MSNBC show
Alan Keyes is Making Sense
Alan KeyesMarch 20, 2002
ALAN KEYES, MSNBC HOST: Welcome to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
Well, we're obviously in a situation where despite the president's efforts of special envoy General Zinni whose talks with Palestinians and Israelis today concluded once again inconclusively, today — they're going to meet again later in the week, but the violence has not concluded.
A suicide bombing left seven Israelis, including four soldiers, dead when an Islamic militant boarded a bus and detonated explosives strapped to his body. There were apparently dozens of injuries.
I can understand perfectly well that folks looking at this situation, seeing all the death, the violence mounting up — I think our hearts are broken. They go out to people on both sides who are suffering in this terrible crisis, and it leads folks to ask themselves again and again — intelligent people — what's the remedy? What can we do? What will help?
Well, I think that there was a piece in “The New York Times” today by columnist Tom Friedman that's probably the result of that kind of well-intentioned yearning for something to do that would help these folks find a way to peace. I have to tell you, though, that reading over the column and the ideas in it, I'm not at all sure that Tom Friedman thought this through before he put it forward.
I used to find when I was working in the State Department that sometimes wishful thinking, hoping, a strong desire to do something positive can actually get in the way of clear thinking. And yet it's only clear thinking that will make a positive contribution to real peace in the world. And so you have an obligation sometimes to put aside your yearnings for the sake of clarity.
I don't think Tom Friedman did that today. He put forward some ideas that the heart of which is that the United States should put our military forces into a position that would essentially have them in the middle between Israel and the Palestinians. The Israelis would withdraw from the occupied territories on Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians would be responsible for internal security in those areas, but the borders would be controlled by a U.S./Palestinian security force.
The Temple Mount, considered one of the most sensitive areas of Jerusalem, would be protected by U.S. troops with Palestinians having internal control of the mosques and Israel having control over their side, as he puts it.
I have to tell you, knowing some of the complexities in the region, I think that this idea — and the column actually began by saying, “Well, you all need to sit down while I tell you this.”
Actually, folks didn't need to sit down. They just needed to make sure they didn't turn their thinking off, which I think Mr. Friedman may have done while his heart was pounding with the beauties of this idea because I don't think he thought it through very clearly.
But we're going to try to do that tonight on this program, to do it in the way one has to do it, not just say, “Well, this is an idea. We could go and” — no, you've got to think about what will the consequences be. What will the actors do? How will they respond? What would our position end up being if we, in fact, went forward with an idea like this?
To help us out in this thinking, we have up front tonight, Frank Gaffney, the president of the Center for Security Policy. And also with us, Jonathan Broder, a longtime Middle East affairs correspondent who's an analyst for msnbc.com.
Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
JONATHAN BRODER, MSNBC.COM ANALYST: Thank you. Nice to be back.
KEYES: Now, Jonathan Broder, I want to start with you tonight because I need some help here. I read that — the Friedman piece, and to be quite frank about it, my reaction was, to say the least, highly unfavorable. I just thought this was somebody who hadn't done — put enough thought into this idea.
Maybe if he had put the column aside for a day or two, he would have thought better of it. I don't know. But I don't think he thought at all about what the consequences would be, and yet I'm told that you look at the piece and think it has some merit. Why do you think this would be a good idea?
BRODER: Well, I think it's an interesting idea.
For one, you have to consider what America's larger interests in the region are. Right now, the biggest threat to U.S. security is, I think, Saddam Hussein and the threat of the development of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States and the Bush administration have declared that they are going to take care of Saddam Hussein, but in order to do this, it needs allies and the help of our Arab allies in the region. The Arabs have made it very, very clear that they will not help the United States until the United States does something about the fighting between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
All other ideas that have been tried to get the Israelis and the Palestinians to make peace have failed, and, at this point, I think the United States, which up until now — the Bush administration, which up until now had been willing to sort of stand aside and let the two sides go at each other — realizes that, in order to accomplish its own goals in the region and to watch out after its own interests, needs to address this issue, and to put troops on the ground, I think, between the Israelis and the Palestinians would give the Israelis a sense of security and would also give the Palestinians a sense of security.
So I think it's an idea that, while it's out of the box and a bold idea, is worth looking into.
KEYES: Well, one further thought, though, because the one big problem I have with it — he keeps talking about peacekeeping and so forth, but, at the moment, there's no peace to keep.
You put your forces in between two sides that are shooting at each other, and what makes you think two things won't happen — one, that one side or the other will shoot at you, two, that you will have to shoot back — so that, instead of being a country going into the region trying to talk to both sides, we would be in a position where we might end up killing both sides.
BRODER: I think...
KEYES: And that's going to create goodwill for us? I don't understand it.
BRODER: I think the assumption is that once the Israelis withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza that the friction and the point of contact between them and the reason for the fighting will have gone away, and the Israelis will withdraw behind their lines, the Palestinians will be behind their lines, the — without the Israelis and the Palestinians in each others faces, an American peacekeeping force between them would have a much easier task.
KEYES: Well, Jonathan, before I say anything to that, I'm going to give Frank Gaffney here a chance because I have a feeling, Frank, that if I just let you do it, you're going to say in response to that what's on my mind. But, anyway, we will see.
Looking at this proposal, Frank, in terms of putting U.S. forces into this situation, do you think this is a good idea? What will happen?
FRANK GAFFNEY, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY: I don't think it's a good idea, Alan. I think — when Tom Friedman started off by saying, “Sit down,” I think somebody should have said to him, “Tom, lie down.”
(LAUGHTER)
GAFFNEY: This requires psychoanalysis. There's a sort of post-traumatic shock syndrome going on, I think.
Tom has invested a career in promoting the peace process. The notion that today one can believe that there is a peace process, let alone that it can be improved, is really the stuff of fantasy, and I think Tom has had a big run this week or this month, I should say, with the so-called Abdullah plan being a warmed-over version of the Friedman plan whereby, much as Jonathan just said, it's theorized the Arabs would recognize and, in fact, normalize relations with the Israelis if the Israelis gave back the so-called occupied territory, that is to say, we're told, the areas were captured in the 1967 war and then fought over again in 1973.
Alan, I don't think I have shown this to you, but I think it's really instructive. This is a map that's appeared on the Palestinian Authority Web site. And when we keep talking about what it is the Palestinians want, what it is that they will settle for, what it is that, if only they got it back, they would leave Israel alone, I keep coming back to this because it seems as though at least what Arafat is saying to his own people. if not in English to the Tom Friedmans of the world, certainly to his own people symbolically as in this map and with his rhetoric is, “We want the occupied territories back, all right. But the occupied territories aren't just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It's all of pre-1967 Israel as well,” and putting the United States in the middle of that would be a formula for disaster.
KEYES: Let me go back to Jonathan.
On that point, Jonathan, because as you were talking about it — the idea that, if the Israelis withdraw, that's going to end the reason the Palestinians are attacking them and so forth — that seems to pretty well accept lock, stock, and barrel the Palestinian understanding of why this violence is occurring.
I have to tell you that I look back at the events, even of the last several months, and it doesn't seem to track with the truth insofar as certain elements on the Palestinian side, even when efforts were being made to turn over control to the Palestinians, didn't buy that, kept attacking the Israelis, and they then responded.
Is Mr. Friedman simply acting like those events never took place and that the Palestinians didn't appear even when steps were being taken to turn over control of the West Bank, to want to take steps against Israel to pursue their larger political agenda, the one Frank is talking about?
If that's the case, they won't stop just because Americans are there, and our forces will end up being shot at. If that possibility emerges, would you justify rules of engagement that has our troops killing Palestinians?
BRODER: Look, the Palestinian population is divided. There are extremists, but there are a lot of people, particularly in the Palestinian Authority, that want the West Bank and Gaza and do not want...
KEYES: Well, Jonathan — Jonathan, when you think through a policy like this — let me stop you right there.
BRODER: Yeah.
KEYES: You have a responsibility — I used to do this on policy planning in the State Department. You have a responsibility to think through all of the possibilities and probabilities.
The very fact that extremists exist and that they may or may not be kept under control could mean that there would be continued efforts to assault Israel and that they would then have to go through American forces to do that.
If they were determined to do that, as they have been when Israeli forces were there and even as they have been when Arafat's Palestinian police forces were supposed to be there, would you authorize our forces to take action and kill these Palestinian extremists?
BRODER: Yes. That would be the whole purpose of a peacekeeping...
KEYES: All right. Step number one, that means we're shooting Palestinians, and I don't think the Palestinians would react well to that. If it turned out that the interposition of our forces didn't stop attacks against Israel and the Israelis then felt they were vulnerable and wanted to move more effectively than we were moving in their own interest, would we block them and risk fighting Israelis in that circumstance?
BRODER: Look, I think that any kind of arrangement where you put Palestinian — where you put American troops as peacekeepers into that region would have to be preceded by understandings with the Israelis and the Palestinians about the rules of engagement.
But the main point here is that there would be an Israeli withdrawal from the territories, which would remove the main point of friction that causes fighting between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
KEYES: I understand that, but — Frank, it's — one last word for you, I think, because we're coming down to the wire here. I am listening to this, and it just seems to me that there is an unwillingness to take account of hard realities about the forces on the Palestinian side and about the Israeli reactions. Aren't we very likely to get caught in the crossfire here?
GAFFNEY: I think so, Alan. I think that fundamental reality is this wouldn't end the friction. If people on the Palestinian side — extremists and Arafat and others they represent — want the liberation of all of so-called Palestine, it isn't going to be the end of it.
American monitors or peacekeepers or whatever you call them are going to be special targets for attack. U.S. interests will suffer, and I'm afraid that our friends, our allies in Israel in a joint war on terrorism will be put in mortal peril. This is a formula for disaster.
KEYES: Well...
BRODER: Alan, can I just interject...
KEYES: One last word very quickly. Very quickly.
BRODER: I think we have to look about — look at the larger American interests that are at stake and are in danger here if we don't do something in the — between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
KEYES: Well, Jonathan, the one last word I would say to that, though — and I really want to thank both of you for being with me tonight. This is kind of interesting. I think it's one of those ideas that's so bad that it's worth talking about.
But leave that aside, I get the feeling, Jonathan, that we're in a situation we want to do good, and since we don't have any good ideas, we're sort of throwing a bad one on the table to see if it will float, but that really isn't the best way to make policy, I don't think, and...
BRODER: And subordinating Israel's security to our larger interests is a formula again for their interests as well as ours being suffered.
KEYES: Frank, I won't cede the point, though, that this plan would be in our larger interests.
We're going to get into that further because, in our next segment, we'll get to the heart of the matter. We're going to have a panel of folks coming together to continue the discussion that we have set the stage for with the exchange between Frank and Jonathan. Should we, in fact, be putting our forces in the middle?
And we'll talk about these questions. First of all, will U.S. military presence end the fighting? If not, would the U.S. end up fighting with both sides? Would this kind of a step strengthen our role as an honest broker, somebody able to talk to both sides and possibly bring them to a negotiated settlement? We'll be talking about those questions.
Plus, we'll continue our open phone line segment. Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA with whatever is on your mind.
You're watching MSNBC, the best news on cable.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL: A significant number of individuals on the list could neither be verified as having left the country, nor could they be located within the country.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: That's Attorney General John Ashcroft today on those voluntary interviews he was seeking with foreign nationals. He's looking for 3,000 or more of mostly Arab descent.
In our next half-hour, we're going to debate whether or not what he is seeking is going to offend people because of racial profiling. We're also going to ask whether anything effective is being done to keep better track of foreigners in the United States.
Also, a reminder that the chat room is humming tonight. Beeker says, “America should take care of America and avoid foreign entanglements.” You, too, can join right in now at chat.msnbc.com.
First, though, we're going to continue to try to get to the heart of the matter talking about Tom Friedman's column about the possibility of putting in U.S. forces, U.S. troops in between the Palestinians and the Israelis to keep the two sides apart, to try to enforce some kind of a truce or a negotiated settlement, and whether that would, in fact, end the fighting, contribute to an environment in which constructive negotiations could take place.
Joining us now to try to get to the heart of this matter, David Silverstein, deputy director for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, an anti-terrorism organization formed after 9/11 in response to the attacks on the United States.
Also with us, Arnold DeBorchgrave, senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and editor in chief at “The Washington Times” and United Press International, and Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School for Government, former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, and he's author of the new book “The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Super Power Can't Go It Alone.”
Welcome to MAKING SENSE, gentlemen.
I think a number of issues are raised by this kind of — well, I guess I charitably call it an intriguing idea that has been put forward, but I think I want to start with Arnold DeBorchgrave, asking whether you see some merit, some soundness in this proposal. I've been honest. I'm kind of very skeptical in looking at what the consequences might be, but do you think there's some sense to be made about this idea of putting U.S. troops in the middle there?
ARNOLD DEBORCHGRAVE, “THE WASHINGTON TIMES”: Alan, that's a very interesting trial balloon, but I'm afraid it's going to remain tethered to the ground. We forget that Arab extremists, Palestinian extremists consider Americans synonymous with Israelis, and any troops put there will be seen by the crazies as there to protect the Israelis, not to protect the Palestinians, and, eventually, they will become fair game.
KEYES: Do you think then that they would, as the Israelis troops have often been, then be targeted precisely in order to provoke some kind of a response that would discredit us?
DEBORCHGRAVE: That's precisely what I would see coming down the pike. Don't forget that the Palestinians on the extreme side, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are not going to be satisfied with a U.S. military presence separating the two sides. That's when they will start taking the Americans as targets as well as the Israelis.
KEYES: Let me go to Joseph Nye because I think one of the ideas or concerns that was put forward by Jonathan Broader had to do with the fact that in order to pursue our anti-terrorism policy, to get help and cooperation against Iraq, we have to do something that is going to help establish some cooperation with the Arab countries. I think that may be, in fact, one of the purported objectives of the Friedman approach, but do you think that it would contribute to that result or not?
JOSEPH NYE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: I wouldn't put troops — American troops in the position that you described. I would have George Tenet go back and actually use CIA people to work with members of the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis to work out some of the cease-fire on the scene that General Zinni is now trying to put in place.
We have a strong national interest in getting a peace process going again, and I think we're not going to be able to move on Iraq, for example, until we've done something about the issue of Israel and Palestinian.
So I wouldn't put American troops in the middle. I certainly would put George Tenet in the middle.
KEYES: So that would be aimed at trying to help to get to a position where there was trustworthy and reliable both intelligence and understanding of the factual situation so you don't get into this kind of “Who shot John?” situation between the two both sides?
NYE: Right. Right. In fact, a friend of mine in the Israeli government said that the best chance they had of dealing with terrorism was before the second intifada when they actually were working with the Palestinian Authority.
Nobody knows who the bad guys are and has a better fix on them than the people on the scene, and there was a lot less terrorism, there was a lot more ability to deal with it when you had this kind of cooperation.
So what we need to be doing is getting into the business of putting the Israelis and the Palestinians on the ground together to solve this problem, not putting American troops in between them.
KEYES: David Silverstein, what's your sense of this before we go a little further? Do you think that putting American troops in the middle would contribute to or derogate from the prospects that we get some kind of more peaceful prospects in that region?
DAVID SILVERSTEIN, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES: I have to tell you that I think it's a tremendous mistake to suggest that American troops caught in the middle in a crossfire, if you will, between Arab terrorists on the one side and Israeli soldiers on the other would do anything but suffer horrendous losses.
And I have to say that even if it was only a limited deployment, let's say CIA officers, that would be a mistake, too, because if we've learned anything about the Middle East in the past few years, past two decades, in fact, we know that when you put anybody, any American in the Wild, Wild West that exists in the Middle East, he's going to have a target on his forehead.
That's an unfortunate reality. We've got lots of brave men and women in the CIA and other departments that are over there, but if you identify them and you invite them to work with extremists, they're going to be targeted. It's a sad fact.
DEBORCHGRAVE: Alan, let's not forget, too, that the ultimate objective of the Palestinians is an independent state, a viable independent state, on the West Bank and in Gaza, which would, of course, entail dismantling the Israeli settlements, about 200,000 settlers in about 150 settlements. I don't see that coming any day soon, and until that is guaranteed to the Palestinians, I don't see the fighting stopping under any circumstances.
KEYES: But wouldn't that very fact that you refer to also mean that if we put U.S. troops in there — one of the things that worries me is the possibility that we would have some reaction from extremists on both sides and that, in fact, Americans would become targets for some Israeli elements as well if we were moving in directions that blocked an Israeli ability, ay, to respond to Palestinian attacks. Wouldn't that for the first time be — put us in a position where we might be at daggers drawn with Israel?
DEBORCHGRAVE: I don't really see that happening. I can't see the Israelis under any circumstances firing against American troops, and — but I can see the extremist Palestinians doing just that, and as I said earlier, because they see us as being synonymous with the Israelis. Everywhere you go in South Asia today, throughout the Middle East — I've done that recently — Israel and the United States are synonymous among the hate mongers.
SILVERSTEIN: You know — could I butt in for just a second?
KEYES: Sure.
SILVERSTEIN: Mr. DeBorchgrave has a terrific statement there. The fact of the matter is that there isn't a day that goes by in the West Bank and Gaza when our President George Bush isn't burned in effigy by radical Palestinian terrorists or our flag is burned on a daily basis. In fact, Palestinian students overseas in Europe and elsewhere routinely gather to burn the American and the Israeli flags and to taunt the Americans perhaps at the embassy, perhaps elsewhere.
It's a terrible mistake, and putting our troop there would only put them in harm's way, and there — and more importantly — let me make one more point. More importantly, it undermines what America's all about. We are the shining beacon of democracy, we are an example to the world, and when we put our troops into a fellow democracy on some half — who knows what kind of plan — then we are undermining that fellow democracy. It sets a terrible example.
KEYES: Now if I could go back to Joseph Nye for a second because some of the issues that have been raised do seem to apply to a certain extent even to the idea of putting folks in to help with intelligence and things of this kind. Doesn't that assume that there's going to be a certain level of — What shall we call it? — good will on the part, say, of the Palestinians? Do you think that Yasser Arafat, others around him have the ability to restrain or influence the extremists who might target Americans even in that situation?
NYE: We are going to have to get some sort of political settlement between Arafat and Sharon to get a framework where it makes sense to have CIA people working on the ground with people from the Palestinian Authority and from the Israeli government.
Essentially, we did have a time when that worked. If you look at the period before September a year and a half ago, we actually were doing that, and it worked. So you can't just stick to the CIA officials there now and expect them to be anything other than targets.
But if you — if the administration continues, as it has been doing through General Zinni, to put pressure on both sides to get a cease-fire and it's in their political interest to do so, then you can begin the plan that I'm describing.
KEYES: One of the...
DEBORCHGRAVE: Alan...
KEYES: Oh, go ahead.
DEBORCHGRAVE: Alan, let's not forget the imperial overreach syndrome that is slowly moving onto the geopolitical radar screen with troops in Georgia and in the Philippines, and, of course, Afghanistan isn't finished, and preparing for a war against Iraq and also in Colombia now.
We've decided that we can go in and help the government troops against FARC. That's no longer limited to a drug-eradication program. It seems to me that we're reaching a point where the pendulum will begin swinging in the other direction, that we have overreached.
SILVERSTEIN: Alan, if I could comment on what Mr. Nye said earlier, he's put his finger on it. You need a political settlement first before you can envision anything that has to do with American troops, even though — even in that situation, even in a situation of peace, it's a bad idea.
But you've got to ask yourself, “How do we get to a political settlement?” We certainly can't do it with Mr. Arafat. Bill Clinton embarrassed himself bending over backwards at Camp David in August of 2000 trying making sure Arafat got everything he wanted, and it was rejected out of hand.
And we have to ask ourselves, since Arafat's army, Fatah, Al-Aqsa Brigades have been added to the State Department's list of terrorists, what does that tell us? Is Arafat a partner for peace, or is he just another petty tyrant who's about to have a state awarded to him? I think it says an awful lot.
DEBORCHGRAVE: I would say that more to the point is what Sharon said recently about him, that he's irrelevant, and I think a lot of people now are waiting for the end of Arafat's career and see what — and wait and see what happens to — as his replacement. There's a lot of speculation already about the coming successors to Arafat.
SILVERSTEIN: You know, it's a great point you've raised, but I've got to tell you that the coming successors are no better than Arafat himself. Let's take a look at them.
It's Jabril Rajoub, who's the security director in the West Bank. It's Mohammad Dahlan, who runs things in the Gaza Strip. These aren't ordinary guys. These aren't cops on the beat. These aren't chiefs of police. These are terrorists, murderers.
And, in fact, Jabril Rajoub just bragged openly in the press that he helped to plan Sharon's attempted assassination in 1992...
DEBORCHGRAVE: I never suggested...
SILVERSTEIN: ... and...
DEBORCHGRAVE: I never suggested that his successors would be moderate types, not at all.
SILVERSTEIN: Sure.
DEBORCHGRAVE: Quite the contrary.
KEYES: Well — but it definitely is...
Go ahead, Mr...
NYE: No, I just wanted to say that, you know, Sharon made a major effort to make Arafat irrelevant. The point is it failed. One need not defend Arafat to see that, if you want a political settlement, you're going to have to work with him.
KEYES: Well, see — but I want to raise a question, and I'm not sure we'll have time to discuss it, but I think it might be worth putting out there so you all can think about it and the audience as well because — every time I hear this discussion of Arafat, should he be there or should he not be there, it occurs to me that the Israelis have one advantage over the Palestinian people, and that is if they think Ariel Sharon isn't doing well enough, they have a mechanism to replace him, to put somebody else in place who has been put there by a legitimate mandate, elections and so forth and so on.
Are we thinking enough about the fact that if we really are serious about some kind of Palestinian political entity, we have got to work with the Arab-Palestinian side to develop a constitutional framework for the alestinian people that will free them from what is, I think, the albatross of leadership that they can't change because they have no legitimate mechanism for doing so?
DEBORCHGRAVE: Let's not forget that half the population is less than 20 years old among the Palestinians, and many of them look at Israel as having a short — historically speaking, a short shelf life, and the demographics will eventually prevail, and then they will have weapons of mass destruction to boot.
SILVERSTEIN: Alan, what we really need to think about is democracy in the Middle East right across the entire segment of that — of the world. There's no democracy in Saudi Arabia. There's no democracy in Syria. There's no democracy in Iraq, Iran, and so on, and there certainly is no democracy in the Palestinian Authority, and that's what we have to think about.
KEYES: We have come to the end of our time. Thank you all for a very fascinating and, I think, substantive contribution here. I would leave you with one last thought, though. That element of democracy is sometimes thought of by people as a goal in this situation.
What I'm suggesting is that on the Arab side, it might be one of the important instrumental elements. We always ask about how we get leadership and so forth and so on. Well, one way to get leadership is to develop responsible mechanisms amongst the people to choose their own leaders in a way that would then correspond to the kind of responsibility they bear in some kind of state entity. I think we need to think more about that, Constitutional issue first.
Next, John Ashcroft says he can't find over 1,000 illegal aliens, mostly those of Arab descent. What's going on? We'll get into it right after this.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
After the 9/11 attacks, the Justice Department came up with a list of 5,000 men who had entered the United States on non-immigrant visas and had passports from countries where Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network has been present or active. Officials initially asked the men to come forward voluntarily for questioning. They hoped that some light would be shed on the attacks. Today, Attorney General John Ashcroft was out there announcing the progress so far.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL: In total, approximately one half of the foreign nationals on the list were located and interviewed. The anti-terrorist task forces did a superb job of finding the individuals we sought, but candidly, their best efforts could not overcome the serious flaws that exist in our ability to locate visitors to our country. That's our current ability. We're seeking to improve that dramatically. A significant number of individuals on the list could neither be verified as having left the country, nor could they be located within the country.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now this means that the justice department report shows that almost — out of 4,800 foreigners, federal officials simply couldn't find 1,097 men, who recently came to the United States from terrorist-sponsoring nations.
This raises some disturbing questions for us. I mean, why aren't we more effective at keeping track of visitors in our country who come from foreign countries? Why are we moving to make it even easier for some of these folks to continue to stay here, to wander around doing whatever they please without an effective ability to keep track of what's going on?
I think that this is a critically important element of how we deal with the possibility of a terrorist threat on the home front. And I don't think we have to apologize to people either for trying to tighten up our security and help to keep track of foreign visitors who come to America. We are not saying anything disparaging about the good folks, but we have a right to try to keep better tabs on people so that we can respond to the bad ones.
Joining us now to debate what we should do about this, Gene AbiNader, the managing director of the Arab-American Institute; and Dan Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, or FAIR, an organization against mass immigration into the United States. Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
Let me go to Jean AbiNader first. What do you think are the effective ways to deal with this problem and what kind of concerns do you think it raises, for instance, in the Arab-American community?
JEAN ABINADER, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE: Well, those are really apples and oranges because the overall issue of immigration reform and the reform of the INS which was obviously spotlighted yesterday is a very different issue with the impact on the Arab-American community, which is a result of the events of 9/11.
The Arab-American community, if you look at the actual numbers, is very small in terms of overall proportion of people who, for example, have overstayed their visas or who have been issued deportation orders. So what's happening to us as a result of political efforts by the administration, particularly to the attorney general, to create some sense of momentum, because so far they haven't been able to come up with anything concrete based on the previous activities.
But that's only a very different issue from what we want to do in terms of immigration reform. And I think we shouldn't mix those two.
KEYES: But see, there are two separate questions. Immigration reform is one thing. And it is an element, I think, of the issue that I am raising. But one of the first things that concerns me is I think we need to have a system that allows us to keep pretty close track of what foreign visitors are doing in America, where they're going, so that if need be, we would be able to pinpoint their location and to deal with them one way or another, whatever might be the case...
ABINADER: I don't think you're going to have...
KEYES: ... while they are here. Why shouldn't we be able to do that?
ABINADER: I don't think you're going have — I don't think you're going to have a lot of opposition to that in this country. I think the real question becomes when do those measures become intrusive or become prohibitive in terms of people feeling like they are on parole when they come into this country instead of on vacation.
So I think everybody wants more security. The question is how do we do it in such a way, using technology, that what we're able to do makes it wonderful for visitors to be here, but at the same time, makes us feel that we are doing something in terms of the security this country needs.
KEYES: Dan Stein, how do you see this problem, in the context of the concerns we have, obviously, with security, but also the larger question of exactly what we do in order to make sure that we are kind of keeping tabs on the visitors who come to America so that we can get in touch with them when we need to?
DAN STEIN, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM: I'm glad to be here, Alan. Well, you know, the obvious question is: Where is the other half? How come the attorney general couldn't find the other half? We support what is clearly the right thing to do.
Frankly, the Department of Justice has really no alternative based on the security threats involved. I think they have a duty to the American people and the public safety to try to make sure they know who has come into the country from certain countries and what they're doing here. And in the underlying foundational question, I think everybody wants to know is, what are we going to do to fix the mess at the INS?
KEYES: Do you think that the proposals that have been laid on the table in terms of merging the INS and the Customs folks and the folks who are guarding the border, that that kind of consolidation is going to make things more effective, or will we create a large bureaucracy that would be more unwielding even than the INS?
STEIN: Alan, we have been talking about an integrated border management agency since the Nixon administration, and it always bogs down on bureaucratic inertia and parochial interests in Congress. If George Bush and Tom Ridge are going to get something like this done — and it does need to be done, for sure — they're going to have to really be — persevere over the special interests that always make it so difficult.
You need to have an integrated border management function that's in charge of the customs, immigration enforcement, gives priority to effective border controls. People don't have a right to come into this country if they're not citizens unless they can affirmatively demonstrate they have a right to be here. And people don't have a right to stay in this country and not show up for school or get flight training when they are not authorized, irrespective of what the federal law authorizes.
But more important than integrated border management is an integrated state, federal and local system so that our drivers license system and our other state document structures work seamlessly with the federal government to ensure that a person who overstays the visa is identified and gotten out of the country.
ABINADER: And my point, Alan, is that has nothing to do with September 11. I think this is a larger question, and that's the way it should be handled. Whether it's student visas — which — look at student visas as a very good example. We have over 170,000 foreign students in this country, and yet you have some states like Tennessee saying, well, we think we are going to pass legislation and make those students check in every week or every month with their local police officials. That's not coming here to learn about American democracy, that's coming here to be on parole. So we have to be very careful about what we do in this case.
KEYES: Meaning no particular offense, having been part of the work of the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) for some years when I was in the foreign service, in a certain sense, when visitors come to America, they are on parole. That is quite the lateral meaning of the whole system of passports and visas that govern the exchange of visitors in international relations. You are literally on parole, and the passport was precisely the sign that that parole had been given, and that in a certain sense your government was standing behind you to say you were who you say you are, and so forth, and so on.
ABINADER: How would you feel, Alan, if you were...
KEYES: Let me finish.
ABINADER: OK.
KEYES: And don't bring up other countries. We are treated that way in other countries. In France, in other parts of Europe, in places where when you go to a hotel, you turn your passport in and don't see it again. We have had one of the most lax regimes in that regard of any country in the world, which is why I don't think we should be apologetic about toughening it up.
ABINADER: I think, actually, we have been more open than other countries. And I, as I said in the beginning, I'm not opposed to toughening it up, but I think we have to do it in a way that meets security needs without being intrusive and defeats the purpose of encouraging people to come and visit this country. We have a great story to tell. We have a great story to tell, and the way to do it is to bring people into this country, let them see what it's like and take that message back home.
KEYES: Dan Stein, we have about 30 seconds.
STEIN: One of the problems is we've got too many people coming through the system. We've got to bring down the overall level of immigration for five or 10 years to get the whole system fixed. We have really top-down reforms that are needed. Congress has to get serious about it, stop playing politics. The president has got to stop pandering to Mexico and these other countries, and get serious about border control and national security now.
KEYES: I have got to tell you, I agree with that last point. I think the idea that every time we have a president who visits Mexico, we have got to offer them some Christmas present in terms of the...
STEIN: Amen.
KEYES: ... laxness of our enforcement of our immigration laws is a huge error that hurts both countries.
Gentlemen, thank you for being with us tonight. Really appreciate it.
Next, I want to hear what's on your mind. So, you call us at 1-866-KEYES-USA. And later, my “Outrage of the Day.”
But first, does this make sense to you? In Barstow, California, the folks who brought us citizen canine, you know, the dog on the voters' rolls, at an elementary school, their kids were playing cops and robbers — you know, they shape their fingers into imaginary guns, they pretend to be law enforcement officers and bad guys. You did that when you were a kid, so did I. Are we bad people? Anyway, the school officials have decided that this is dangerous, and one kid had been threatened with being expelled from school if he doesn't stop playing this dangerous game.
Will somebody tell me where we are supposed to get policemen and soldiers and other folks from if kids never start in life taking an interest in what they do? These aren't bad professions; these are quite good people. They're heroic people. Why shouldn't we encourage children to take a look at that way of life, not as something dangerous, but as something that might be worthwhile and a virtuous contribution. Just to discourage them out of some blanket nervous nanny wussy feeling that, golly, this is dangerous. Isn't that, in fact, going to make us less capable of defending ourselves? Does this make sense?
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now let's get to what's on your mind. We'll start with Steve from Idaho. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
STEVE: Thank you, Mr. Keyes. I have enjoyed very much the debate on the conflict over the Palestinians and Israeli conflict. However, I have not heard a suggestion on your part to bringing any peace to that area. What would you say, sir, to bringing in U.N. troops rather than just U.S. forces? Certainly the Palestinians and Israelis don't hate Canadians and Germans, or for that matter, Arab countries within the U.N.
KEYES: See, my problem is that I think that the Palestinian extremists will kill anybody who gets in their way. That's the problem with extremists who are taking that kind of an approach.
Also, there's a history in the Middle East, you know, of U.N. involvement. Sometimes it has been worthwhile and other times as on the Gaza Strip before the 1967 war, the U.N. forces weren't very useful. When they were told to get out of the way by somebody who wanted to commit aggression, they just got out of the way.
That left a bad taste in the mouth of the Israelis in particular. So I'm not sure how it would go over, but the first prerequisite as people pointed out on the panel is to have an actual peace agreement. And if you try to put the cart before the horse and while they are still fighting, it doesn't matter who they are. They will be shot at.
Nancy from New York. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CALLER: Hi, Alan. I love your show.
KEYES: Thank you.
CALLER: I think it would be suicide to put American troops in the Mideast. And I think the Palestinian terrorists would target them. I think Israel is a Democratic country. We need to let them defend themselves.
KEYES: I happen to agree with you. I find it a little incongruous and Bill Bennett wrote a great column on this by the way today, which I think appeared in the “Washington Post” talking about the fact that the Bush Administration has been criticizing Israel for doing the needful against terrorists who are attacking them at a time when it seems kind of incongruous when we are doing the same thing. Let's go to Michael from Ohio.
CALLER: Thank you. And it's good to talk to you again, Mr. Keyes. I haven't called you since you had a program in 1998. I think it was called “Wake Up, America.”
KEYES: My radio program. Welcome back.
CALLER: Thank you. I was wondering, how many fronts do we think we can fight on at one time? I think we are in the Philippines and have peacekeepers in the Ukraine. We are in Afghanistan. And now we're talking about sending troops to the Middle East. What is that going to do to our homeland security?
KEYES: I think we have a problem — No. 1, we need to distinguish between things we do directly to fight the war on terrorism, where we are going after particular terrorist enclaves and working with governments to prevent terrorists from establishing structures and facilities. That's going to be an ongoing problem. We develop the forces and deploy them and bring them home when that job is done. That is different than the kind of work we might do in Afghanistan where we have a long-term commitment or Bosnia with the peacekeeping or the proposal Friedman made. Too many of those commitments could very well stretch us thin.
Let's go to Raphael from New York quickly.
CALLER: Thank you for the honor of allowing me to have a comment on the show.
KEYES: Quickly.
CALLER: I am an active duty 19-year veteran. I'd go anywhere my country wants me to go where they need me. However, I do admit to reservations to going to the Middle East. I am curious what your thoughts are along the lines of Steve from Idaho earlier.
KEYES: I think actually as I said during the program that it would be a very bad idea to put our forces in the middle. It would hurt our ability to help achieve peace, and they would probably be caught in the crossfire fighting against both sides. That would be very bad for us. Thank you for your call and thanks all of you for your feedback.
Next, the outrage of the day. What Air Canada has done to knuckle under to terrorists and whether it's good to send that kind of a message to our respect for individual liberty. That is what I will be talking about. You stay with me. I'll be right back.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now for my “Outrage Of The Day.” Remember Salman Rushdie, the fellow who was banned after writing “Satanic Verses” and other things that displeased some of the folk in the Muslim word and one of the mullahs bought out a fatwah against him that he was going to be killed and he became the objective of terrorism?
Apparently the FAA has decided special measures need to be taken when he is going to be on a plane, and because of that Air Canada has now put on a fatwah of their own, saying that Salman Rushdie is not to be allowed on any of their planes anywhere in the world.
I am not a particular friend or enemy of his, but it seems to me that is a bad way to respond to terrorism. I wonder what it is they are doing special for Salman Rushdie that they are not doing for the rest of us. They claim that security measures are going to inconvenience passengers, but can we be any more inconvenienced than we already are? And we are being inconvenienced to defend our liberty. We shouldn't knuckle under to these terrorists.
That's my sense of it. The NEWS WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS is up next. See you tomorrow.
Well, we're obviously in a situation where despite the president's efforts of special envoy General Zinni whose talks with Palestinians and Israelis today concluded once again inconclusively, today — they're going to meet again later in the week, but the violence has not concluded.
A suicide bombing left seven Israelis, including four soldiers, dead when an Islamic militant boarded a bus and detonated explosives strapped to his body. There were apparently dozens of injuries.
I can understand perfectly well that folks looking at this situation, seeing all the death, the violence mounting up — I think our hearts are broken. They go out to people on both sides who are suffering in this terrible crisis, and it leads folks to ask themselves again and again — intelligent people — what's the remedy? What can we do? What will help?
Well, I think that there was a piece in “The New York Times” today by columnist Tom Friedman that's probably the result of that kind of well-intentioned yearning for something to do that would help these folks find a way to peace. I have to tell you, though, that reading over the column and the ideas in it, I'm not at all sure that Tom Friedman thought this through before he put it forward.
I used to find when I was working in the State Department that sometimes wishful thinking, hoping, a strong desire to do something positive can actually get in the way of clear thinking. And yet it's only clear thinking that will make a positive contribution to real peace in the world. And so you have an obligation sometimes to put aside your yearnings for the sake of clarity.
I don't think Tom Friedman did that today. He put forward some ideas that the heart of which is that the United States should put our military forces into a position that would essentially have them in the middle between Israel and the Palestinians. The Israelis would withdraw from the occupied territories on Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians would be responsible for internal security in those areas, but the borders would be controlled by a U.S./Palestinian security force.
The Temple Mount, considered one of the most sensitive areas of Jerusalem, would be protected by U.S. troops with Palestinians having internal control of the mosques and Israel having control over their side, as he puts it.
I have to tell you, knowing some of the complexities in the region, I think that this idea — and the column actually began by saying, “Well, you all need to sit down while I tell you this.”
Actually, folks didn't need to sit down. They just needed to make sure they didn't turn their thinking off, which I think Mr. Friedman may have done while his heart was pounding with the beauties of this idea because I don't think he thought it through very clearly.
But we're going to try to do that tonight on this program, to do it in the way one has to do it, not just say, “Well, this is an idea. We could go and” — no, you've got to think about what will the consequences be. What will the actors do? How will they respond? What would our position end up being if we, in fact, went forward with an idea like this?
To help us out in this thinking, we have up front tonight, Frank Gaffney, the president of the Center for Security Policy. And also with us, Jonathan Broder, a longtime Middle East affairs correspondent who's an analyst for msnbc.com.
Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
JONATHAN BRODER, MSNBC.COM ANALYST: Thank you. Nice to be back.
KEYES: Now, Jonathan Broder, I want to start with you tonight because I need some help here. I read that — the Friedman piece, and to be quite frank about it, my reaction was, to say the least, highly unfavorable. I just thought this was somebody who hadn't done — put enough thought into this idea.
Maybe if he had put the column aside for a day or two, he would have thought better of it. I don't know. But I don't think he thought at all about what the consequences would be, and yet I'm told that you look at the piece and think it has some merit. Why do you think this would be a good idea?
BRODER: Well, I think it's an interesting idea.
For one, you have to consider what America's larger interests in the region are. Right now, the biggest threat to U.S. security is, I think, Saddam Hussein and the threat of the development of weapons of mass destruction.
The United States and the Bush administration have declared that they are going to take care of Saddam Hussein, but in order to do this, it needs allies and the help of our Arab allies in the region. The Arabs have made it very, very clear that they will not help the United States until the United States does something about the fighting between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
All other ideas that have been tried to get the Israelis and the Palestinians to make peace have failed, and, at this point, I think the United States, which up until now — the Bush administration, which up until now had been willing to sort of stand aside and let the two sides go at each other — realizes that, in order to accomplish its own goals in the region and to watch out after its own interests, needs to address this issue, and to put troops on the ground, I think, between the Israelis and the Palestinians would give the Israelis a sense of security and would also give the Palestinians a sense of security.
So I think it's an idea that, while it's out of the box and a bold idea, is worth looking into.
KEYES: Well, one further thought, though, because the one big problem I have with it — he keeps talking about peacekeeping and so forth, but, at the moment, there's no peace to keep.
You put your forces in between two sides that are shooting at each other, and what makes you think two things won't happen — one, that one side or the other will shoot at you, two, that you will have to shoot back — so that, instead of being a country going into the region trying to talk to both sides, we would be in a position where we might end up killing both sides.
BRODER: I think...
KEYES: And that's going to create goodwill for us? I don't understand it.
BRODER: I think the assumption is that once the Israelis withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza that the friction and the point of contact between them and the reason for the fighting will have gone away, and the Israelis will withdraw behind their lines, the Palestinians will be behind their lines, the — without the Israelis and the Palestinians in each others faces, an American peacekeeping force between them would have a much easier task.
KEYES: Well, Jonathan, before I say anything to that, I'm going to give Frank Gaffney here a chance because I have a feeling, Frank, that if I just let you do it, you're going to say in response to that what's on my mind. But, anyway, we will see.
Looking at this proposal, Frank, in terms of putting U.S. forces into this situation, do you think this is a good idea? What will happen?
FRANK GAFFNEY, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY: I don't think it's a good idea, Alan. I think — when Tom Friedman started off by saying, “Sit down,” I think somebody should have said to him, “Tom, lie down.”
(LAUGHTER)
GAFFNEY: This requires psychoanalysis. There's a sort of post-traumatic shock syndrome going on, I think.
Tom has invested a career in promoting the peace process. The notion that today one can believe that there is a peace process, let alone that it can be improved, is really the stuff of fantasy, and I think Tom has had a big run this week or this month, I should say, with the so-called Abdullah plan being a warmed-over version of the Friedman plan whereby, much as Jonathan just said, it's theorized the Arabs would recognize and, in fact, normalize relations with the Israelis if the Israelis gave back the so-called occupied territory, that is to say, we're told, the areas were captured in the 1967 war and then fought over again in 1973.
Alan, I don't think I have shown this to you, but I think it's really instructive. This is a map that's appeared on the Palestinian Authority Web site. And when we keep talking about what it is the Palestinians want, what it is that they will settle for, what it is that, if only they got it back, they would leave Israel alone, I keep coming back to this because it seems as though at least what Arafat is saying to his own people. if not in English to the Tom Friedmans of the world, certainly to his own people symbolically as in this map and with his rhetoric is, “We want the occupied territories back, all right. But the occupied territories aren't just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It's all of pre-1967 Israel as well,” and putting the United States in the middle of that would be a formula for disaster.
KEYES: Let me go back to Jonathan.
On that point, Jonathan, because as you were talking about it — the idea that, if the Israelis withdraw, that's going to end the reason the Palestinians are attacking them and so forth — that seems to pretty well accept lock, stock, and barrel the Palestinian understanding of why this violence is occurring.
I have to tell you that I look back at the events, even of the last several months, and it doesn't seem to track with the truth insofar as certain elements on the Palestinian side, even when efforts were being made to turn over control to the Palestinians, didn't buy that, kept attacking the Israelis, and they then responded.
Is Mr. Friedman simply acting like those events never took place and that the Palestinians didn't appear even when steps were being taken to turn over control of the West Bank, to want to take steps against Israel to pursue their larger political agenda, the one Frank is talking about?
If that's the case, they won't stop just because Americans are there, and our forces will end up being shot at. If that possibility emerges, would you justify rules of engagement that has our troops killing Palestinians?
BRODER: Look, the Palestinian population is divided. There are extremists, but there are a lot of people, particularly in the Palestinian Authority, that want the West Bank and Gaza and do not want...
KEYES: Well, Jonathan — Jonathan, when you think through a policy like this — let me stop you right there.
BRODER: Yeah.
KEYES: You have a responsibility — I used to do this on policy planning in the State Department. You have a responsibility to think through all of the possibilities and probabilities.
The very fact that extremists exist and that they may or may not be kept under control could mean that there would be continued efforts to assault Israel and that they would then have to go through American forces to do that.
If they were determined to do that, as they have been when Israeli forces were there and even as they have been when Arafat's Palestinian police forces were supposed to be there, would you authorize our forces to take action and kill these Palestinian extremists?
BRODER: Yes. That would be the whole purpose of a peacekeeping...
KEYES: All right. Step number one, that means we're shooting Palestinians, and I don't think the Palestinians would react well to that. If it turned out that the interposition of our forces didn't stop attacks against Israel and the Israelis then felt they were vulnerable and wanted to move more effectively than we were moving in their own interest, would we block them and risk fighting Israelis in that circumstance?
BRODER: Look, I think that any kind of arrangement where you put Palestinian — where you put American troops as peacekeepers into that region would have to be preceded by understandings with the Israelis and the Palestinians about the rules of engagement.
But the main point here is that there would be an Israeli withdrawal from the territories, which would remove the main point of friction that causes fighting between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
KEYES: I understand that, but — Frank, it's — one last word for you, I think, because we're coming down to the wire here. I am listening to this, and it just seems to me that there is an unwillingness to take account of hard realities about the forces on the Palestinian side and about the Israeli reactions. Aren't we very likely to get caught in the crossfire here?
GAFFNEY: I think so, Alan. I think that fundamental reality is this wouldn't end the friction. If people on the Palestinian side — extremists and Arafat and others they represent — want the liberation of all of so-called Palestine, it isn't going to be the end of it.
American monitors or peacekeepers or whatever you call them are going to be special targets for attack. U.S. interests will suffer, and I'm afraid that our friends, our allies in Israel in a joint war on terrorism will be put in mortal peril. This is a formula for disaster.
KEYES: Well...
BRODER: Alan, can I just interject...
KEYES: One last word very quickly. Very quickly.
BRODER: I think we have to look about — look at the larger American interests that are at stake and are in danger here if we don't do something in the — between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
KEYES: Well, Jonathan, the one last word I would say to that, though — and I really want to thank both of you for being with me tonight. This is kind of interesting. I think it's one of those ideas that's so bad that it's worth talking about.
But leave that aside, I get the feeling, Jonathan, that we're in a situation we want to do good, and since we don't have any good ideas, we're sort of throwing a bad one on the table to see if it will float, but that really isn't the best way to make policy, I don't think, and...
BRODER: And subordinating Israel's security to our larger interests is a formula again for their interests as well as ours being suffered.
KEYES: Frank, I won't cede the point, though, that this plan would be in our larger interests.
We're going to get into that further because, in our next segment, we'll get to the heart of the matter. We're going to have a panel of folks coming together to continue the discussion that we have set the stage for with the exchange between Frank and Jonathan. Should we, in fact, be putting our forces in the middle?
And we'll talk about these questions. First of all, will U.S. military presence end the fighting? If not, would the U.S. end up fighting with both sides? Would this kind of a step strengthen our role as an honest broker, somebody able to talk to both sides and possibly bring them to a negotiated settlement? We'll be talking about those questions.
Plus, we'll continue our open phone line segment. Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA with whatever is on your mind.
You're watching MSNBC, the best news on cable.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL: A significant number of individuals on the list could neither be verified as having left the country, nor could they be located within the country.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: That's Attorney General John Ashcroft today on those voluntary interviews he was seeking with foreign nationals. He's looking for 3,000 or more of mostly Arab descent.
In our next half-hour, we're going to debate whether or not what he is seeking is going to offend people because of racial profiling. We're also going to ask whether anything effective is being done to keep better track of foreigners in the United States.
Also, a reminder that the chat room is humming tonight. Beeker says, “America should take care of America and avoid foreign entanglements.” You, too, can join right in now at chat.msnbc.com.
First, though, we're going to continue to try to get to the heart of the matter talking about Tom Friedman's column about the possibility of putting in U.S. forces, U.S. troops in between the Palestinians and the Israelis to keep the two sides apart, to try to enforce some kind of a truce or a negotiated settlement, and whether that would, in fact, end the fighting, contribute to an environment in which constructive negotiations could take place.
Joining us now to try to get to the heart of this matter, David Silverstein, deputy director for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, an anti-terrorism organization formed after 9/11 in response to the attacks on the United States.
Also with us, Arnold DeBorchgrave, senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and editor in chief at “The Washington Times” and United Press International, and Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School for Government, former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, and he's author of the new book “The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Super Power Can't Go It Alone.”
Welcome to MAKING SENSE, gentlemen.
I think a number of issues are raised by this kind of — well, I guess I charitably call it an intriguing idea that has been put forward, but I think I want to start with Arnold DeBorchgrave, asking whether you see some merit, some soundness in this proposal. I've been honest. I'm kind of very skeptical in looking at what the consequences might be, but do you think there's some sense to be made about this idea of putting U.S. troops in the middle there?
ARNOLD DEBORCHGRAVE, “THE WASHINGTON TIMES”: Alan, that's a very interesting trial balloon, but I'm afraid it's going to remain tethered to the ground. We forget that Arab extremists, Palestinian extremists consider Americans synonymous with Israelis, and any troops put there will be seen by the crazies as there to protect the Israelis, not to protect the Palestinians, and, eventually, they will become fair game.
KEYES: Do you think then that they would, as the Israelis troops have often been, then be targeted precisely in order to provoke some kind of a response that would discredit us?
DEBORCHGRAVE: That's precisely what I would see coming down the pike. Don't forget that the Palestinians on the extreme side, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are not going to be satisfied with a U.S. military presence separating the two sides. That's when they will start taking the Americans as targets as well as the Israelis.
KEYES: Let me go to Joseph Nye because I think one of the ideas or concerns that was put forward by Jonathan Broader had to do with the fact that in order to pursue our anti-terrorism policy, to get help and cooperation against Iraq, we have to do something that is going to help establish some cooperation with the Arab countries. I think that may be, in fact, one of the purported objectives of the Friedman approach, but do you think that it would contribute to that result or not?
JOSEPH NYE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: I wouldn't put troops — American troops in the position that you described. I would have George Tenet go back and actually use CIA people to work with members of the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis to work out some of the cease-fire on the scene that General Zinni is now trying to put in place.
We have a strong national interest in getting a peace process going again, and I think we're not going to be able to move on Iraq, for example, until we've done something about the issue of Israel and Palestinian.
So I wouldn't put American troops in the middle. I certainly would put George Tenet in the middle.
KEYES: So that would be aimed at trying to help to get to a position where there was trustworthy and reliable both intelligence and understanding of the factual situation so you don't get into this kind of “Who shot John?” situation between the two both sides?
NYE: Right. Right. In fact, a friend of mine in the Israeli government said that the best chance they had of dealing with terrorism was before the second intifada when they actually were working with the Palestinian Authority.
Nobody knows who the bad guys are and has a better fix on them than the people on the scene, and there was a lot less terrorism, there was a lot more ability to deal with it when you had this kind of cooperation.
So what we need to be doing is getting into the business of putting the Israelis and the Palestinians on the ground together to solve this problem, not putting American troops in between them.
KEYES: David Silverstein, what's your sense of this before we go a little further? Do you think that putting American troops in the middle would contribute to or derogate from the prospects that we get some kind of more peaceful prospects in that region?
DAVID SILVERSTEIN, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES: I have to tell you that I think it's a tremendous mistake to suggest that American troops caught in the middle in a crossfire, if you will, between Arab terrorists on the one side and Israeli soldiers on the other would do anything but suffer horrendous losses.
And I have to say that even if it was only a limited deployment, let's say CIA officers, that would be a mistake, too, because if we've learned anything about the Middle East in the past few years, past two decades, in fact, we know that when you put anybody, any American in the Wild, Wild West that exists in the Middle East, he's going to have a target on his forehead.
That's an unfortunate reality. We've got lots of brave men and women in the CIA and other departments that are over there, but if you identify them and you invite them to work with extremists, they're going to be targeted. It's a sad fact.
DEBORCHGRAVE: Alan, let's not forget, too, that the ultimate objective of the Palestinians is an independent state, a viable independent state, on the West Bank and in Gaza, which would, of course, entail dismantling the Israeli settlements, about 200,000 settlers in about 150 settlements. I don't see that coming any day soon, and until that is guaranteed to the Palestinians, I don't see the fighting stopping under any circumstances.
KEYES: But wouldn't that very fact that you refer to also mean that if we put U.S. troops in there — one of the things that worries me is the possibility that we would have some reaction from extremists on both sides and that, in fact, Americans would become targets for some Israeli elements as well if we were moving in directions that blocked an Israeli ability, ay, to respond to Palestinian attacks. Wouldn't that for the first time be — put us in a position where we might be at daggers drawn with Israel?
DEBORCHGRAVE: I don't really see that happening. I can't see the Israelis under any circumstances firing against American troops, and — but I can see the extremist Palestinians doing just that, and as I said earlier, because they see us as being synonymous with the Israelis. Everywhere you go in South Asia today, throughout the Middle East — I've done that recently — Israel and the United States are synonymous among the hate mongers.
SILVERSTEIN: You know — could I butt in for just a second?
KEYES: Sure.
SILVERSTEIN: Mr. DeBorchgrave has a terrific statement there. The fact of the matter is that there isn't a day that goes by in the West Bank and Gaza when our President George Bush isn't burned in effigy by radical Palestinian terrorists or our flag is burned on a daily basis. In fact, Palestinian students overseas in Europe and elsewhere routinely gather to burn the American and the Israeli flags and to taunt the Americans perhaps at the embassy, perhaps elsewhere.
It's a terrible mistake, and putting our troop there would only put them in harm's way, and there — and more importantly — let me make one more point. More importantly, it undermines what America's all about. We are the shining beacon of democracy, we are an example to the world, and when we put our troops into a fellow democracy on some half — who knows what kind of plan — then we are undermining that fellow democracy. It sets a terrible example.
KEYES: Now if I could go back to Joseph Nye for a second because some of the issues that have been raised do seem to apply to a certain extent even to the idea of putting folks in to help with intelligence and things of this kind. Doesn't that assume that there's going to be a certain level of — What shall we call it? — good will on the part, say, of the Palestinians? Do you think that Yasser Arafat, others around him have the ability to restrain or influence the extremists who might target Americans even in that situation?
NYE: We are going to have to get some sort of political settlement between Arafat and Sharon to get a framework where it makes sense to have CIA people working on the ground with people from the Palestinian Authority and from the Israeli government.
Essentially, we did have a time when that worked. If you look at the period before September a year and a half ago, we actually were doing that, and it worked. So you can't just stick to the CIA officials there now and expect them to be anything other than targets.
But if you — if the administration continues, as it has been doing through General Zinni, to put pressure on both sides to get a cease-fire and it's in their political interest to do so, then you can begin the plan that I'm describing.
KEYES: One of the...
DEBORCHGRAVE: Alan...
KEYES: Oh, go ahead.
DEBORCHGRAVE: Alan, let's not forget the imperial overreach syndrome that is slowly moving onto the geopolitical radar screen with troops in Georgia and in the Philippines, and, of course, Afghanistan isn't finished, and preparing for a war against Iraq and also in Colombia now.
We've decided that we can go in and help the government troops against FARC. That's no longer limited to a drug-eradication program. It seems to me that we're reaching a point where the pendulum will begin swinging in the other direction, that we have overreached.
SILVERSTEIN: Alan, if I could comment on what Mr. Nye said earlier, he's put his finger on it. You need a political settlement first before you can envision anything that has to do with American troops, even though — even in that situation, even in a situation of peace, it's a bad idea.
But you've got to ask yourself, “How do we get to a political settlement?” We certainly can't do it with Mr. Arafat. Bill Clinton embarrassed himself bending over backwards at Camp David in August of 2000 trying making sure Arafat got everything he wanted, and it was rejected out of hand.
And we have to ask ourselves, since Arafat's army, Fatah, Al-Aqsa Brigades have been added to the State Department's list of terrorists, what does that tell us? Is Arafat a partner for peace, or is he just another petty tyrant who's about to have a state awarded to him? I think it says an awful lot.
DEBORCHGRAVE: I would say that more to the point is what Sharon said recently about him, that he's irrelevant, and I think a lot of people now are waiting for the end of Arafat's career and see what — and wait and see what happens to — as his replacement. There's a lot of speculation already about the coming successors to Arafat.
SILVERSTEIN: You know, it's a great point you've raised, but I've got to tell you that the coming successors are no better than Arafat himself. Let's take a look at them.
It's Jabril Rajoub, who's the security director in the West Bank. It's Mohammad Dahlan, who runs things in the Gaza Strip. These aren't ordinary guys. These aren't cops on the beat. These aren't chiefs of police. These are terrorists, murderers.
And, in fact, Jabril Rajoub just bragged openly in the press that he helped to plan Sharon's attempted assassination in 1992...
DEBORCHGRAVE: I never suggested...
SILVERSTEIN: ... and...
DEBORCHGRAVE: I never suggested that his successors would be moderate types, not at all.
SILVERSTEIN: Sure.
DEBORCHGRAVE: Quite the contrary.
KEYES: Well — but it definitely is...
Go ahead, Mr...
NYE: No, I just wanted to say that, you know, Sharon made a major effort to make Arafat irrelevant. The point is it failed. One need not defend Arafat to see that, if you want a political settlement, you're going to have to work with him.
KEYES: Well, see — but I want to raise a question, and I'm not sure we'll have time to discuss it, but I think it might be worth putting out there so you all can think about it and the audience as well because — every time I hear this discussion of Arafat, should he be there or should he not be there, it occurs to me that the Israelis have one advantage over the Palestinian people, and that is if they think Ariel Sharon isn't doing well enough, they have a mechanism to replace him, to put somebody else in place who has been put there by a legitimate mandate, elections and so forth and so on.
Are we thinking enough about the fact that if we really are serious about some kind of Palestinian political entity, we have got to work with the Arab-Palestinian side to develop a constitutional framework for the alestinian people that will free them from what is, I think, the albatross of leadership that they can't change because they have no legitimate mechanism for doing so?
DEBORCHGRAVE: Let's not forget that half the population is less than 20 years old among the Palestinians, and many of them look at Israel as having a short — historically speaking, a short shelf life, and the demographics will eventually prevail, and then they will have weapons of mass destruction to boot.
SILVERSTEIN: Alan, what we really need to think about is democracy in the Middle East right across the entire segment of that — of the world. There's no democracy in Saudi Arabia. There's no democracy in Syria. There's no democracy in Iraq, Iran, and so on, and there certainly is no democracy in the Palestinian Authority, and that's what we have to think about.
KEYES: We have come to the end of our time. Thank you all for a very fascinating and, I think, substantive contribution here. I would leave you with one last thought, though. That element of democracy is sometimes thought of by people as a goal in this situation.
What I'm suggesting is that on the Arab side, it might be one of the important instrumental elements. We always ask about how we get leadership and so forth and so on. Well, one way to get leadership is to develop responsible mechanisms amongst the people to choose their own leaders in a way that would then correspond to the kind of responsibility they bear in some kind of state entity. I think we need to think more about that, Constitutional issue first.
Next, John Ashcroft says he can't find over 1,000 illegal aliens, mostly those of Arab descent. What's going on? We'll get into it right after this.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
After the 9/11 attacks, the Justice Department came up with a list of 5,000 men who had entered the United States on non-immigrant visas and had passports from countries where Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network has been present or active. Officials initially asked the men to come forward voluntarily for questioning. They hoped that some light would be shed on the attacks. Today, Attorney General John Ashcroft was out there announcing the progress so far.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL: In total, approximately one half of the foreign nationals on the list were located and interviewed. The anti-terrorist task forces did a superb job of finding the individuals we sought, but candidly, their best efforts could not overcome the serious flaws that exist in our ability to locate visitors to our country. That's our current ability. We're seeking to improve that dramatically. A significant number of individuals on the list could neither be verified as having left the country, nor could they be located within the country.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now this means that the justice department report shows that almost — out of 4,800 foreigners, federal officials simply couldn't find 1,097 men, who recently came to the United States from terrorist-sponsoring nations.
This raises some disturbing questions for us. I mean, why aren't we more effective at keeping track of visitors in our country who come from foreign countries? Why are we moving to make it even easier for some of these folks to continue to stay here, to wander around doing whatever they please without an effective ability to keep track of what's going on?
I think that this is a critically important element of how we deal with the possibility of a terrorist threat on the home front. And I don't think we have to apologize to people either for trying to tighten up our security and help to keep track of foreign visitors who come to America. We are not saying anything disparaging about the good folks, but we have a right to try to keep better tabs on people so that we can respond to the bad ones.
Joining us now to debate what we should do about this, Gene AbiNader, the managing director of the Arab-American Institute; and Dan Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, or FAIR, an organization against mass immigration into the United States. Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
Let me go to Jean AbiNader first. What do you think are the effective ways to deal with this problem and what kind of concerns do you think it raises, for instance, in the Arab-American community?
JEAN ABINADER, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE: Well, those are really apples and oranges because the overall issue of immigration reform and the reform of the INS which was obviously spotlighted yesterday is a very different issue with the impact on the Arab-American community, which is a result of the events of 9/11.
The Arab-American community, if you look at the actual numbers, is very small in terms of overall proportion of people who, for example, have overstayed their visas or who have been issued deportation orders. So what's happening to us as a result of political efforts by the administration, particularly to the attorney general, to create some sense of momentum, because so far they haven't been able to come up with anything concrete based on the previous activities.
But that's only a very different issue from what we want to do in terms of immigration reform. And I think we shouldn't mix those two.
KEYES: But see, there are two separate questions. Immigration reform is one thing. And it is an element, I think, of the issue that I am raising. But one of the first things that concerns me is I think we need to have a system that allows us to keep pretty close track of what foreign visitors are doing in America, where they're going, so that if need be, we would be able to pinpoint their location and to deal with them one way or another, whatever might be the case...
ABINADER: I don't think you're going to have...
KEYES: ... while they are here. Why shouldn't we be able to do that?
ABINADER: I don't think you're going have — I don't think you're going to have a lot of opposition to that in this country. I think the real question becomes when do those measures become intrusive or become prohibitive in terms of people feeling like they are on parole when they come into this country instead of on vacation.
So I think everybody wants more security. The question is how do we do it in such a way, using technology, that what we're able to do makes it wonderful for visitors to be here, but at the same time, makes us feel that we are doing something in terms of the security this country needs.
KEYES: Dan Stein, how do you see this problem, in the context of the concerns we have, obviously, with security, but also the larger question of exactly what we do in order to make sure that we are kind of keeping tabs on the visitors who come to America so that we can get in touch with them when we need to?
DAN STEIN, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM: I'm glad to be here, Alan. Well, you know, the obvious question is: Where is the other half? How come the attorney general couldn't find the other half? We support what is clearly the right thing to do.
Frankly, the Department of Justice has really no alternative based on the security threats involved. I think they have a duty to the American people and the public safety to try to make sure they know who has come into the country from certain countries and what they're doing here. And in the underlying foundational question, I think everybody wants to know is, what are we going to do to fix the mess at the INS?
KEYES: Do you think that the proposals that have been laid on the table in terms of merging the INS and the Customs folks and the folks who are guarding the border, that that kind of consolidation is going to make things more effective, or will we create a large bureaucracy that would be more unwielding even than the INS?
STEIN: Alan, we have been talking about an integrated border management agency since the Nixon administration, and it always bogs down on bureaucratic inertia and parochial interests in Congress. If George Bush and Tom Ridge are going to get something like this done — and it does need to be done, for sure — they're going to have to really be — persevere over the special interests that always make it so difficult.
You need to have an integrated border management function that's in charge of the customs, immigration enforcement, gives priority to effective border controls. People don't have a right to come into this country if they're not citizens unless they can affirmatively demonstrate they have a right to be here. And people don't have a right to stay in this country and not show up for school or get flight training when they are not authorized, irrespective of what the federal law authorizes.
But more important than integrated border management is an integrated state, federal and local system so that our drivers license system and our other state document structures work seamlessly with the federal government to ensure that a person who overstays the visa is identified and gotten out of the country.
ABINADER: And my point, Alan, is that has nothing to do with September 11. I think this is a larger question, and that's the way it should be handled. Whether it's student visas — which — look at student visas as a very good example. We have over 170,000 foreign students in this country, and yet you have some states like Tennessee saying, well, we think we are going to pass legislation and make those students check in every week or every month with their local police officials. That's not coming here to learn about American democracy, that's coming here to be on parole. So we have to be very careful about what we do in this case.
KEYES: Meaning no particular offense, having been part of the work of the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) for some years when I was in the foreign service, in a certain sense, when visitors come to America, they are on parole. That is quite the lateral meaning of the whole system of passports and visas that govern the exchange of visitors in international relations. You are literally on parole, and the passport was precisely the sign that that parole had been given, and that in a certain sense your government was standing behind you to say you were who you say you are, and so forth, and so on.
ABINADER: How would you feel, Alan, if you were...
KEYES: Let me finish.
ABINADER: OK.
KEYES: And don't bring up other countries. We are treated that way in other countries. In France, in other parts of Europe, in places where when you go to a hotel, you turn your passport in and don't see it again. We have had one of the most lax regimes in that regard of any country in the world, which is why I don't think we should be apologetic about toughening it up.
ABINADER: I think, actually, we have been more open than other countries. And I, as I said in the beginning, I'm not opposed to toughening it up, but I think we have to do it in a way that meets security needs without being intrusive and defeats the purpose of encouraging people to come and visit this country. We have a great story to tell. We have a great story to tell, and the way to do it is to bring people into this country, let them see what it's like and take that message back home.
KEYES: Dan Stein, we have about 30 seconds.
STEIN: One of the problems is we've got too many people coming through the system. We've got to bring down the overall level of immigration for five or 10 years to get the whole system fixed. We have really top-down reforms that are needed. Congress has to get serious about it, stop playing politics. The president has got to stop pandering to Mexico and these other countries, and get serious about border control and national security now.
KEYES: I have got to tell you, I agree with that last point. I think the idea that every time we have a president who visits Mexico, we have got to offer them some Christmas present in terms of the...
STEIN: Amen.
KEYES: ... laxness of our enforcement of our immigration laws is a huge error that hurts both countries.
Gentlemen, thank you for being with us tonight. Really appreciate it.
Next, I want to hear what's on your mind. So, you call us at 1-866-KEYES-USA. And later, my “Outrage of the Day.”
But first, does this make sense to you? In Barstow, California, the folks who brought us citizen canine, you know, the dog on the voters' rolls, at an elementary school, their kids were playing cops and robbers — you know, they shape their fingers into imaginary guns, they pretend to be law enforcement officers and bad guys. You did that when you were a kid, so did I. Are we bad people? Anyway, the school officials have decided that this is dangerous, and one kid had been threatened with being expelled from school if he doesn't stop playing this dangerous game.
Will somebody tell me where we are supposed to get policemen and soldiers and other folks from if kids never start in life taking an interest in what they do? These aren't bad professions; these are quite good people. They're heroic people. Why shouldn't we encourage children to take a look at that way of life, not as something dangerous, but as something that might be worthwhile and a virtuous contribution. Just to discourage them out of some blanket nervous nanny wussy feeling that, golly, this is dangerous. Isn't that, in fact, going to make us less capable of defending ourselves? Does this make sense?
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now let's get to what's on your mind. We'll start with Steve from Idaho. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
STEVE: Thank you, Mr. Keyes. I have enjoyed very much the debate on the conflict over the Palestinians and Israeli conflict. However, I have not heard a suggestion on your part to bringing any peace to that area. What would you say, sir, to bringing in U.N. troops rather than just U.S. forces? Certainly the Palestinians and Israelis don't hate Canadians and Germans, or for that matter, Arab countries within the U.N.
KEYES: See, my problem is that I think that the Palestinian extremists will kill anybody who gets in their way. That's the problem with extremists who are taking that kind of an approach.
Also, there's a history in the Middle East, you know, of U.N. involvement. Sometimes it has been worthwhile and other times as on the Gaza Strip before the 1967 war, the U.N. forces weren't very useful. When they were told to get out of the way by somebody who wanted to commit aggression, they just got out of the way.
That left a bad taste in the mouth of the Israelis in particular. So I'm not sure how it would go over, but the first prerequisite as people pointed out on the panel is to have an actual peace agreement. And if you try to put the cart before the horse and while they are still fighting, it doesn't matter who they are. They will be shot at.
Nancy from New York. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CALLER: Hi, Alan. I love your show.
KEYES: Thank you.
CALLER: I think it would be suicide to put American troops in the Mideast. And I think the Palestinian terrorists would target them. I think Israel is a Democratic country. We need to let them defend themselves.
KEYES: I happen to agree with you. I find it a little incongruous and Bill Bennett wrote a great column on this by the way today, which I think appeared in the “Washington Post” talking about the fact that the Bush Administration has been criticizing Israel for doing the needful against terrorists who are attacking them at a time when it seems kind of incongruous when we are doing the same thing. Let's go to Michael from Ohio.
CALLER: Thank you. And it's good to talk to you again, Mr. Keyes. I haven't called you since you had a program in 1998. I think it was called “Wake Up, America.”
KEYES: My radio program. Welcome back.
CALLER: Thank you. I was wondering, how many fronts do we think we can fight on at one time? I think we are in the Philippines and have peacekeepers in the Ukraine. We are in Afghanistan. And now we're talking about sending troops to the Middle East. What is that going to do to our homeland security?
KEYES: I think we have a problem — No. 1, we need to distinguish between things we do directly to fight the war on terrorism, where we are going after particular terrorist enclaves and working with governments to prevent terrorists from establishing structures and facilities. That's going to be an ongoing problem. We develop the forces and deploy them and bring them home when that job is done. That is different than the kind of work we might do in Afghanistan where we have a long-term commitment or Bosnia with the peacekeeping or the proposal Friedman made. Too many of those commitments could very well stretch us thin.
Let's go to Raphael from New York quickly.
CALLER: Thank you for the honor of allowing me to have a comment on the show.
KEYES: Quickly.
CALLER: I am an active duty 19-year veteran. I'd go anywhere my country wants me to go where they need me. However, I do admit to reservations to going to the Middle East. I am curious what your thoughts are along the lines of Steve from Idaho earlier.
KEYES: I think actually as I said during the program that it would be a very bad idea to put our forces in the middle. It would hurt our ability to help achieve peace, and they would probably be caught in the crossfire fighting against both sides. That would be very bad for us. Thank you for your call and thanks all of you for your feedback.
Next, the outrage of the day. What Air Canada has done to knuckle under to terrorists and whether it's good to send that kind of a message to our respect for individual liberty. That is what I will be talking about. You stay with me. I'll be right back.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now for my “Outrage Of The Day.” Remember Salman Rushdie, the fellow who was banned after writing “Satanic Verses” and other things that displeased some of the folk in the Muslim word and one of the mullahs bought out a fatwah against him that he was going to be killed and he became the objective of terrorism?
Apparently the FAA has decided special measures need to be taken when he is going to be on a plane, and because of that Air Canada has now put on a fatwah of their own, saying that Salman Rushdie is not to be allowed on any of their planes anywhere in the world.
I am not a particular friend or enemy of his, but it seems to me that is a bad way to respond to terrorism. I wonder what it is they are doing special for Salman Rushdie that they are not doing for the rest of us. They claim that security measures are going to inconvenience passengers, but can we be any more inconvenienced than we already are? And we are being inconvenienced to defend our liberty. We shouldn't knuckle under to these terrorists.
That's my sense of it. The NEWS WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS is up next. See you tomorrow.