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Alan Keyes is Making Sense
Alan KeyesMarch 18, 2002
ALAN KEYES, HOST: Good evening. I'm Alan Keyes. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
Vice President Cheney was in Kuwait this morning. He was rounding out what has been his visit to several of the important capitals in the Middle East.
He ended up going back to Israel on business not related to the business that had taken him there in the first place, which was, in fact, to try to sound out opinion as to what the United States should be doing with respect to Iraq.
Now, in one sense or another, I think, there have been, over the course of the last several days, while Cheney has traveled around, some confusion about what the overall goal and aim of U.S. policy might be toward Iraq.
For example, here is President Bush from last Wednesday.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: All options are on the table, and — but one thing I will not allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now here is what Paul Wolfowitz said over the weekend.
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PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY: We have not made any decision yet about what to do in Iraq militarily or any other way. I mean, the president has stated that there's a problem. He has all his options on the table, as he said. I think, in every case, our preference is always to try to solve these things through diplomatic means, if it's possible.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now, you see, many of the folks who are listening to the administration's rhetoric are, I think, people who believe that we ought to go in and smack Saddam Hussein, that he's been there for too long, that he poses a great threat.
A lot of the rhetoric of the administration justifies wanting the belief that this is an action that needs to be taken in a military sense, fairly quickly, as part of our overall effort with respect to terrorism.
Then there's the other side of the agenda. The side that talks in diplomatic terms and seems to suggest that all the saber rattling is intended, in fact, to get Saddam Hussein to once again welcome the U.N. inspectors and do other things that would restore what proved to be, unfortunately, an ineffectual regime of U.N. oversight.
That has led some folks to wonder whether it's a prelude to military action or part of an overall strategy, a maneuver, if you like, aimed at putting pressure on Saddam Hussein.
This was suggested in a column that caught my eye in today's paper by syndicated columnist Robert Novak who spoke to several Republican members of Congress who are concerned with President Bush's comments on Iraq, or so he reports.
Quote, “This kind of rhetoric, I think, is dangerous,” Senator Chuck Hagel told Novak, “because it does put us in a position where you have to take action or you're going to look like you're bluffing and lose your credibility.”
Novak concludes by saying, “Is the president bluffing? That would be risky, but it offers a more benign explanation of his performance last week. Alternatively, a unilateral decision to rid the world of Saddam and his cabal would set the United States on a course that some of Bush's staunchest supporters and reporters fear and dread.”
Now that's Robert Novak commenting on the possibility that what we have been seeing over the course of the last little while is, in fact, part of a kind of war of maneuvering that's building up pressure against Saddam Hussein in order to achieve certain diplomatic goals.
In part, that might appear logical, particularly from the point of view of, say, Secretary of State Colin Powell over at the State Department who has been hearing from all and sundry, including America's European allies, that they don't really want us to take action against Saddam Hussein.
On the other hand, it's not going to be too pleasing to many who believe that Saddam is, in fact, intrinsically dangerous and that it's time that we went in and removed that danger, particularly as it relates to the use of weapons of mass destruction in the context of terrorism.
Well, what is going on? Up front tonight to help us try to understand that, we have Republican Congressman Peter King of New York, a member of the House Committee on International Relations. Also with us, Colonel Jack Jacobs, retired from the Army, now an MSNBC military analyst.
Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
Colonel Jacobs, let me start with you.
REP. PETER KING (R-NY), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE: Thank you, Alan.
KEYES: Well, it's good to have you.
Let me start with you because we have been hearing, I think, a lot of rhetoric that would give comfort to folks who think we ought to be taking swift military action against Saddam Hussein, but, on the other hand, it seems in a context where it's possible that it's just part of some diplomatic maneuvering.
Now, as you look at the situation that's evolving in terms of the administration's policy, where do you think we're headed?
COL. JACK JACOBS (RET.), U.S. ARMY: Well, if you think about how Secretary Powell likes to thing about things, he's an old military guy, and he doesn't like to do anything unless he has started off at the end. He wants to determine what the end game is first, how — what Iraq is going to look like after the fact, and then go about ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein.
And without determining how Iraq is going to be governed afterwards, I don't think any decision is going to be made to attack Iraq or do anything in Iraq because there are plenty of psychopaths inside of Iraq, and if you get rid of Saddam Hussein, there's no reason why you won't have another one over there to take over where he left off.
KEYES: Well, does that mean, in your view, the kind of rhetoric we've been hearing that does seem in some ways to be a prelude to military action, stories that have appeared in the newspapers presuming that the military is gung ho to do something — are these things just aimed at creating greater pressure against Iraq, rather than being a real prelude to action?
JACOBS: Well, there's no reason why it can't be both of them. Not only that, it could be a bit like the boy who cried wolf. You keep talking about how you're going to invade Iraq and you're going to invade Iraq, and, you know, Iraq goes on alert and it keeps going on alert, and, very soon, it gets tired of going on alert, and just about the time they get tired of going on alert, then we attack them.
And there are other reasons as well. We're making a lot of noise at least partially because there are a lot of states in the region who are not particularly interested in seeing us go to war with Iraq and do anything to destabilize the area, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and so on.
I think if we keep talking about how we go after Iraq, we keep saying it over and over again, eventually, these guys might think it's a fait accompli and might accept it.
KEYES: Representative King, what do you make of what we have been watching over the last little while? Is it a prelude to war, or is it a diplomatic maneuver?
KING: I don't think it's a diplomatic think. What I think it is — the Bush administration has made a decision. Ultimately, they want Saddam Hussein removed. If it has to be done militarily, ultimately, they will do that.
I think the colonel is right. I think they're trying to lay a foundation right now, very strong rhetoric, letting our allies know, letting undecided countries know that one way or the other we do intend to have Saddam Hussein removed and put out.
At the same time, President Bush said, I think, when he went to Afghanistan, he doesn't rush, he doesn't jump, and I think the military has to be ready. We will have to be ready to have the government to come in after Saddam Hussein. Nothing is going to be done precipitously.
The president wants it clear to our European allies and also to the countries in the Middle East that we do intend, one way or the other, to remove Saddam Hussein. It could be next month. It could be four months from now. It could be six months from now. No one knows what the time schedule will be, but we are definitely on that path.
KEYES: Well, one of things, though, that struck my mind last week was that it was put in the context of certain demands, if you like, that I — it seemed to me Saddam Hussein could at some point meet, including a return of the U.N. inspectors and submission to the kind of regime that was put in place at the end of the Persian Gulf War.
What if on these point that are being outlined for his behavior he actually gives us what we want? Is that, in fact, going to be sufficient given what he himself represents?
KING: No, I don't think it would be enough because no one would trust him based on what happened after 1991 and 1992. I mean, if we were given total access and we could have total — you know, no one stopping us at all, perhaps.
But, you know, that's not going to happen with Saddam Hussein. Everyone knows with him it's cat and mouse, he lets you in, he cuts you out. He raises problems. He raises objections. We don't want to go through that again.
President Bush has made it clear — to me, it's clear, anyway — that those attempts to allow inspections will not be enough because no one would accept them and no one would believe them.
KEYES: Well, see — but I've got to say, Representative King, I did not hear that last week. What I heard, in fact, was an outline that had very strong rhetoric in terms of military action, but that then concluded in such a way that there were kind of — I don't know — correctable offenses involved where Saddam Hussein could act in certain ways that might leave him in place.
Colonel Jacobs, do you think that that would be a sufficient result?
JACOBS: No, probably not. And we have to keep in mind that though it sounds like the administration speaks with one voice, it is not one voice. There are a lot of competing interests inside the administration that — I have a tendency to view what comes out of administration or the policy that comes out a bit like that of blind justice with Condoleezza Rice in the middle, and you have the Defense Department in one tray and the State Department in the other tray, and, right now, the Defense Department is heavier.
But that doesn't mean that you don't have competing interests with the State Department wanting to do things one way and the Defense Department wanting to do things another way and the receptivity to acceding to anything that Saddam Hussein might do in a conciliatory way more easily received in a State Department that doesn't necessarily mean it's going to be our policy.
KEYES: Well, see, I know that, that that's true, but, at the end of the day, though, if you combine the military rhetoric with something that gave him this way out and yet didn't fundamentally alter the nature of his regime, would that, in fact, simply be buying time for him to become a greater threat in the context of the terrorism we face right now?
JACOBS: Yes. And I suspect the administration is looking at it in exactly that kind of way. I agree with the congressman to the extent that I don't think that we're going to let ourselves be fooled again, despite the fact, in certain respects, there is some stability in having a psychopath in Iraq.
But I don't think we're going to put up with it very much longer, and if we can find a diplomatic way out of it, we will. But, at the end of the day, we are going to try to find a way to change the regime there in a way that we can supervise what's going on in the Middle East.
KEYES: Now, Representative King, it seemed to me, as the vice president was going around the Middle East talking to various people on this trip, he wasn't getting a very sympathetic response in terms of the need for tough action against Iraq, from Jordan, from Egypt, and others.
In that sort of a context, if we move unilaterally to do something about Saddam, don't we risk taking a hit in terms of damaging relationships that we might need elsewhere in the war on terror?
KING: I don't think so, Alan. I think that the U.S. will have the support it needs when those countries are convinced we're going to take action and we're going to follow through.
Listen, in their ideal world, we would never take any action. The European nations didn't want us to take action in Bosnia, but, when we finally did, the issue was pretty much resolved. I think it's going to be the same in the Middle East against Iraq.
You know, no one wants to jump into a war here. The fact is many of these Arab states — they would prefer to have the status quo go forward, but, also, once they realize that we're serious about it, I think they will line up. But — you know, they may be reluctant, but I think they will.
I know I've been talking to some Cabinet officials in European nations who are publicly not that supportive, but, at the end of the day, it was made pretty clear to me that, if the U.S. does go forward, we can count on support. It may not be enthusiastic support, but we'll get it because we are the only super power, and if we are serious about taking out Saddam Hussein, we will have the support.
And saying this — I want to make it clear I'm not minimizing this. I'm not one of these people who think's this is going to be an easy job or we can do it overnight or there's not going to be a loss of life, but I think the Bush administration has made a very calculated decision that Saddam Hussein must go.
Now they have to put the pieces together and I'm confident that, when they finally do take action, the pieces will have been put together.
KEYES: Colonel Jacobs, Representative King, I want to thank you both for being with us this evening and helping to clarify...
KING: Thank you, Alan.
KEYES: ... what I think has been a week in which some folks have tried to put interpretations that can be a little confusing on these events.
The one thing that I think is perfectly clear is that, objectively speaking, we have in Saddam Hussein somebody who could very well pose a serious danger in the context of the larger terrorist threat. He's got the will. He may be developing the means to tie into terrorists who mean us great harm and supply them with the wherewithal that would help destroy American lives.
In that context, it seems to me rhetoric needs to be more than rhetoric. It has to be an urgent call to action and support on behalf of the American people if we're to deal with this danger.
Well, we'll get further into these matters with our panel as we get to the heart of the matter when we're going to address these key issues: Is the saber rattling real? If it is, what affect will it have on the larger war on terror, given the reluctance that some of our friends and allies to take action against Iraq? If it is not, if it's a diplomatic maneuver, can we afford to bluff, and what do we hope to accomplish?
Plus, as always, our open phone line segment. Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA with whatever is on your mind.
But, first, does this make sense?
Over in Great Britain, they've had an effort, they claim, to try to reduce the number of teenage pregnancies. They recorded 95,000 in the year 2000, and the government has pledged to cut that number in half by 2010.
Well, in order to pursue this, they have been providing people over the counter with the morning-after pill, a kind of pill that's aimed at inducing some kind of abortive effect on the possibility that you had conception from sexual behavior.
And following after the government's lead, a supermarket chain in Great Britain, Tesco Supermarket, is offering the pill as a promotion. What, are they giving it away with a breakfast cereal? I don't know.
But think about this, my friends. So these guys think that you're going to reduce teenage pregnancy by encouraging promiscuity. Does that make sense?
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
TOM RIDGE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY: The advisory system is based on five threat conditions for five different alerts — low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe. They're going to be represented by five colors — green, blue, yellow, orange, and red.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: That was Tom Ridge, our homeland security adviser. Actually, it's a position that has become so important, Congress would like to have a chance to chat with him, but the president says no.
Coming up in our next half-hour, why President Bush doesn't want Tom Ridge to testify before Congress. Is it a good idea? We'll be talking with a couple of folks about that very question.
Also, a reminder that the chat room is humming tonight.
On Iraq, Kim says, “Just taking out Saddam is not enough. His son and his cohorts need to be removed, like the Taliban.”
You can join right in right now at chat.msnbc.com.
But, first, we're going to get to the heart of the matter. We are talking about U.S. policy toward Iraq and the fact that we've had some pretty tough talk from the administration, combined with what could be construed as kind of a diplomatic agenda that would leave Saddam Hussein with an ability to comply with certain demands and kind of get out from under the gun of a possible U.S. military action.
What is the real aim and purpose? Is it a prelude to war, or is it maneuvering in order to get Saddam Hussein to respond in ways that would satisfy this more diplomatic agenda, or is it a combination of the two?
To talk with us about it tonight, Robert Gallucci, a former deputy chief for the United Nations Special Commission in charge of on-site inspections of Iraq's weapons capabilities. He is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.
Also with us, Raymond Tanter, formerly a member of President Reagan's National Security Council, now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
And Walid Phares, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a professor of Middle East studies at Florida Atlantic University.
Welcome to MAKING SENSE, gentlemen, and thank you for being with us tonight.
I want to go first to Bob Gallucci and ask a question that occurred to me as I was watching the toing and froing a little bit last week and the statement that the president has his options open but particular emphasis on Saddam Hussein's recalcitrance with respect to U.N. inspections and so forth.
What is your sense of the present situation? Are we looking at a regime of pressure aimed at getting these U.N. inspectors and such a regime back in place? If that were possible, would it be a sufficient response to what Saddam Hussein represents? What's your view, given the experience that you've had, Robert?
ROBERT GALLUCCI, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR: I'm pretty clear that the answer to that is maybe. It is possible — not likely, but possible — that we could get an inspection regime (UNINTELLIGIBLE) under former IAA General Director Blicks (ph) in inspecting with freedom to go anywhere, any time, inspect everything guided by American intelligence, and so offset or put off Saddam's programs, particularly in biological and nuclear weapons regeneration and chemical weapons, that it would be effective, and I'm assuming here that the objective is principally these programs.
If, in fact, nothing will do other than regime change, then, obviously, the inspection regime is only politically useful if it fails. If it fails, then we've demonstrated that we tried and we have a talking point to use in the Arab world and with the European allies.
If that isn't the objective, then it is worthwhile trying to block a weapons program. But it must be completely free as it was initially in 1991 to 1995, not the 1996-97 version.
KEYES: So what would constitute failure then, something that wasn't, in fact, as complete and free as it needed to be?
GALLUCCI: Well, I mean, failure is a regime that Saddam accepts and allows him to continue with the regeneration of those programs. We both assume and have evidence that he's trying to regenerate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missiles as well.
So, if we have an inspection regime and that continues, it's worse than nothing. But if we have an inspection regime that makes it impossible for him to pursue those programs effectively and they are our real objective, then it can be effective.
This all assumes, right — we've got to be clear about this. This all assumes that we don't have any evidence that is convincing and persuasive to us and others that Saddam is in some way responsible or supportive of what happened on September 11th. If that were to be true, then I don't see how an inspection regime helps us one whit.
KEYES: Yeah. Exactly.
Raymond Tanter, what's your sense of this? Is this something that ought to be tied to some kind of inspection regime, or should we, in fact, be preparing the minds of our allies and others for a move against Saddam Hussein?
RAYMOND TANTER, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY: Alan, the purpose of tough language, use of rogue state language, evil axis language, is to mobilize three publics — the core American republic, the allies, and the adversaries.
You have to put the allies on notice that the American government is serious this time about regime change in Iraq. You have to tell Saddam Hussein that he has to yield on the inspections regime.
Even if he were to yield, however, I think Saddam's regime has to go.
KEYES: But if it's tied to that and he does yield, what would we then do? Would we be looking for ways in which he did not comply properly? Doesn't that leave him a lot of room to kind of maneuver in such a way as to keep our, for instance, Mideast allies off balance with the pretense that he's somehow cooperating?
TANTER: You've a good point, Alan, but the reason that Saddam is even considering yielding is precisely because the course of diplomacy is working. Force and diplomacy walk hand in hand. Force and diplomacy must be joined together.
It's not a question of who's in favor of force, who's in favor of diplomacy. I think the president is doing an outstanding job using coercive diplomacy as witnessed by the fact that Saddam was considering any-time-anyplace inspection regimes.
KEYES: Walid Phares, as Vice President Cheney went around the Middle East, he didn't seem to get a very positive response. As a matter of fact, no positive response at all that I could see from the leaders in terms of a move against Iraq.
In light of that response, if we consider that he is part of the terrorist threat to this country, don't we have to move anyway and what would the consequences be?
WALID PHARES, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES: Well, Alan, first, we have to look at the big picture, and the big picture is that, since October 7th and the state of the union address, the United States and its real strategic allies have devised a strategy to get rid of regimes that are considered evil and terrorist organizations.
This is why dealing with Saddam Hussein today is not about just inspecting weapons. It's about making sure that there will be a guarantee, a regime in Baghdad that would actually guarantee that this country won't be a factory of mass destruction or a state sponsoring terrorism.
I personally would have chosen to go and eliminate the other organizations — terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, because my concern is that it's not just a unilateral action there. You have Iran and Syria and Hezbollah who are now preparing certainly with Iraq the response at the time when the United States and its allies would start.
And I am — would be concerned to see what would be the reaction of the Arab League meeting in Beirut in a few weeks to see if the region, as you said, would protect Saddam Hussein because they are afraid. Many regimes are afraid that a change in Iraq would actually lead to a change in their regimes. That would be the most important subject to discuss in the next few days.
KEYES: Does that mean that in your sense of it — because when we were talking to the representative, he had the sense that folks would fall in line if we had to move unilaterally against Iraq, that our other partners in the region among the Arabs would be galvanized by our willingness to act. Do you think that that would, in fact, happen?
PHARES: Well, first of all, we have to understand that the counteroffensive on what would be an American-led offensive has already started. The Iranians have made statements. Many in the Arab world, other than Iraq, as I said earlier, are preparing themselves, bracing themselves to diplomatically counter this action.
But let me tell you one thing. The most important element here is to make sure that the internal ingredient, the Northern Alliance of Iran, the Kurds or the Shi'ites in the South, the other Sunni elements within Baghdad would be prepared well.
I didn't see the Kurds invited to Washington yet. I didn't see any of the leading officials of the opposition still in action. I didn't see (UNINTELLIGIBLE) where we have already a government in exile.
It is very important, Alan, to show the Arab world that it's not just an American revenge against Saddam Hussein. It's the Iraqi people in uprising against a dictator.
KEYES: Bob Gallucci, do you think that that — that we've seen the kind of preparation in that regard, across a broad range of diplomatic as well as political preparations that actually lend credibility to the notion we're going to remove this man and put a new regime in place?
GALLUCCI: Judging from the reports that we've seen, I don't think that we've been persuasive as yet if what we've gotten is a real reaction in the press to our argument that the regime must be changed. I see, therefore, as I said before, great value in pursuing an inspection regime.
If the inspection regime works in addressing the weapons of mass destruction, that's all to the good. If it fails, then we're really back to where we were in 1991, 11 years ago, when we had Resolution 687 and we had an international community agreed that that regime needed to abide by that resolution and give up its weapons of mass destruction or it would be subjected to continued hostilities.
That was the implicit and explicit threat, and that we can push back on our other members of the Security Council, that we can push back to the — to those in the region.
KEYES: Yeah, but — but, Robert, what I...
GALLUCCI: They're there right now.
KEYES: What I don't understand, though, is that, in effect, what happened in consequence of all of that was the abandonment, the kicking out of the inspectors, and Saddam Hussein living all these years with a relatively free hand.
Isn't that proof enough that he's been violating this regime, and wouldn't that justify the very military action that was considered at that time as appropriate, if, in fact, he failed to cooperate?
I don't understand why we don't regard the intervening years as evidence of his failure to comply.
GALLUCCI: Well, in the intervening years, we lost the coalition that was willing to support us in pressing the Iraqis to keep the inspection regime in place. I think you could decide at any point that those programs are so dangerous because they're on the verge of regenerating a capability that you must act, and we may be there now, and if we are, then I think — and we make that judgment based on intelligence, I think it's a reasonable thing for the United States in our own interests and that of regional security to act against that regime.
But you asked the question about whether we were persuasive in the region, and based upon what I've read in the press reports from the vice president's trip, we are not yet persuasive, either in the connection to terrorism or in the regeneration of that capability. If we were, I think your argument would make great, good sense.
KEYES: Raymond Tanter, if that is the case — and we have not yet convinced folks on the basis that Robert Gallucci is discussing — does that mean that we need to be doing a better job. I mean, presumably, the strong rhetoric of the administration has a basis in fact.
Are we seeing a situation where there's a failure to communicate that basis with the kind of effectiveness that would move some of this opinion in a direction that would accept the necessity for strong action that we are talking about?
TANTER: Alan, military success casts a long political shadow. Once the Arab moderate regimes figure out that the United States is serious has been successful in Afghanistan, then you're going to see people coming around, and, publicly, the Arab moderate leaders — why shouldn't they have some reservations? They keep their options open that way.
Privately, I think they're telling the vice president and the president and secretary of state, secretary of defense quite different statements, and those statements are probably to the effect that, “If you're going in and you're serious, we're with you. But do a good job. None of this pinprick bombing as December, 1998, four days over a weekend, and then leave.”
KEYES: Thank you very much. Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for coming today.
We're obviously dealing with a situation of great complexity, and it's one that is reflected, I think, in the complexity of the president's policy.
Obviously also, we're dealing with a situation where bureaucracy is tugging with itself, and the resultant of that tug of war is seen in the public statements of policy.
The one thing that I think is consistent and clear, however, is that Saddam Hussein poses a real danger in the estimation of the United States and that we are doing what we think is necessary to prepare the ground for decisive action against him. That decisive action could be prepared with this regime of inspection.
I personally believe, though, that we've given him plenty enough time to prove or disprove his willingness to go along with that regime, and on every front, he has disproved it. Why we would given him another chance just to get a bunch of other folks to go along who should have better sense, I don't know.
I think that if we need to move against him, we should make clear the grounds in relation to our present war on terrorism and take the necessary action.
Later, we're going to get to what's on your mind on any topic. Call us at 1-866-KEYES-USA. 1-866-KEYES-USA. You're watching MSNBC, the best news on cable.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
We talked a minute ago about the fact that Tom Ridge, who obviously is taking on more and more of an important role in terms of the administration of our homeland security, he's been asked to go up to the Hill to testify and the president is proving reluctant to allow him to do so. Here's what President Bush had to say about it last week.
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GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: He doesn't have to testify. He's a part of my staff, and that's part of the prerogative of the executive branch of government and we hold that very dear.
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KEYES: Now, Senator Tom Daschle says he's considering a subpoena to force Ridge to testify. Here's what he had to say.
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SEN. TOM DASCHLE (D-SD), MAJORITY LEADER: He's also the administrator of all of the array of agencies that are now being coordinated in response to the need for homeland defense. So, he's taking on a different role than that of Condoleezza Rice, who serves as an adviser to the president. This goes way beyond that, and for that reason, especially, it's important for us to be able to coordinate and work with him much more closely.
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KEYES: Now, I have to tell you that I think that Senator Daschle was actually wrong about Condoleezza Rice's role, because she's also a coordinator. As a matter of fact, established under law by the National Security Council Act to be a coordinator with respect to this nation's national security affairs. And that means that she has a very comparable position to the one that Tom Ridge is occupying.
I myself feel that we're faced here not just with a question of the moment, with an expedient question that has to do with how we handle this present situation. It also is a question that involves the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress of the United States and whether or not, in time of war, we sit by and allow those prerogatives to be eroded while substantive power is given to officials who are then shielded from congressional oversight. If we get into that habit, it seems to me we could seriously upset the balance of our constitutional system and it's something we do have to be concerned about.
Is that happening here? That I think is the question of the day. And to help us understand it a little better, we are joined now by Republican Congressman Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, who is the chair of the subcommittee on homeland security; and Democratic congresswoman Jane Harman of California, also a member of the homeland security subcommittee. Welcome to MAKING SENSE and thank you very much for joining us tonight.
Representative Chambliss, I'd like to start with you because I expressed I think a very honest concern on my part with respect to the possible effect that this situation of war could have on the Congress' role. If we got into the habit of putting substantive responsibility into the hands of officials in a position where they could then step back from congressional scrutiny and not have to consult and answer questions and aid the Congress in formulating the kind of policies that go into the budget and so forth and so on, wouldn't we be establishing a dangerous constitutional precedent, especially given that the war on terror could go on for a long time?
REP. SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R), GEORGIA: I don't think so, Alan. I mean, we're in a different war than any American has ever been involved in before. The White House took the prerogative, I think rightfully so, of creating the Office of Homeland Security by executive order. They charged Governor Ridge with having jurisdiction and authority over this number of federal agencies and subagencies. This is his responsibility to administer and get his arms around this number of agencies.
Now, can you imagine the congressional committees that have some jurisdiction over some of these agents and subagencies. If Governor Ridge is allowed to go up and testify, then every single committee in Congress is going to want him up there to testify. This guy needs to be able to do his job. He has got the flexibility now to do it. He's been to the Hill. He's talked to the Democratic leadership. He's talked to the Republican leadership. He has talked to the Democratic caucus, the Republican policy committee. He's communicating with members of Congress on a regular and daily basis and everybody know what is being done with this money.
So, I don't think it's fair to get him up there. I think he needs to be doing his job as a staff adviser to the president and he's got the president's ear. So, I think it would be a bad policy move to require him to come up to testify.
KEYES: Well, I have to say, though, it almost seems to me that you're making my case for me because you suggest that he has been given large, substantive responsibilities over many agencies of the government. That seems to me to be something that would ordinarily be subject to congressional oversight. A pattern of government in which such satrophies were established, in such a way that unlike the cabinet or other people, they weren't responsive to Congress, that the image of a government so organized by any president doesn't bother you in terms of its constitutional implications?
CHAMBLISS: Well, he doesn't have authority over all of these agencies and subagencies. He's just responsible for working with them to see that they implement the president's wishes and the president's desires under the budget. This is not his budget. This is the president's budget. And he's charged with the responsibility of making sure that they have the funds that they ask for, but that they implement it. And he doesn't have the substantive authority to implement it himself.
KEYES: Now, Representative Harman, some folks I know who might even share some of the concerns that I have, look at Senator Daschle, look at folks on the Democrat side, and they basically see this in the context of political maneuvering and an effort to do things that would somehow create opportunities to embarrass the administration.
Do you think that we are in danger of seeing this kind of sort of political harassment in this situation or is there a legitimate issue here that requires that Tom Ridge respond to the Congress?
REP. JANE HARMAN (D), CALIFORNIA: Well, I think the fight over testifying before Congress is a side show, Alan. But there are Republicans who support that. Senator Stevens of the Senate appropriations committee, a Republican, strongly supports Ridge coming up.
The real fight, the real issue is what are Ridge's powers, and we have never settled that in a way that I find satisfactory. He is not an assistant to the president. I was an assistant to President Jimmy Carter. That is not his role. He is the director of the Office of Homeland Security. He is not an adviser like Condoleezza Rice, who's called the National Security Adviser. You know that. You worked at the National Security Council.
This man is supposedly in charge of creating a strategy for 100 agencies. I'm holding up the same chart that Saxby Chambliss held up. Right at the top, it says the Office of Homeland Security. That office has no power and many of us on a bipartisan basis thinks he should be given Cabinet-level status, which would require him to testify, but he'd be a Cabinet secretary and have budget authority.
KEYES: Well, wouldn't that then suggest that given the situation in which we final ourselves, you would want Congress to take the kind of step with respect with Tom Ridge that it took with respect to the national security adviser and to formulize in legislation...
HARMAN: You bet.
KEYES: ... the existence of this office and so forth? Is that the same of this effort, because it's been presented almost like it's just petty maneuvering to get him to come up and talk about things. Is there a serious agenda here that aims at somehow regularizing this position?
HARMAN: Well, my agenda is to be sure that this man does have the power that he needs to have so he can create a national security strategy and compel 100 federal agencies and numbers of others to follow the strategy. We need one homeland security policy in this country. It's been five months since Tom Ridge came to town and we don't have one.
KEYES: Well, here I have a question, though. And, I guess, in a way, it's directed to both of you. But I'll start with Representative Saxby Chambliss, because I look at this, I'm a little confused and I think it was reflected in Congresswoman Harman's statement there because she inadvertently used the term national security when she meant homeland security.
And yet, when you look at the role of homeland security and all the different elements involved in, doesn't it, in fact, overlap with many areas with what ought to be the responsibilities of the national security adviser? It has domestic, it has foreign, it has intelligence components. It seems very much like the kind of interagency, interdepartmental challenge that the National Security Council staff is supposed to handle. Are we duplicating functions here, Representative Chambliss?
CHAMBLISS: Well, I don't think so, Alan. I'll say to Jane, and I generally agree on most everything, but the issue of whether or not we ought to have legislative authority creating the office of homeland security is one area we disagree on, because of just what you said.
You know, this is a new position. It's a position that we've never had to have before and, therefore, we're still feeling our way through. And the president has been very clear about the fact that we may reach a point in time where we do need legislative authority setting forth the exact powers of this office.
But right now, we need to make a determination of exactly what the office ought to be doing and there needs to be great flexibility in reaching the point to where we really do know what overlapping there is and if there should be overlapping, what the jurisdiction of each particular agency that you do overlap with should have.
So, I think it's very critical that we continue to allow great flexibility in this office and if we reach the point to where legislative authority is needed, then I can assure you that the administration is going to be coming forward with recommendations.
KEYES: Representative Harman, we have very few seconds left. One last word.
HARMAN: Well, the turf disputes are too strong. It's too late, unfortunately, for Ridge himself to propose this. I wish the president would act. We cannot wait in this country for a strategy that will protect all of us against what could be very well a very serious second wave of attacks.
KEYES: And I have to say, in conclusion, thank you, first of all, both of you for joining me tonight in helping us I think to understand what is not at heart — it's not a petty dispute, I don't think. I think it's serious. It's serious at a constitutional level and a level of national secure.
At the end of the day, I do believe that if Congress is going to have to look at this eventually, then they ought to be consulted along the way. They should be jealous of their prerogatives, especially during wartime. And I think it is a failure to respect the requirements of our national security if they don't exercise their prerogatives. After all, what is more important to the security of our freedom than the Constitution of the United States, and it ought to be respected even as we meet the exigencies of war.
Thank you both for joining us. Next, we're going to hear what's on your mind. You can call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA. That's 1-866-KEYES-USA. And later, my “Outrage of the Day”, something that comes close to both my heart and experience, the outcome of the election in Zimbabwe and what it actually implies for you and me in terms of what might be our future situation with respect to demands made on our pocketbook. Have you though about this? I have.
And that will be my “Outrage of the Day.” We'll be right back, so you stay with us.
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KEYES: Now we get to “What's On Your Mind.” First, let's go to Paul from California. Paul, are you making sense?
CALLER: Yes.
KEYES: Welcome to the show. What's on your mind?
CALLER: I'd like to say I think that September 11 was the best thing that happened to George Bush. I think his whole presidency would be out of the water right now if it weren't for this whole hoax, this homeland security is just a trick to limit our personal freedoms, and I'm really disappointed that he's just getting so much attention drawn. If it weren't for September 11, his rating would be plummeted right now.
KEYES: Well, I don't know about that, Paul, but I'll tell you something. I think that, as I have made the serious point, we do have to be wary of what happens to our freedoms, our liberties, our constitutional balance as we face this threat from terrorism.
But the threat is real, September 11 was real, the concerns that the president and his folks are responding to are quite real and I think we are going to be in serious trouble if we start moving on the assumption that we're faced with some kind of hoax. Hoaxes don't usually kill that many thousands of people. Let's go to George from California.
CALLER: Hello? hello?
KEYES: Welcome to MAKING SENSE. Go ahead, George.
CALLER: OK. Bush is alienating our coalition or our allies and inflaming the opposition. We're going to have to go unilaterally into Iraq. That means more American deaths. Now, he of all people knows that he never got a scratch and the only time he got a scratch was when he was eating pretzels.
KEYES: I have to tell you, the fact that we might risk some lives going against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, if we don't move against those who could provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks, then we are going to risk a lot of lives right here at home and that would be irresponsible. So, I think we can debate back and forth the tame table, things of that kind, but I don't think there can be much debate about the need to move unilaterally if we must in defense of American live in this terrorist...
CALLER: Why would he break up our coalition to get...
KEYES: Right now there is no coalition with respect to Iraq. That was made clear by all...
CALLER: Because of him.
KEYES: That was discussed by all the panelists. It's not our fault. It's because they lost their backbone. The terror threat means that we can't afford to let that be an excuse for fecklessness. In my opinion.
Anyway, thank you for you feedback. Appreciate you calling in. Next, “My Outrage of the Day.” There's been an election in Zimbabwe. The new president, who is the old president, Robert Mugabe, said they've issued a blow to imperialism. What it actually seems they did is issue a blow to the country's economy that could involve all of us eventually. Stay tuned to find out how. We'll be right back.
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KEYES: Robert Mugabe has just been re-elected as the prime minister of Zimbabwe in an election that has been called into question in terms of all the usual tactics that were used to suppress the vote of his opposition and diffuse and cast his opposition into disarray.
That's not the main thing that bothers me. The main thing that bothers me is that he's been pursuing policies and now promises to do more of the same that destroy the farming sector of his country because it was mostly run effectively by white farmers, and he is now moving against them in order to placate the political desires of his constituents within Zimbabwe, with the results, my friends, that an economy that was more than capable not just of feeding its own people, but of feeding Southern Africa and Africa will be turned into a basket case.
There'll be tens of thousands of starving folks and at some point begging bowl in hand they will come to us to tell us that it was somehow our fault. I hope you remember that if Mugabe had been more of a builder and less of a fighter, he wouldn't have destroyed the economy in his own country and have to turn to others for help. That's my sense of it. Thank you for joining us.
Next, The News with Brian Williams. I'll see you tomorrow.
Vice President Cheney was in Kuwait this morning. He was rounding out what has been his visit to several of the important capitals in the Middle East.
He ended up going back to Israel on business not related to the business that had taken him there in the first place, which was, in fact, to try to sound out opinion as to what the United States should be doing with respect to Iraq.
Now, in one sense or another, I think, there have been, over the course of the last several days, while Cheney has traveled around, some confusion about what the overall goal and aim of U.S. policy might be toward Iraq.
For example, here is President Bush from last Wednesday.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: All options are on the table, and — but one thing I will not allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now here is what Paul Wolfowitz said over the weekend.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY: We have not made any decision yet about what to do in Iraq militarily or any other way. I mean, the president has stated that there's a problem. He has all his options on the table, as he said. I think, in every case, our preference is always to try to solve these things through diplomatic means, if it's possible.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now, you see, many of the folks who are listening to the administration's rhetoric are, I think, people who believe that we ought to go in and smack Saddam Hussein, that he's been there for too long, that he poses a great threat.
A lot of the rhetoric of the administration justifies wanting the belief that this is an action that needs to be taken in a military sense, fairly quickly, as part of our overall effort with respect to terrorism.
Then there's the other side of the agenda. The side that talks in diplomatic terms and seems to suggest that all the saber rattling is intended, in fact, to get Saddam Hussein to once again welcome the U.N. inspectors and do other things that would restore what proved to be, unfortunately, an ineffectual regime of U.N. oversight.
That has led some folks to wonder whether it's a prelude to military action or part of an overall strategy, a maneuver, if you like, aimed at putting pressure on Saddam Hussein.
This was suggested in a column that caught my eye in today's paper by syndicated columnist Robert Novak who spoke to several Republican members of Congress who are concerned with President Bush's comments on Iraq, or so he reports.
Quote, “This kind of rhetoric, I think, is dangerous,” Senator Chuck Hagel told Novak, “because it does put us in a position where you have to take action or you're going to look like you're bluffing and lose your credibility.”
Novak concludes by saying, “Is the president bluffing? That would be risky, but it offers a more benign explanation of his performance last week. Alternatively, a unilateral decision to rid the world of Saddam and his cabal would set the United States on a course that some of Bush's staunchest supporters and reporters fear and dread.”
Now that's Robert Novak commenting on the possibility that what we have been seeing over the course of the last little while is, in fact, part of a kind of war of maneuvering that's building up pressure against Saddam Hussein in order to achieve certain diplomatic goals.
In part, that might appear logical, particularly from the point of view of, say, Secretary of State Colin Powell over at the State Department who has been hearing from all and sundry, including America's European allies, that they don't really want us to take action against Saddam Hussein.
On the other hand, it's not going to be too pleasing to many who believe that Saddam is, in fact, intrinsically dangerous and that it's time that we went in and removed that danger, particularly as it relates to the use of weapons of mass destruction in the context of terrorism.
Well, what is going on? Up front tonight to help us try to understand that, we have Republican Congressman Peter King of New York, a member of the House Committee on International Relations. Also with us, Colonel Jack Jacobs, retired from the Army, now an MSNBC military analyst.
Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
Colonel Jacobs, let me start with you.
REP. PETER KING (R-NY), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE: Thank you, Alan.
KEYES: Well, it's good to have you.
Let me start with you because we have been hearing, I think, a lot of rhetoric that would give comfort to folks who think we ought to be taking swift military action against Saddam Hussein, but, on the other hand, it seems in a context where it's possible that it's just part of some diplomatic maneuvering.
Now, as you look at the situation that's evolving in terms of the administration's policy, where do you think we're headed?
COL. JACK JACOBS (RET.), U.S. ARMY: Well, if you think about how Secretary Powell likes to thing about things, he's an old military guy, and he doesn't like to do anything unless he has started off at the end. He wants to determine what the end game is first, how — what Iraq is going to look like after the fact, and then go about ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein.
And without determining how Iraq is going to be governed afterwards, I don't think any decision is going to be made to attack Iraq or do anything in Iraq because there are plenty of psychopaths inside of Iraq, and if you get rid of Saddam Hussein, there's no reason why you won't have another one over there to take over where he left off.
KEYES: Well, does that mean, in your view, the kind of rhetoric we've been hearing that does seem in some ways to be a prelude to military action, stories that have appeared in the newspapers presuming that the military is gung ho to do something — are these things just aimed at creating greater pressure against Iraq, rather than being a real prelude to action?
JACOBS: Well, there's no reason why it can't be both of them. Not only that, it could be a bit like the boy who cried wolf. You keep talking about how you're going to invade Iraq and you're going to invade Iraq, and, you know, Iraq goes on alert and it keeps going on alert, and, very soon, it gets tired of going on alert, and just about the time they get tired of going on alert, then we attack them.
And there are other reasons as well. We're making a lot of noise at least partially because there are a lot of states in the region who are not particularly interested in seeing us go to war with Iraq and do anything to destabilize the area, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and so on.
I think if we keep talking about how we go after Iraq, we keep saying it over and over again, eventually, these guys might think it's a fait accompli and might accept it.
KEYES: Representative King, what do you make of what we have been watching over the last little while? Is it a prelude to war, or is it a diplomatic maneuver?
KING: I don't think it's a diplomatic think. What I think it is — the Bush administration has made a decision. Ultimately, they want Saddam Hussein removed. If it has to be done militarily, ultimately, they will do that.
I think the colonel is right. I think they're trying to lay a foundation right now, very strong rhetoric, letting our allies know, letting undecided countries know that one way or the other we do intend to have Saddam Hussein removed and put out.
At the same time, President Bush said, I think, when he went to Afghanistan, he doesn't rush, he doesn't jump, and I think the military has to be ready. We will have to be ready to have the government to come in after Saddam Hussein. Nothing is going to be done precipitously.
The president wants it clear to our European allies and also to the countries in the Middle East that we do intend, one way or the other, to remove Saddam Hussein. It could be next month. It could be four months from now. It could be six months from now. No one knows what the time schedule will be, but we are definitely on that path.
KEYES: Well, one of things, though, that struck my mind last week was that it was put in the context of certain demands, if you like, that I — it seemed to me Saddam Hussein could at some point meet, including a return of the U.N. inspectors and submission to the kind of regime that was put in place at the end of the Persian Gulf War.
What if on these point that are being outlined for his behavior he actually gives us what we want? Is that, in fact, going to be sufficient given what he himself represents?
KING: No, I don't think it would be enough because no one would trust him based on what happened after 1991 and 1992. I mean, if we were given total access and we could have total — you know, no one stopping us at all, perhaps.
But, you know, that's not going to happen with Saddam Hussein. Everyone knows with him it's cat and mouse, he lets you in, he cuts you out. He raises problems. He raises objections. We don't want to go through that again.
President Bush has made it clear — to me, it's clear, anyway — that those attempts to allow inspections will not be enough because no one would accept them and no one would believe them.
KEYES: Well, see — but I've got to say, Representative King, I did not hear that last week. What I heard, in fact, was an outline that had very strong rhetoric in terms of military action, but that then concluded in such a way that there were kind of — I don't know — correctable offenses involved where Saddam Hussein could act in certain ways that might leave him in place.
Colonel Jacobs, do you think that that would be a sufficient result?
JACOBS: No, probably not. And we have to keep in mind that though it sounds like the administration speaks with one voice, it is not one voice. There are a lot of competing interests inside the administration that — I have a tendency to view what comes out of administration or the policy that comes out a bit like that of blind justice with Condoleezza Rice in the middle, and you have the Defense Department in one tray and the State Department in the other tray, and, right now, the Defense Department is heavier.
But that doesn't mean that you don't have competing interests with the State Department wanting to do things one way and the Defense Department wanting to do things another way and the receptivity to acceding to anything that Saddam Hussein might do in a conciliatory way more easily received in a State Department that doesn't necessarily mean it's going to be our policy.
KEYES: Well, see, I know that, that that's true, but, at the end of the day, though, if you combine the military rhetoric with something that gave him this way out and yet didn't fundamentally alter the nature of his regime, would that, in fact, simply be buying time for him to become a greater threat in the context of the terrorism we face right now?
JACOBS: Yes. And I suspect the administration is looking at it in exactly that kind of way. I agree with the congressman to the extent that I don't think that we're going to let ourselves be fooled again, despite the fact, in certain respects, there is some stability in having a psychopath in Iraq.
But I don't think we're going to put up with it very much longer, and if we can find a diplomatic way out of it, we will. But, at the end of the day, we are going to try to find a way to change the regime there in a way that we can supervise what's going on in the Middle East.
KEYES: Now, Representative King, it seemed to me, as the vice president was going around the Middle East talking to various people on this trip, he wasn't getting a very sympathetic response in terms of the need for tough action against Iraq, from Jordan, from Egypt, and others.
In that sort of a context, if we move unilaterally to do something about Saddam, don't we risk taking a hit in terms of damaging relationships that we might need elsewhere in the war on terror?
KING: I don't think so, Alan. I think that the U.S. will have the support it needs when those countries are convinced we're going to take action and we're going to follow through.
Listen, in their ideal world, we would never take any action. The European nations didn't want us to take action in Bosnia, but, when we finally did, the issue was pretty much resolved. I think it's going to be the same in the Middle East against Iraq.
You know, no one wants to jump into a war here. The fact is many of these Arab states — they would prefer to have the status quo go forward, but, also, once they realize that we're serious about it, I think they will line up. But — you know, they may be reluctant, but I think they will.
I know I've been talking to some Cabinet officials in European nations who are publicly not that supportive, but, at the end of the day, it was made pretty clear to me that, if the U.S. does go forward, we can count on support. It may not be enthusiastic support, but we'll get it because we are the only super power, and if we are serious about taking out Saddam Hussein, we will have the support.
And saying this — I want to make it clear I'm not minimizing this. I'm not one of these people who think's this is going to be an easy job or we can do it overnight or there's not going to be a loss of life, but I think the Bush administration has made a very calculated decision that Saddam Hussein must go.
Now they have to put the pieces together and I'm confident that, when they finally do take action, the pieces will have been put together.
KEYES: Colonel Jacobs, Representative King, I want to thank you both for being with us this evening and helping to clarify...
KING: Thank you, Alan.
KEYES: ... what I think has been a week in which some folks have tried to put interpretations that can be a little confusing on these events.
The one thing that I think is perfectly clear is that, objectively speaking, we have in Saddam Hussein somebody who could very well pose a serious danger in the context of the larger terrorist threat. He's got the will. He may be developing the means to tie into terrorists who mean us great harm and supply them with the wherewithal that would help destroy American lives.
In that context, it seems to me rhetoric needs to be more than rhetoric. It has to be an urgent call to action and support on behalf of the American people if we're to deal with this danger.
Well, we'll get further into these matters with our panel as we get to the heart of the matter when we're going to address these key issues: Is the saber rattling real? If it is, what affect will it have on the larger war on terror, given the reluctance that some of our friends and allies to take action against Iraq? If it is not, if it's a diplomatic maneuver, can we afford to bluff, and what do we hope to accomplish?
Plus, as always, our open phone line segment. Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA with whatever is on your mind.
But, first, does this make sense?
Over in Great Britain, they've had an effort, they claim, to try to reduce the number of teenage pregnancies. They recorded 95,000 in the year 2000, and the government has pledged to cut that number in half by 2010.
Well, in order to pursue this, they have been providing people over the counter with the morning-after pill, a kind of pill that's aimed at inducing some kind of abortive effect on the possibility that you had conception from sexual behavior.
And following after the government's lead, a supermarket chain in Great Britain, Tesco Supermarket, is offering the pill as a promotion. What, are they giving it away with a breakfast cereal? I don't know.
But think about this, my friends. So these guys think that you're going to reduce teenage pregnancy by encouraging promiscuity. Does that make sense?
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
TOM RIDGE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY: The advisory system is based on five threat conditions for five different alerts — low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe. They're going to be represented by five colors — green, blue, yellow, orange, and red.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: That was Tom Ridge, our homeland security adviser. Actually, it's a position that has become so important, Congress would like to have a chance to chat with him, but the president says no.
Coming up in our next half-hour, why President Bush doesn't want Tom Ridge to testify before Congress. Is it a good idea? We'll be talking with a couple of folks about that very question.
Also, a reminder that the chat room is humming tonight.
On Iraq, Kim says, “Just taking out Saddam is not enough. His son and his cohorts need to be removed, like the Taliban.”
You can join right in right now at chat.msnbc.com.
But, first, we're going to get to the heart of the matter. We are talking about U.S. policy toward Iraq and the fact that we've had some pretty tough talk from the administration, combined with what could be construed as kind of a diplomatic agenda that would leave Saddam Hussein with an ability to comply with certain demands and kind of get out from under the gun of a possible U.S. military action.
What is the real aim and purpose? Is it a prelude to war, or is it maneuvering in order to get Saddam Hussein to respond in ways that would satisfy this more diplomatic agenda, or is it a combination of the two?
To talk with us about it tonight, Robert Gallucci, a former deputy chief for the United Nations Special Commission in charge of on-site inspections of Iraq's weapons capabilities. He is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.
Also with us, Raymond Tanter, formerly a member of President Reagan's National Security Council, now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
And Walid Phares, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a professor of Middle East studies at Florida Atlantic University.
Welcome to MAKING SENSE, gentlemen, and thank you for being with us tonight.
I want to go first to Bob Gallucci and ask a question that occurred to me as I was watching the toing and froing a little bit last week and the statement that the president has his options open but particular emphasis on Saddam Hussein's recalcitrance with respect to U.N. inspections and so forth.
What is your sense of the present situation? Are we looking at a regime of pressure aimed at getting these U.N. inspectors and such a regime back in place? If that were possible, would it be a sufficient response to what Saddam Hussein represents? What's your view, given the experience that you've had, Robert?
ROBERT GALLUCCI, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR: I'm pretty clear that the answer to that is maybe. It is possible — not likely, but possible — that we could get an inspection regime (UNINTELLIGIBLE) under former IAA General Director Blicks (ph) in inspecting with freedom to go anywhere, any time, inspect everything guided by American intelligence, and so offset or put off Saddam's programs, particularly in biological and nuclear weapons regeneration and chemical weapons, that it would be effective, and I'm assuming here that the objective is principally these programs.
If, in fact, nothing will do other than regime change, then, obviously, the inspection regime is only politically useful if it fails. If it fails, then we've demonstrated that we tried and we have a talking point to use in the Arab world and with the European allies.
If that isn't the objective, then it is worthwhile trying to block a weapons program. But it must be completely free as it was initially in 1991 to 1995, not the 1996-97 version.
KEYES: So what would constitute failure then, something that wasn't, in fact, as complete and free as it needed to be?
GALLUCCI: Well, I mean, failure is a regime that Saddam accepts and allows him to continue with the regeneration of those programs. We both assume and have evidence that he's trying to regenerate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missiles as well.
So, if we have an inspection regime and that continues, it's worse than nothing. But if we have an inspection regime that makes it impossible for him to pursue those programs effectively and they are our real objective, then it can be effective.
This all assumes, right — we've got to be clear about this. This all assumes that we don't have any evidence that is convincing and persuasive to us and others that Saddam is in some way responsible or supportive of what happened on September 11th. If that were to be true, then I don't see how an inspection regime helps us one whit.
KEYES: Yeah. Exactly.
Raymond Tanter, what's your sense of this? Is this something that ought to be tied to some kind of inspection regime, or should we, in fact, be preparing the minds of our allies and others for a move against Saddam Hussein?
RAYMOND TANTER, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY: Alan, the purpose of tough language, use of rogue state language, evil axis language, is to mobilize three publics — the core American republic, the allies, and the adversaries.
You have to put the allies on notice that the American government is serious this time about regime change in Iraq. You have to tell Saddam Hussein that he has to yield on the inspections regime.
Even if he were to yield, however, I think Saddam's regime has to go.
KEYES: But if it's tied to that and he does yield, what would we then do? Would we be looking for ways in which he did not comply properly? Doesn't that leave him a lot of room to kind of maneuver in such a way as to keep our, for instance, Mideast allies off balance with the pretense that he's somehow cooperating?
TANTER: You've a good point, Alan, but the reason that Saddam is even considering yielding is precisely because the course of diplomacy is working. Force and diplomacy walk hand in hand. Force and diplomacy must be joined together.
It's not a question of who's in favor of force, who's in favor of diplomacy. I think the president is doing an outstanding job using coercive diplomacy as witnessed by the fact that Saddam was considering any-time-anyplace inspection regimes.
KEYES: Walid Phares, as Vice President Cheney went around the Middle East, he didn't seem to get a very positive response. As a matter of fact, no positive response at all that I could see from the leaders in terms of a move against Iraq.
In light of that response, if we consider that he is part of the terrorist threat to this country, don't we have to move anyway and what would the consequences be?
WALID PHARES, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES: Well, Alan, first, we have to look at the big picture, and the big picture is that, since October 7th and the state of the union address, the United States and its real strategic allies have devised a strategy to get rid of regimes that are considered evil and terrorist organizations.
This is why dealing with Saddam Hussein today is not about just inspecting weapons. It's about making sure that there will be a guarantee, a regime in Baghdad that would actually guarantee that this country won't be a factory of mass destruction or a state sponsoring terrorism.
I personally would have chosen to go and eliminate the other organizations — terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, because my concern is that it's not just a unilateral action there. You have Iran and Syria and Hezbollah who are now preparing certainly with Iraq the response at the time when the United States and its allies would start.
And I am — would be concerned to see what would be the reaction of the Arab League meeting in Beirut in a few weeks to see if the region, as you said, would protect Saddam Hussein because they are afraid. Many regimes are afraid that a change in Iraq would actually lead to a change in their regimes. That would be the most important subject to discuss in the next few days.
KEYES: Does that mean that in your sense of it — because when we were talking to the representative, he had the sense that folks would fall in line if we had to move unilaterally against Iraq, that our other partners in the region among the Arabs would be galvanized by our willingness to act. Do you think that that would, in fact, happen?
PHARES: Well, first of all, we have to understand that the counteroffensive on what would be an American-led offensive has already started. The Iranians have made statements. Many in the Arab world, other than Iraq, as I said earlier, are preparing themselves, bracing themselves to diplomatically counter this action.
But let me tell you one thing. The most important element here is to make sure that the internal ingredient, the Northern Alliance of Iran, the Kurds or the Shi'ites in the South, the other Sunni elements within Baghdad would be prepared well.
I didn't see the Kurds invited to Washington yet. I didn't see any of the leading officials of the opposition still in action. I didn't see (UNINTELLIGIBLE) where we have already a government in exile.
It is very important, Alan, to show the Arab world that it's not just an American revenge against Saddam Hussein. It's the Iraqi people in uprising against a dictator.
KEYES: Bob Gallucci, do you think that that — that we've seen the kind of preparation in that regard, across a broad range of diplomatic as well as political preparations that actually lend credibility to the notion we're going to remove this man and put a new regime in place?
GALLUCCI: Judging from the reports that we've seen, I don't think that we've been persuasive as yet if what we've gotten is a real reaction in the press to our argument that the regime must be changed. I see, therefore, as I said before, great value in pursuing an inspection regime.
If the inspection regime works in addressing the weapons of mass destruction, that's all to the good. If it fails, then we're really back to where we were in 1991, 11 years ago, when we had Resolution 687 and we had an international community agreed that that regime needed to abide by that resolution and give up its weapons of mass destruction or it would be subjected to continued hostilities.
That was the implicit and explicit threat, and that we can push back on our other members of the Security Council, that we can push back to the — to those in the region.
KEYES: Yeah, but — but, Robert, what I...
GALLUCCI: They're there right now.
KEYES: What I don't understand, though, is that, in effect, what happened in consequence of all of that was the abandonment, the kicking out of the inspectors, and Saddam Hussein living all these years with a relatively free hand.
Isn't that proof enough that he's been violating this regime, and wouldn't that justify the very military action that was considered at that time as appropriate, if, in fact, he failed to cooperate?
I don't understand why we don't regard the intervening years as evidence of his failure to comply.
GALLUCCI: Well, in the intervening years, we lost the coalition that was willing to support us in pressing the Iraqis to keep the inspection regime in place. I think you could decide at any point that those programs are so dangerous because they're on the verge of regenerating a capability that you must act, and we may be there now, and if we are, then I think — and we make that judgment based on intelligence, I think it's a reasonable thing for the United States in our own interests and that of regional security to act against that regime.
But you asked the question about whether we were persuasive in the region, and based upon what I've read in the press reports from the vice president's trip, we are not yet persuasive, either in the connection to terrorism or in the regeneration of that capability. If we were, I think your argument would make great, good sense.
KEYES: Raymond Tanter, if that is the case — and we have not yet convinced folks on the basis that Robert Gallucci is discussing — does that mean that we need to be doing a better job. I mean, presumably, the strong rhetoric of the administration has a basis in fact.
Are we seeing a situation where there's a failure to communicate that basis with the kind of effectiveness that would move some of this opinion in a direction that would accept the necessity for strong action that we are talking about?
TANTER: Alan, military success casts a long political shadow. Once the Arab moderate regimes figure out that the United States is serious has been successful in Afghanistan, then you're going to see people coming around, and, publicly, the Arab moderate leaders — why shouldn't they have some reservations? They keep their options open that way.
Privately, I think they're telling the vice president and the president and secretary of state, secretary of defense quite different statements, and those statements are probably to the effect that, “If you're going in and you're serious, we're with you. But do a good job. None of this pinprick bombing as December, 1998, four days over a weekend, and then leave.”
KEYES: Thank you very much. Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for coming today.
We're obviously dealing with a situation of great complexity, and it's one that is reflected, I think, in the complexity of the president's policy.
Obviously also, we're dealing with a situation where bureaucracy is tugging with itself, and the resultant of that tug of war is seen in the public statements of policy.
The one thing that I think is consistent and clear, however, is that Saddam Hussein poses a real danger in the estimation of the United States and that we are doing what we think is necessary to prepare the ground for decisive action against him. That decisive action could be prepared with this regime of inspection.
I personally believe, though, that we've given him plenty enough time to prove or disprove his willingness to go along with that regime, and on every front, he has disproved it. Why we would given him another chance just to get a bunch of other folks to go along who should have better sense, I don't know.
I think that if we need to move against him, we should make clear the grounds in relation to our present war on terrorism and take the necessary action.
Later, we're going to get to what's on your mind on any topic. Call us at 1-866-KEYES-USA. 1-866-KEYES-USA. You're watching MSNBC, the best news on cable.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes.
We talked a minute ago about the fact that Tom Ridge, who obviously is taking on more and more of an important role in terms of the administration of our homeland security, he's been asked to go up to the Hill to testify and the president is proving reluctant to allow him to do so. Here's what President Bush had to say about it last week.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: He doesn't have to testify. He's a part of my staff, and that's part of the prerogative of the executive branch of government and we hold that very dear.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now, Senator Tom Daschle says he's considering a subpoena to force Ridge to testify. Here's what he had to say.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
SEN. TOM DASCHLE (D-SD), MAJORITY LEADER: He's also the administrator of all of the array of agencies that are now being coordinated in response to the need for homeland defense. So, he's taking on a different role than that of Condoleezza Rice, who serves as an adviser to the president. This goes way beyond that, and for that reason, especially, it's important for us to be able to coordinate and work with him much more closely.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Now, I have to tell you that I think that Senator Daschle was actually wrong about Condoleezza Rice's role, because she's also a coordinator. As a matter of fact, established under law by the National Security Council Act to be a coordinator with respect to this nation's national security affairs. And that means that she has a very comparable position to the one that Tom Ridge is occupying.
I myself feel that we're faced here not just with a question of the moment, with an expedient question that has to do with how we handle this present situation. It also is a question that involves the constitutional prerogatives of the Congress of the United States and whether or not, in time of war, we sit by and allow those prerogatives to be eroded while substantive power is given to officials who are then shielded from congressional oversight. If we get into that habit, it seems to me we could seriously upset the balance of our constitutional system and it's something we do have to be concerned about.
Is that happening here? That I think is the question of the day. And to help us understand it a little better, we are joined now by Republican Congressman Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, who is the chair of the subcommittee on homeland security; and Democratic congresswoman Jane Harman of California, also a member of the homeland security subcommittee. Welcome to MAKING SENSE and thank you very much for joining us tonight.
Representative Chambliss, I'd like to start with you because I expressed I think a very honest concern on my part with respect to the possible effect that this situation of war could have on the Congress' role. If we got into the habit of putting substantive responsibility into the hands of officials in a position where they could then step back from congressional scrutiny and not have to consult and answer questions and aid the Congress in formulating the kind of policies that go into the budget and so forth and so on, wouldn't we be establishing a dangerous constitutional precedent, especially given that the war on terror could go on for a long time?
REP. SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R), GEORGIA: I don't think so, Alan. I mean, we're in a different war than any American has ever been involved in before. The White House took the prerogative, I think rightfully so, of creating the Office of Homeland Security by executive order. They charged Governor Ridge with having jurisdiction and authority over this number of federal agencies and subagencies. This is his responsibility to administer and get his arms around this number of agencies.
Now, can you imagine the congressional committees that have some jurisdiction over some of these agents and subagencies. If Governor Ridge is allowed to go up and testify, then every single committee in Congress is going to want him up there to testify. This guy needs to be able to do his job. He has got the flexibility now to do it. He's been to the Hill. He's talked to the Democratic leadership. He's talked to the Republican leadership. He has talked to the Democratic caucus, the Republican policy committee. He's communicating with members of Congress on a regular and daily basis and everybody know what is being done with this money.
So, I don't think it's fair to get him up there. I think he needs to be doing his job as a staff adviser to the president and he's got the president's ear. So, I think it would be a bad policy move to require him to come up to testify.
KEYES: Well, I have to say, though, it almost seems to me that you're making my case for me because you suggest that he has been given large, substantive responsibilities over many agencies of the government. That seems to me to be something that would ordinarily be subject to congressional oversight. A pattern of government in which such satrophies were established, in such a way that unlike the cabinet or other people, they weren't responsive to Congress, that the image of a government so organized by any president doesn't bother you in terms of its constitutional implications?
CHAMBLISS: Well, he doesn't have authority over all of these agencies and subagencies. He's just responsible for working with them to see that they implement the president's wishes and the president's desires under the budget. This is not his budget. This is the president's budget. And he's charged with the responsibility of making sure that they have the funds that they ask for, but that they implement it. And he doesn't have the substantive authority to implement it himself.
KEYES: Now, Representative Harman, some folks I know who might even share some of the concerns that I have, look at Senator Daschle, look at folks on the Democrat side, and they basically see this in the context of political maneuvering and an effort to do things that would somehow create opportunities to embarrass the administration.
Do you think that we are in danger of seeing this kind of sort of political harassment in this situation or is there a legitimate issue here that requires that Tom Ridge respond to the Congress?
REP. JANE HARMAN (D), CALIFORNIA: Well, I think the fight over testifying before Congress is a side show, Alan. But there are Republicans who support that. Senator Stevens of the Senate appropriations committee, a Republican, strongly supports Ridge coming up.
The real fight, the real issue is what are Ridge's powers, and we have never settled that in a way that I find satisfactory. He is not an assistant to the president. I was an assistant to President Jimmy Carter. That is not his role. He is the director of the Office of Homeland Security. He is not an adviser like Condoleezza Rice, who's called the National Security Adviser. You know that. You worked at the National Security Council.
This man is supposedly in charge of creating a strategy for 100 agencies. I'm holding up the same chart that Saxby Chambliss held up. Right at the top, it says the Office of Homeland Security. That office has no power and many of us on a bipartisan basis thinks he should be given Cabinet-level status, which would require him to testify, but he'd be a Cabinet secretary and have budget authority.
KEYES: Well, wouldn't that then suggest that given the situation in which we final ourselves, you would want Congress to take the kind of step with respect with Tom Ridge that it took with respect to the national security adviser and to formulize in legislation...
HARMAN: You bet.
KEYES: ... the existence of this office and so forth? Is that the same of this effort, because it's been presented almost like it's just petty maneuvering to get him to come up and talk about things. Is there a serious agenda here that aims at somehow regularizing this position?
HARMAN: Well, my agenda is to be sure that this man does have the power that he needs to have so he can create a national security strategy and compel 100 federal agencies and numbers of others to follow the strategy. We need one homeland security policy in this country. It's been five months since Tom Ridge came to town and we don't have one.
KEYES: Well, here I have a question, though. And, I guess, in a way, it's directed to both of you. But I'll start with Representative Saxby Chambliss, because I look at this, I'm a little confused and I think it was reflected in Congresswoman Harman's statement there because she inadvertently used the term national security when she meant homeland security.
And yet, when you look at the role of homeland security and all the different elements involved in, doesn't it, in fact, overlap with many areas with what ought to be the responsibilities of the national security adviser? It has domestic, it has foreign, it has intelligence components. It seems very much like the kind of interagency, interdepartmental challenge that the National Security Council staff is supposed to handle. Are we duplicating functions here, Representative Chambliss?
CHAMBLISS: Well, I don't think so, Alan. I'll say to Jane, and I generally agree on most everything, but the issue of whether or not we ought to have legislative authority creating the office of homeland security is one area we disagree on, because of just what you said.
You know, this is a new position. It's a position that we've never had to have before and, therefore, we're still feeling our way through. And the president has been very clear about the fact that we may reach a point in time where we do need legislative authority setting forth the exact powers of this office.
But right now, we need to make a determination of exactly what the office ought to be doing and there needs to be great flexibility in reaching the point to where we really do know what overlapping there is and if there should be overlapping, what the jurisdiction of each particular agency that you do overlap with should have.
So, I think it's very critical that we continue to allow great flexibility in this office and if we reach the point to where legislative authority is needed, then I can assure you that the administration is going to be coming forward with recommendations.
KEYES: Representative Harman, we have very few seconds left. One last word.
HARMAN: Well, the turf disputes are too strong. It's too late, unfortunately, for Ridge himself to propose this. I wish the president would act. We cannot wait in this country for a strategy that will protect all of us against what could be very well a very serious second wave of attacks.
KEYES: And I have to say, in conclusion, thank you, first of all, both of you for joining me tonight in helping us I think to understand what is not at heart — it's not a petty dispute, I don't think. I think it's serious. It's serious at a constitutional level and a level of national secure.
At the end of the day, I do believe that if Congress is going to have to look at this eventually, then they ought to be consulted along the way. They should be jealous of their prerogatives, especially during wartime. And I think it is a failure to respect the requirements of our national security if they don't exercise their prerogatives. After all, what is more important to the security of our freedom than the Constitution of the United States, and it ought to be respected even as we meet the exigencies of war.
Thank you both for joining us. Next, we're going to hear what's on your mind. You can call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA. That's 1-866-KEYES-USA. And later, my “Outrage of the Day”, something that comes close to both my heart and experience, the outcome of the election in Zimbabwe and what it actually implies for you and me in terms of what might be our future situation with respect to demands made on our pocketbook. Have you though about this? I have.
And that will be my “Outrage of the Day.” We'll be right back, so you stay with us.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now we get to “What's On Your Mind.” First, let's go to Paul from California. Paul, are you making sense?
CALLER: Yes.
KEYES: Welcome to the show. What's on your mind?
CALLER: I'd like to say I think that September 11 was the best thing that happened to George Bush. I think his whole presidency would be out of the water right now if it weren't for this whole hoax, this homeland security is just a trick to limit our personal freedoms, and I'm really disappointed that he's just getting so much attention drawn. If it weren't for September 11, his rating would be plummeted right now.
KEYES: Well, I don't know about that, Paul, but I'll tell you something. I think that, as I have made the serious point, we do have to be wary of what happens to our freedoms, our liberties, our constitutional balance as we face this threat from terrorism.
But the threat is real, September 11 was real, the concerns that the president and his folks are responding to are quite real and I think we are going to be in serious trouble if we start moving on the assumption that we're faced with some kind of hoax. Hoaxes don't usually kill that many thousands of people. Let's go to George from California.
CALLER: Hello? hello?
KEYES: Welcome to MAKING SENSE. Go ahead, George.
CALLER: OK. Bush is alienating our coalition or our allies and inflaming the opposition. We're going to have to go unilaterally into Iraq. That means more American deaths. Now, he of all people knows that he never got a scratch and the only time he got a scratch was when he was eating pretzels.
KEYES: I have to tell you, the fact that we might risk some lives going against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, if we don't move against those who could provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks, then we are going to risk a lot of lives right here at home and that would be irresponsible. So, I think we can debate back and forth the tame table, things of that kind, but I don't think there can be much debate about the need to move unilaterally if we must in defense of American live in this terrorist...
CALLER: Why would he break up our coalition to get...
KEYES: Right now there is no coalition with respect to Iraq. That was made clear by all...
CALLER: Because of him.
KEYES: That was discussed by all the panelists. It's not our fault. It's because they lost their backbone. The terror threat means that we can't afford to let that be an excuse for fecklessness. In my opinion.
Anyway, thank you for you feedback. Appreciate you calling in. Next, “My Outrage of the Day.” There's been an election in Zimbabwe. The new president, who is the old president, Robert Mugabe, said they've issued a blow to imperialism. What it actually seems they did is issue a blow to the country's economy that could involve all of us eventually. Stay tuned to find out how. We'll be right back.
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KEYES: Robert Mugabe has just been re-elected as the prime minister of Zimbabwe in an election that has been called into question in terms of all the usual tactics that were used to suppress the vote of his opposition and diffuse and cast his opposition into disarray.
That's not the main thing that bothers me. The main thing that bothers me is that he's been pursuing policies and now promises to do more of the same that destroy the farming sector of his country because it was mostly run effectively by white farmers, and he is now moving against them in order to placate the political desires of his constituents within Zimbabwe, with the results, my friends, that an economy that was more than capable not just of feeding its own people, but of feeding Southern Africa and Africa will be turned into a basket case.
There'll be tens of thousands of starving folks and at some point begging bowl in hand they will come to us to tell us that it was somehow our fault. I hope you remember that if Mugabe had been more of a builder and less of a fighter, he wouldn't have destroyed the economy in his own country and have to turn to others for help. That's my sense of it. Thank you for joining us.
Next, The News with Brian Williams. I'll see you tomorrow.