would the Pakistanis massacred the six? If they had to massacre somebody, they would have massacred the Hindu pundits. The second attack took place when Mr. Joswonsing (ph) (UNINTELLIGIBLE) the state department, sitting with Mr. Colin Powell, and the Indian parliament is attacked. And that gives him ammunition for propaganda.
The third attack in Jammu happens when assistant secretary of state Christina Rocca is in New Delhi. I mean, why would Pakistanis would be so dumb if they were sponsoring these attacks to precisely do them at a point which will give ammunition and propaganda stuff to India? These attacks have not been sponsored by Pakistan, were not done with their consent or knowledge, and President Musharraf and his government have denied it.
I think these attacks probably are sponsored by somebody in India or some agency. I'm not accusing the government of India. But then these help India. And through these attacks, they are building the pretext of war. India has decided to attack Pakistan, and it's just going through the steps to find the justification. And you can't accuse Mr. Musharraf of that.
KEYES: Chidu Rajghatta, how do you respond to the idea that these attacks are actually engendered from the Indian side to provoke this crisis?
RAJGHATTA: Well, actually, when the camera wasn't on me, I was laughing into my coat sleeve because this is the kind of, you know, errant nonsense we have heard time and again. We heard it with 9/11, too. We didn't do it. It was the Mossad which did it. It was the CIA which did it. It was, you know, some American extremist.
This is the kind of nonsense which would just be laughed out of court. I mean, why would the Indians kill their own people? I mean, that's ridiculous and it's beneath my dignity to even talk about it. The fact of the matter is universally, everybody over the last week, starting with President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, the prime ministers of Japan, prime minister of Britain, have said that there is unremitting terrorist activity by the Pakistani army, by the Pakistani military regime against India and that should be stopped.
And instead of doing that, Musharraf comes out with his, you know, nuclear guns blazing in his speech yesterday and says, terrorism? What terrorism? Infiltration? What infiltration? I mean, somebody has got to tell this man the truth.
KEYES: Now do you think, Nayyar Zaidi, that again, I mean, I don't want to seem uncharitable here. And I know that America is trying to work with Pakistan, but that has also caused Musharraf some problems in terms of the perception of fundamentalists and other extremists that he's selling out.
Is it possible that he rattles the saber and causes this kind of difficulty in order — in a sense to prove his political manhood to those who are questioning his close cooperation with the United States?
ZAIDI: Once again, I disagree. I don't think General Musharraf is rattling sabers or nuclear sabers. He has said clearly in his speech that he would do whatever he can to satisfy the complaints. But he also has to address the Pakistani nation and reassure the people of Pakistan that if they are attacked, the Pakistani armed forces will fully defend Pakistan, including the use of nuclear weapons, which was the position of the United States and NATO.
KEYES: Why the reference to nuclear weapons though in this context?
ZAIDI: Well, because Pakistan is the smaller country. And, you know, you had a doctrine in NATO which said, you know, if the Russians attack western Europe, we are not going to sit there and fight tank by tank and soldier by soldier. That was the NATO doctrine. So the smaller countries always have to say, gee, if you attack me, then I'm going to use all the weapons at my disposal. But I do not think that leaders of India and Pakistan will be that irresponsible.
KEYES: We will see. I am going to have to stop here, gentleman. Thank you both for coming with us tonight. We — oh, I am sorry. We will in fact be coming back with our guests. I forgot that. And we will continue our discussion of the Indo-Pakistan situation and whether on not in fact this is going to undermine America's ability to pursue the war on terror.
Later we'll have my outrage of the day. We're going to look at some shocking X-rays from suicide bombings in Israel.
You're watching America's news channel, MSNBC.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: See, I was right, we are back with Chidu Rajghatta, foreign editor of the “Times of India,” and Nayyar Zaidi, chief Washington correspondent for the “Jang.”
And we're talking, of course, about the intensifying confrontation between India and Pakistan — two nuclear armed powers in the South Asia region — looming over them, the possibility of a nuclear exchange that could claim 12 million lives, as many as 100 million, according to some estimates.
Seems unimaginable. Chidu Rajghatta, it does seem unimaginable to most Americans, both in terms of the huge numbers that would be involved in such an exchange. Why would India want to risk that kind of a war at this juncture?
RAJGHATTA: Alan, India is not the country which is risking a nuclear war. Just remember, the fundamental point here is that India has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, which means India is not going to start a nuclear war. It's stated — it's a stated policy. So there's only one country which can start a nuclear war, and the Indian policy is one of retaliation.
So, like Nayyar Zaidi said, because they are a smaller country, they think that when they're getting licked, pull out the nukes. Yes, it's not going to be pretty, but, hey, India is not going to start this.
ZAIDI: Can I...
KEYES: Yes, go ahead.
ZAIDI: One thing I want to address here is that we are talking like India and Pakistan will start the war with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons will be used within 24 or 48 hours. That's not going to happen. I think it will start with a limited war and it might escalate on the international borders.
But the international community, in my opinion, will have plenty of time to manage this crisis and make sure that it does not escalate into a nuclear war. But like Rajghatta cited the statements of United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, and if all these nations continue to back Indian positions, then they are inviting war.
RAJGHATTA: I hope that — I mean, we don't go by this premise that, all right, let's start a limited war and somebody will step in. I think we shouldn't even go down this...
ZAIDI: No, India has stated that they had are going to attack Pakistan and go for a decisive victory. It is not General Musharraf, it is Prime Minister Vajpayee...
RAJGHATTA: The fact of the matter is for 20 years, Pakistan has already been fighting a war against India. It's a proxy war, and it's very important to note that Nayyar mentioned the year 1990. That's a very important year for two reasons. One is, that was the year when Pakistan...
ZAIDI: Well, how do you calculate 20 years? That goes through 1982. It's 1989.
RAJGHATTA: When Pakistan went...
ZAIDI: 1982, there was no activity in Kashmir.
RAJGHATTA: Nayyar, let me finish.
ZAIDI: Yes.
RAJGHATTA: 1989, '90 was the years that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan...
ZAIDI: That's 13 years.
RAJGHATTA: And there was this large freelance mujahedeen which was usefully employed in Kashmir, and that was also the time the Pakistanis went covertly nuclear. That's when the whole trouble in Kashmir began, and for all these — for the entire '90s decade, Pakistan has used this nuclear power to foment terrorism in Pakistan. That's a universally acknowledged fact.
ZAIDI: But...
RAJGHATTA: Over the past week, every world leader has accused Pakistan of terrorism. Every world leader has asked Musharraf: back down. Withdraw. Stop the infiltration.
KEYES: Gentlemen, gentlemen, I have to interrupt here, because this time we really are out of time. I do want to leave you both with one thought, possibly a little bit prejudicial from the point of view of Pakistan.
But my question, as I listened to your debate about why this is occurring now and even, Nayyar Zaidi, what you were saying about somebody stepping in, I hope that Musharraf is not miscalculating here in the belief that he can stir this pot, cause some trouble, get something he wants out of this situation because of the situation America is in, because I think he's pushing the region in an extremely dangerous direction and that's going to prove to be a very dangerous miscalculation that will hurt the region and the overall effort we all should have against terror very badly.
I want to thank you both for joining us today. Really appreciate it.
Next, my outrage of the day, where we'll take a look at some of the less focused on but very real consequences of these terrible suicide bombings.
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KEYES: As the end of Israel's major action on the West Bank, we have seen a stepping up of suicide bombs. Now we should know that these bombs are packed with nails, screws, and bolts to maximize injurious effects. Dr. Michael L. Messing of Chicago, Illinois was in Israel working with the victims of suicide bombers.
He sent us these X-rays of the victims. You can see that this is intended to inflict even life with cruelty. That's my sense of it. Thanks. “THE NEWS WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS” is up next. See you tomorrow.