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Alan Keyes is Making Sense
Alan KeyesMarch 12, 2002
ALAN KEYES, HOST: Good evening. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
Tonight, we're going to talk about two aspects of the situation we find ourselves in in the war on terrorism. In the first half hour, we're going to be dealing with an issue that came up over the weekend having to do with the relevance of our nuclear weapons targeting policy to the whole environment of the war on terrorism, the axis of evil. What's the appropriate way to try to deal with the potential threat of the abuse of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists against the United States?
And the half hour after that, we're going to take a look at issues that arise in the context of American immigration policy. We learned today, for instance, that two months before September 11, the federal government granted visa upgrades to two of the hijackers, Mohamed Atta, and Omar Al-Shehhi. The upgrades were needed so that they could take flying lessons. And guess what? They got — the flight school just got the notice today that the upgrades had been approved. Well, better late than ever.
Meanwhile, today the House of Representatives votes to ease immigration restrictions. So, first the INS proves that they're incompetent, and then the House gives them more power. This makes a lot of sense. We'll be talking about that in the second half hour.
But first, over the weekend, everybody was talking about the paper that was leaked in the media, which detailed some changes, potential changes, the thinking about changes, in the targeting policy for America's nuclear weapons and overall in the kind of weapons we are producing, the kind of research we are doing, all aimed presumably at trying to refit our nuclear policy for the challenges of the present terrorist environment, the terrorist war that we are fighting.
From NBC News, military analyst William Arkin who came out with this, they told us that the Bush administration has actually ordered the Pentagon to draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against at least seven countries — Russia, the axis of evil, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, and also China, Libya, and Syria.
The so-called nuclear posture review, which was delivered to Congress earlier this year, said weapons could be used in three situations: against targets which cannot be destroyed by conventional weapons; in retaliation on an attack on Americans with weapons of mass destruction involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; or in the event of a surprising military development.
Now, these revelations have cause add bit of a stir in some quarters as folks react either for or against this perceived possible change in our nuclear policy, some people believing that we are lowering the threshold in terms of the possible use of nuclear weapons and making the world more dangerous. Other people believing we're trying to establish a regime of deterrence that obviously would help to make the world safer for Americans if it would enlist the help of some of these rogue regimes in preventing the acts of terrorism which might then result in their destruction. We are going to be talking about the pros and cons of this issue this evening.
Up front, Frank Gaffney, founder and president for the Center for Security Policy, also an assistant secretary of defense for international security in the Reagan administration. He wrote about this subject in today's “Washington Times” in an article that was entitled “Adults Address the Unthinkable.” Frank, welcome back to MAKING SENSE. Appreciate your coming tonight.
FRANK GAFFNEY, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY: Thank you. Always a pleasure, Alan.
KEYES: We obviously have seen a bit of a stir as this paper and the thinking that's involved in it has come before the public. What's all the fuss about here?
GAFFNEY: It's a fuss that was calculated, I think, by Bill Arkin, the fellow you mentioned, who leaked this classified report, got access to it. It was leaked to him. And he in turn passed it to the “LA Times” and others.
Arkin is a guy who has periodically done this in the past to inflame international and, to some extent, domestic opposition to nuclear weapons. He comes from a school that says we shouldn't have nuclear weapons, we don't want us or ideally anybody else to have them, but let's start with the one that is we have.
There's another school — we ought to be clear about this — I think the Clinton administration epitomized it — which says, well, we ought to have nuclear weapons, but we don't want to do anything to maintain them or to assure that they remain safe and reliable for the future.
And then there's the Bush administration, which I think to its credit has said, wait a minute, let's take a mature, adult approach to this. We believe we do need nuclear weapons. We believe that they play an important role in maintaining our security and deterring aggression against us. Let's think through, as you said in your opening, how in the 21st century we may find ourselves challenged.
We may find ourselves threatened even in ways vastly more devastating than what we saw on September 11. And let's figure out how to make sure that our nuclear deterrent posture addresses those threats to the extent it can and we maintain that deterrent posture for the long haul.
KEYES: Now, obviously some elements of this policy that is being talked about shouldn't surprise anybody. China, Russia, powers that are potentially hostile, armed with nuclear weapons, clearly we would have to have some kind of a plan to respond to an attack that came from those quarters in spite of what may be the state of our relations, since this is obviously contingency planning.
GAFFNEY: Right.
KEYES: I think what might catch the attention of folks, though, is the fact that we are thinking about targeting a second-level tier of states, some of whom are a part of the axis of evil. Explain your thought about what the possible thinking might be behind that targeting of these second-tier axis of evil-type states?
GAFFNEY: Well, as I said, in keeping with the idea that we're looking at a very different world in the 21st century than the one we knew, say, in the old Cold War, we're looking at different actors, each of whom has some kind of weapon of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and/or nuclear or at least atomic weapons, and each of whom is getting the means to deliver such weapons over longer and longer distances with ballistic missiles or other means.
These are states with whom we might find ourselves in conflict. They are all to varying degrees involved in terrorism. They have sponsored it. They are providing technology, weapons of mass destruction, missile and other technology, to state sponsors of terrorism. They are working amongst each other in ways that could be very injurious to our interests.
And I think what the administration has said, not let's go attack these people, or not let's go decide how we're going to attack them tomorrow, but if we found ourselves, God forbid, in a circumstance where it may be possible to prevent a horrible act of aggression against us or our friends or interests, let's think through now before that moment arises what we can do to prevent that from happening, including possibly the use of nuclear weapons.
KEYES: Aren't we also though — because I think when you combine it with the axis of evil rhetoric, there is a certain implication that if a terrorist somehow attacked the United States, we're going to look around the world and hold certain states responsible on a prima facie basis. Doesn't that provide them with a motive for using the contacts and connections they may have in the terrorist underworld to try to prevent such an assault since it might result in serious damage to themselves?
GAFFNEY: It could, Alan. Look, I think one of the thing that is we learned from September 11 is people determined to do us harm may be indifferent not only to the loss of their own lives but to the loss of others' lives.
The hard part about deterrence is that this is no science. This is at best a black art. I like to think of it as an insurance policy. You do what you can to prevent evil people from doing what they might be able to do to you.
And it's a hard call. It involves very difficult judgments. And I can assure you neither President Bush nor I think any other president wants to go to nuclear war, wants to ever use these things. But there may well be circumstances in which it is the least of the evils confronting us. And I think the president is wise to assure that we have the capability and that we can have it in the future in an appropriate way.
This requires modernization of our arsenal. It requires testing of our arsenal. It requires having an infrastructure to support our arsenal. These are all steps that the Bush administration has understand are needed, the Clinton administration didn't want to pay any attention to. But at the end of the day, he doesn't want to use these things. And I hope he won't ever have to.
KEYES: Well, one of the questions I think naturally occurs to me as well is when you're thinking through these very difficult and challenging and in some ways unthinkable possibilities, one always wonders what's the alternative. If we don't try to structure some kind of regime of deterrence with a credible threat that puts people on notice of their own danger, then what exactly is it that might be there to discourage this kind of attack against the United States? I don't think these folks who are critical and kind of chagrined really address what is the heart of this strategic challenge because you have got to try to defend our people against this possibility.
GAFFNEY: I think you do, too. Many of them, the Arkins of the world, if you will, offer up as the alternative arms control, arms control with regimes that have nothing but contempt for the very idea of law at home in their domestic environments to say nothing of international law.
KEYES: Right.
GAFFNEY: This is a fraud.
KEYES: Right. We're running out of time. But I must say regime that aren't even very susceptible to the logic of deterrence are hardly going to be susceptible to the logic of arms control.
GAFFNEY: Absolutely.
KEYES: It makes no sense. Thank you, Frank.
GAFFNEY: Thank you.
KEYES: Appreciate your being with us this evening.
Next, we're going to get together with a panel of experts to get to the heart of this matter. And we're going to look at these questions. First, the one I put to Frank Gaffney in the beginning. What's all the fuss about? Isn't this a necessary element of a deterrence policy aimed at trying to establish some kind of structure to discourage harm to our people? And, finally, what is, in fact, the alternative to trying to establish such a regime of deterrence?
Plus, I want to know what's on your mind. Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA, 1-866-KEYES-USA.
First, though, does this make sense? In Vermont, in response to the fact that there have been moves supportive of homosexuality, some folks have introduced in the state legislature a bill barring teachers from teaching about homosexuality in a positive way in the public schools. This apparently is stalled, it's held up, by the way, in a Republican-controlled education committee because they are saying some of the Republicans — it's near election time — are saying, “Well, it is not the appropriate time to “do this.”
I ask them, when is the appropriate time to take steps that might protect susceptible children from teachings that could very well be contrary to their parent's desires to distort their own understanding? If you don't do it now, how are you going to protect both the innocence and the understanding of our young kids?
I think standing on the sidelines so you can get reelected may make sense to you. But does it make sense to those kids?
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
REP. J.D. HAYWORTH (R), ARIZONA: Because we are a nation at war, this House and this government should seriously consider a moratorium on immigration.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
REP. VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR. (I), VIRGINIA: If we pass legislation like this, the southwestern United States could become like Quebec. We do not need separatist movements in this country. We need to stand for the United States of America as it is today.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Some contentious moments in Congress today before the House voted to ease restrictions that would allow some foreigners stay in the United States as they seek residency. Now, we're going to be debating this issue in our next half hour against the backdrop of the revelation that the INS has just notified the flight school that trained some of the terrorists that flew their planes into the World Trade Center that their visas have been upgraded. Looks like the bureaucracy hasn't caught up with the times.
Meanwhile, our chat room is humming tonight. Omar Yach (ph) says, “We are losing moral high ground with each new target we try to rationalize.” And you can join in right now at chat.msnbc.com.
Now, however, we get to the heart of the matter. We're talking about the flurry of interest, attention, discussion, debate that surrounds the revelation that there's a contemplated change in our nuclear policy, a retargeting of our nuclear weapons possibly, a change in the production schedules, a change in the kind of emphasis in terms of research with respect to our nuclear arsenal to upgrade and modernize, as the administration I think would contend this, of course, to suit the needs of the 21st century. Others see it as a dangerous drift toward a world that would be more dangerous in nuclear terms.
Joining us for this discussion, Cliff May, president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, the think tank formed after 9-11 in response to the threat of terrorism. Also with us, Joe Cirincione, director of the Nonproliferation Project, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank. And Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan.
Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CLIFF MAY, PRESIDENT, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY: Thank you, Alan.
JOE CIRINCIONE, DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE: Thank you, Alan.
KEYES: First, I want to go to Lawrence Korb and really ask the question that I asked Frank Gaffney. As I have watched this and develop and so forth and so on, part of me, I have got to confess, looks at it in a context that seems to me perfectly natural that one would be looking at one's nuclear policy and trying to suit it to the requirements of the somewhat more complex and challenging situation. What's all the fuss about with respect to this paper and the thinking that's involved in it?
LAWRENCE KORB, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: Well, I think the fuss is about those things that you put up when you talked to Frank Gaffney at first, the criteria for using them. We're going to use them against targets that are not susceptible to non-nuclear. We're going to use them under circumstances of our own choosing. So, in addition to the normal deterrence or the retaliation, you're now adding two new criteria, which are very, very, very nebulous and would make it more likely that you would use weapons.
For example, when you say against target that is are not susceptible to non-nuclear devices, what exactly do you mean? Or this catch-all phrase “in the event of unexpected military developments.” And once you do that, you make it much more likely that other countries in the world who have renounced going for nuclear weapons are going to get them. And we risk breaking the taboo against using nuclear weapons ever since the American attacks on Japan some 57 years ago.
And that's what all the fuss is about because rather than making the United States more secure, it's actually made it less secure because a big danger to us is nuclear proliferation.
KEYES: Joe Cirincione, in light of the fact that we live in a world in which nuclear terrorists make totally out of their own kind of peculiar, irrational illogic, they may ignore what seems to us to be the logic of deterrence or the threshold of nuclear weapons and so forth and so on. Aren't we living in a world where we can't calculate in the same linear fashion that might have been appropriate in the era of the Cold War? And don't we need to have a structure and posture that makes it clear that we're flexible enough to meet the kind of threats that may emerge in the 21st century?
CIRINCIONE: It is more difficult to calculate deterrence and to calculate the threats. You're absolutely right, Alan.
But you have got it backwards about the role that nuclear weapons have in this. We are the most powerful military country in the world. We have overwhelming conventional superiority. We're demonstrating it again.
You want to teach a lesson in deterrence? Look at what happened to al Qaeda. That is concrete deterrence.
So, we want to minimize the chance at another country can acquire a nuclear weapon to offset our conventional superiority. It is directly in our interest to have fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer countries with them.
That's why this policy review is such a mistake because it expands the number of nuclear weapons, the types of nuclear weapons, the production capabilities of these nuclear weapons, and the missions for nuclear weapons. If other countries did what we are saying we're going to do, we would label them dangerous rogues.
The test of any policy is how would we feel if another country adopted it? I think we would feel in a very unsafe situation.
KEYES: Joe Cirincione, is this something that we're kind of imposing out of a willful act, as I think Joe was just saying? Or are we looking at a world in which we're faced with a complex range of threats in trying to make sure that our nuclear posture not only is responsive to those threats but actually at some level reestablishes a regime of deterrence, vis-a-vis these regimes that may not be as susceptible as, say, the old Soviet Union was to the linear logic of deterrence?
MAY: Well, look, I don't think that deterrence is something we can count on. We're not targeting any nations. What we're doing is looking at the nations, the rogue nations and the terrorist organizations, that are targeting us and trying to think what we can do about it, yes, in terms of deterrence, but also in terms of retaliation.
It is vital that we have this within our arsenal and that it be clear that we may use it. But, for example, Joe just said, and I think very wrongly, that we've shown al Qaeda what can be done when they do things to us. We know for a fact, Alan, that al Qaeda — they're still out there, after all, we've only destroyed about 20 percent of them worldwide — that they believe that 9-11 was a great triumph, as they call it.
The New York raid as they call it, had broad goals and aspirations. It rang the bells of restoring Arab and Islamic glory.
We have a difficult situation here. Don't forget what we see here is contingency planning, not operational planning. It's thinking about what we might have to do at some point. And we shouldn't rule out using any weapon in our arsenal against the suicide bombers and the kamikaze pilots and all the others who are sworn to kill infidels, to kill us.
KEYES: Well, aren't we, though, Cliff, if we go down this road, possibly encouraging other states to imitate what we're doing, and in that way — and I think this is the point Joe was trying to make — upsetting what had been supposedly our efforts at nonproliferation?
MAY: I think that is a false argument. I really do. What we're saying is that, look, there are some nations who are going to be hostile towards us. That's OK. But if they sponsor terrorism, they are our enemies. And if they sponsor terrorism to develop weapons of mass destruction, they are at war with us.
We are not going to allow terrorist sponsoring nations to have weapons of mass destruction. If that seems unfair, I say so be it. This has nothing to do with the war against terrorism. Let's get that out of the way right away.
CIRINCIONE: It has everything — the nuclear posture review was done before September 11. The positions that are in this review were prepared by conservative analysts, some of whom you know very well, a year ago.
There have always been people who have been arguing to develop new, smaller, more usable nuclear weapons, who wanted to use these weapons in combat situations even when they don't involve any nuclear weapons on the other side. They have always been held in check by the responsible adults in the Department of Defense and in the White House. The responsible adults seem to be out to lunch at this point and have let the nuclear nuts run the show.
MAY: Joe, what would you have us do, tell all the terrorists in the world, “Don't worry, no matter what you do to us, we will never use these weapons?”
(CROSSTALK)
KORB: Let me get in here a second if I can. Nobody is arguing that we shouldn't deter or retaliate. The question is, should we use them, according to this document, against target that is are not susceptible to non-nuclear weapons regardless of the circumstance? The other is when you confront surprising military developments, that means you can use them anytime. This is a false argument, Cliff. Nobody...
MAY: Look...
KORB: ... is against what you're saying. But the fact of the matter is, and Joe is right, I don't know where in the heck the adults were when people were doing this. You know, when I worked for Reagan and it leaked that some of the people working for us were saying nuclear war could be fought and won and it got out, Reagan got up and said, “No, no, that can't happen.” And this is what Bush needs to do. He needs to get up and say, “Well, wait a second, we obviously would use them for deterrence and retaliation, but not on these other criteria, nor...”
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Wait, hold on a second, just if I may express a thought, because here is where I think the problem is. I think, Lawrence, you're assuming a symmetry that used to exist and no longer exists between the two sides in this situation.
KORB: No, no...
KEYES: Hold on. We are dealing with a world in which you have rogue states. You have terrorist networks. You have some folks like the folks within the Osama bin Laden network who aren't susceptible to the logic of deterrence at all. They're ready to give their lives. They don't care what the consequences are for other innocent people. When we are struck and living in a context where that kind of thing can strike us at any time, don't we have to have an arsenal flexible enough to meet that kind of threat?
KORB: No, no, what we're talking about here is the criteria on which you're going to use them. You're mixing two things. The criteria there, when you talk about surprising military developments, or you say because the target is not susceptible to non-nuclear weapons, we're going to break that threat? That's the key thing. Nobody's talking about...
MAY: Lawrence, you're making obviously a good point. And the language there of surprising developments is not very clear. But, again, this was a contingency plan that was leaked, not an operational plan that was announced.
As for targets that have been hardened indeed, if we knew, for example, that Osama bin Laden was way down in a bunker somewhere and there were a precision weapon that we could use to get him and also limit collateral damage, wouldn't you want to do that?
KORB: Not with a nuclear weapon, because you can't.
MAY: You...
KORB: You cannot — listen, I used to fly for the Navy. And we used to load these nuclear weapons. You cannot limit the damage, nor — what you've done now is you've broken the threshold, and everybody will be free to use them.
CIRINCIONE: Right. That's exactly the point. You don't want to make the world safe for nuclear weapons because if we use them to get our terrorists, why doesn't India need a nuclear weapon to go get their terrorists? How about Israel? Why don't they adopt a new nuclear weapon to go get their terrorists? And suddenly you've broken down...
MAY: Israel and India already have nuclear weapons.
CIRINCIONE: Right. And they would never use them.
MAY: Well, we hope that nobody will use them. What we hope most of all is that the rogue states and the terrorists won't use nuclear weapons first against us.
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: ... because I listen to you, I think one thing is clear, though. We do seem to have a consensus that if the objective is deterrence, then there is an appropriate need not only for nuclear weapons but for a structure, for targeting, for weapons appropriate to making that point of deterrence. The deterrence, of course, actually is only credible if your enemy thinks that you're going to be effective in actual use.
And against a certain range of states, including what I understand if I hear correctly, that second tier of rogue states that might possibly be connected with the terrorist networks that would deliver weapons of mass destruction by terroristic means, deterrence is still appropriate there. But the question seems to arise, if I'm listening to the discussion rightly, based on whether or not we are going to initiate the breaking of the nuclear threshold in ways not related to an attack on the United States.
(UNKNOWN): Right.
KEYES: And there I think I would have to agree with Lawrence Korb and Joe that in the context of the logic of deterrence, flexibility makes sense. If we're just going to announce to the world we're going to start throwing nuclear weapons around because it is a more appropriate way to do business we could otherwise do, I think that would be a serious and wrong message given all the work we've put into trying to establish a regime of nonproliferation.
It would encourage other countries faced with exactly the same problem to be careless in their use of nuclear weapons. I don't think we want to do that.
And if this is just a planning document, I think they ought to plan on structure of deterrence and what's needed to maintain it, not on the structure that might send the wrong message about our own willingness to use nuclear weapons in an environment that is not about deterrence.
I don't know, Cliff. I think just it would be dangerous to send that signal.
MAY: I think you don't want to send the signal you're going to throw them around. But you also don't want to send the signal there's no way you'll use them or develop specific weapons with great precision for specific use. The good news in this document is that Russia used to be on our list of nations that we thought we might need to lose nuclear weapons about. It no longer is. Let's hope that in a few years Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya are no longer on this list either.
(CROSSTALK)
CIRINCIONE: Yeah, Russia is on the list. They're still on the list.
KORB: They are on the list.
CIRINCIONE: And most of our weapons are still targeted against Russia.
KEYES: I think that is a misunderstanding. Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being with me tonight and I think obviously a lively and critical debate against a backdrop of something that is I think an ever-increasing matter of concern.
CIRINCIONE: Thank you for having the debate.
KEYES: Really appreciate it.
I think that it's an ever-increasing matter of concern to us, obviously, because in the context of the war on terrorism, there is a new meaning for our homeland population in terms of the possible assault with nuclear weapons. How we can keep this inchoate structure of rogue states, terrorist networks, semi-rational states and organizations from moving against the United States I think is one of those challenges that must preoccupy our policymakers.
In that sense, I think thinking about the unthinkable becomes something that we as Americans have to show a greater understanding and comprehension of so that we give space to our policymakers to develop the flexible response that is will be required to keep us safe in a world that is no longer susceptible to the sort of bipolar linear logic of the old Cold War mutual-assured-destruction kind of thinking.
Well, next, on the very day that Congress gives the INS greater power, the flight school thattrained the 9-11 hijackers has received clearance to give them flying lessons. Good thing they're dead, isn't it?
Doesn't it make you wonder if the bureaucracy hasn't caught up yet with what's happened, maybe we better make sure we don't give them the power to make something else bad happen, or at least to not take the action that might help to prevent it. Anyway, we're going to be debating that in the next segment.
And later, what's on your mind on any topic? Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA.
You're watching MSNBC, the best news on cable.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes. The INS last week sent out letters to the two terrorists who piloted the airliners into the World Trade Center. Notifying them that they were welcome to stay longer in America. They upgraded their visas so they could go to the flying school.
One of the letters was addressed to the late Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the attack. Here's MSNBC's Robert Hager.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
ROBERT HAGER, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): This is Rudy Decker, he owns the flying school in Venice, Florida, where hijackers Mohammed Attaand Marwan Al-Shehhi trained. It was Atta who flew the plane into Trade Center Towers one, and Al-shehhi who flew into Tower two. That was six months ago.
So, imagine Dekker's surprise this weekend, when he got a routine notification in the mail from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that Atta and al-Shehhi have been approved for student visas to study at his flying school.
RUDI DEKKER, FLIGHT SCHOOL OWNER: The flight schools didn't do anything wrong. The government needs to look at itself, and look at the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) what they can change so this would not happen anymore.
HAGER: So how could INS just now be telling the flight school that two terrorists, responsible for nearly 3,000 deaths, and both dead themselves for six months now, have been approved for student visas?
(on camera): INS admits it's embarrassing, but explains it like this. It says when Atta and al-Shehhi first applied to be upgraded from visitors' visas to student visas two summers ago, there was nothing in the records then to raise suspicions. So the upgrade was routinely approved a year later, months before the terrorist attacks. So the INS says it's just a formal notification to the flying school, that was delayed and has only now arrived.
(voice-over): Arrived this weekend in an envelope from the INS student school processing center in London, Kentucky, postmarked this March 5. Typical of INS, says a critical congressman.
REP. ELTON GALLEGLY (R), CALIFORNIA: And our frustration has turned to anger in many cases, with an agency that has been less than functional for a long time.
HAGER: But INS points out the delayed notification is of no real consequence, just a bizarre foul-up, caused by old processing equipment and a huge backlog of data to be entered into it. The agencies is now spending $34 million to speed up its student visa notification system. But too late to prevent this mistake. A system that just now failed to recognize the name Mohamed Atta, which has now become one of the most infamous names in the history of terrorism.
Robert Hager, NBC News, Washington.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
KEYES: So, I have to tell you. It's the last point that particularly bothers me that after all this time, one would have expected that the INS, along with every other government agency and bureaucracy would have been alerted to these names, would have gone through their records with a fine-tooth comb to find out what they knew about these people and what interaction they had with them. Judging by this snafu, the INS didn't do it. And the fact that it didn't raises questions about whether or not we are, in fact, in this environment of challenge to our security dealing with an immigration system that meets our needs. Now against this backdrop of a reminder of the bureaucratic snafus, the difficulties, the out dated organization that really isn't up to the task of screening individuals in light of our security requirements, we now face a Congress that has just passed a piece of legislation in the House that would actually provide for an extension, a grace period, that would allow folks who are in this country illegally, in various ways in violation of the terms of their visas and so forth to have time so they can get their paperwork done we're told between now and November and regularize their status, and so forth.
Against the backdrop of that security concern, is now the time to be relaxing our vigilance, relaxing restrictions, giving the INS more latitude in terms of who stays in the United States? Or would it be wiser at this point to tell a lot of these folks it's time to go home? Joining us now to talk about these questions, Representative Tom Tancredo, Republican of Colorado and chairman of the House Immigration Reform Caucus, who is against easing the restrictions and Stephen Moore, a senior fellow at the Cato institute, a Washington-based libertarian think tank. He is also president of the Club for Growth, an organization that helps elect candidates who support limited government and lower taxes.
Now, Steven, I know out of deference — Congressman Tancredo, I would start with you. But I want to start with Stephen, because I obviously prejudiced the environment just a little bit in a way that I introduced the topic. And if I actually did not want to put you on the spot, I mean it does seem as if we're in a situation where we'd want to be tougher and more restrictive for the not in terms of how we deal with immigration policy so that possibly through that screening process we might get to some of these sleemer cells. Maybe even inadvertently kick some people out of the country who intend to do us harm. Why relax our vigilance now?
STEPHEN MOORE, CATO INSTITUTE: Well, first of all, on your previous segment on the screw ups at the INS, the INS is one of the bureaucractically inept agencies we have in government. I mean the INS makes the IRS, which is another agency you don't like too much, seem competent by comparison. So I agree with you. We need a total overhaul of the way we administer the immigration laws.
What happened tonight, I think, was a pretty common sense measure. It did two things, Alan. It basically said we're going to beef up our border security to make sure that illegal immigrants cannot come into the country, as easily as they've been able to in the past. But it also says, look, the ones who have been here for five or 10 years who have been paying taxes, Alan, who have not gone on welfare, who have been working here, let's make them Americans.
They're Americans in every way, Alan, except for the fact they don't have green cards and I think it is common sensical, I think its humane, it's allowing families to stay together. We all believe in family values. I think it is a sensible policy, coupled with getting tough on the border and really putting teeth in our border patrol.
KEYES: Representative Tancredo, is Steve right there in terms of the compromise that was worked out here, trading off tougher measures against this amnesty for some individuals?
REP. TOM TANCREDO (R), COLORADO: There's only one problem with that. And the part of the bill that he refers to as being toughening, you know, in fact, it was. There was a great part of that bill that did, in fact, toughen the laws with regard to especially student visas. The only problem is, we passed that bill about a month ago. No, excuse me, in December. We passed that bill in December. It is now sitting in the Senate. It was HR-3525, exactly the same bill.
Now, one wonders, why in the world would we pass the bill again? Why would we even bring it up again? Well, there's where another word you used earlier could come into play: sleeper. Because the sleeper in this arrangement is amnesty, or extension of 245-I, which was tagged on to this recreated bill, which we have already passed. It was done so that it would confuse the issue and give people cover so when they voted for this piece of junk, they would be able to say, ahh, I'm sorry, I thought I was voting to toughen the law. We've already passed this bill.
This was an underhanded way to push this particular issue of amnesty. I am disappointed, of course, in my colleagues. But I'm disappointed in the White House for actually pushing this issue. It is bad policy. It's bad politics.
KEYES: Now, Stephen Moore, on the larger question of amnesty, aren't we, in fact, destroying the integrity of our immigration laws if we do these periodic amnesties in various ways that seem to send the signal that people who cheat on the system are actually going to just have to wait, because if they wait long enough, get away with it for long enough, we're going to regularize their status and let them stay?
We've done it now often enough that this is no longer an exception. It is becoming the kind of rule that cheaters can count on. What about all the folks who obey the laws? Aren't they going to get quite upset because they sat in line for 10, 15 years while these other people get to jump the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) by cheating? Won't we just encourage a general destruction of respect for our immigration laws?
MOORE: Well, I think there is something to that. There's no question about it, Alan. We don't want to encourage illegal immigration by saying come in now illegally and then you can get amnesty later.
This is more of a legalization program for people who would be eligible otherwise, Alan, people who basically have a — either a family connection or an employer who wants to hire them in the country. I think also, if you couple this, again, with the tough teeth in terms of the border patrol, I think it makes it a very sensible policy.
The fact of the matter is, Alan, these people aren't leaving. They've been here for five, 10, in some cases, 15 years. They have family here. They've been working. I think it's kind of nonsensical to think that somehow they're going to leave after 15 years being in a country.
TANCREDO: Steven...
MOORE: The other thing to remember, though, is this idea that somehow, this is tied to terrorism is nonsensical. I mean, the fact is George W. Bush, who's the biggest hawk in terms of defending our country against terrorism, is for this bill and thinks it makes a lot of sense both politically and as a policy matter as well.
KEYES: Well, I think he may want to little something to take with him to Mexico.
TANCREDO: Yes. I think he's leaving on the 22nd to see the president of Mexico and wants to give him a gift. But the reality is, of course, it does have national security implications. Just to call something ludicrous does not it make, no matter how often you say it.
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Let the record...
TANCREDO: I'll tell you exactly how. We are going to turn — no. The process is this. If you are here under certain conditions, and by the way, the thing Stephen left out in that explanation of who these people are, they would be otherwise eligible. This is the one true thing about every single one of them that you're going to talk about here or that are going to become eligible under this bill. They are here illegally. Whether they have overstayed their visa or whether they came across the border without our permission. One way or the other, they're here illegally. That is the bottom line.
We are rewarding that behavior and we are supposed to be a nation of laws. Of course, this is an absolute antithesis of that. It is sending the wrong signal to everybody around the world. If you wait, if you do it the right way, if you fill out the paperwork, if you wait in line to come in, you're a sucker. What you should do is sneak into the country, wait under the radar screen for long enough and we'll give you amnesty.
Now the reason why it is a national security issue is because these people will apply. Guess who tries to figure out whether or not their application is valid and whether the information that they have provided is accurate? Guess which agency has that task?
MOORE: Tom, they're already here. They're here already.
(CROSSTALK)
TANCREDO: Back up. Back up. That's exactly right. And they can operate a heck of a lot more freely by being here legally. Can't they?
(CROSSTALK)
Therefore, you are legalizing, potentially legalizing people who are here to do us harm.
MOORE: Most of the people we're talking about are not Muslims. They're not Arabs.
TANCREDO: So what? So what? How many do you need? How many do you need to be here? Is one too many? How about two? How about three? How about four?
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Stephen, wait a second. Wait a second. I used to do this work when I was in the government, in the state department.
TANCREDO: Right.
KEYES: And I have to tell you that the resentment that exists among folks who are out there, because all of the criteria you talked about with relatives and so forth, there are people by the thousands and tens of thousands waiting to get in this country who satisfy those criteria, but who have acted honestly, haven't broken the law, watching folks who did otherwise go to the head of the line and jump the cue, violates every idea of American fairness.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming in today with a lively discussion and, obviously, one that arouses a lot of intense interest. We'll see how it develops as this whole matter is considered in the Senate and further on.
Later, my outrage of the day. But first, I'm going to hear what's on your mind. So call us at 1-866-KEYES-USA. We'll be right back to see you make some sense.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now we're going to find out what's on your mind. Let's go first to Christopher from New Jersey. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CHRISTOPHER: How are you doing, Mr. Keyes?
KEYES: Very good.
CHRISTOPHER: I just want to say that I don't think anyone should really be shocked about the existence of this nuclear weapons agenda because it seems that even in times of peace, that it's part of the department of defense's job to have a full range of what if scenarios for any of our military capabilities.
KEYES: I think that's true. I think one of the things that a lot of people don't want to think about, for instance, is the fact that we might get into a situation where our military forces, for their survival, would have to use tactical nuclear weapons. That's a scenario that always used to come up, especially in the context of overwhelming numbers, such as we might face from the Communist Chinese in certain places, for instance.
So, I think you're right, in terms of contingency planning, not in terms of policy because I think we want it to be our policy that we won't break the threshold. But in terms of what we might face at some point, we might have to do what we have to do to survive.
Let's go to Chris from Illinois. Chris, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CHRIS: Good evening.
KEYES: Hi.
CHRIS: Wouldn't it, by American policy, make us a rogue nation with this nuclear posturing that we're doing?
KEYES: Why do you think so? I don't understand. We are not attacking other countries or threatening to attack other countries without provocation. There's a part of this that's retaliatory in the context of a possible terrorist strike and part of it that is contingent so that our forces will be prepared to meet whatever contingencies might arise in, of course, of an all-out war where we're defending ourselves. How is that rogue? It's actually just part of our defense thinking, isn't it?
CHRIS: Well, it seems sort of like a baiting technique and it's like saying if Saddam was to say, you know, well, we have got these weapons, we'll use them if we have to. We would then call Iraq a rogue nation.
KEYES: I don't think so. I think what we say about Saddam Hussein is that he has actually threatening to use them against us. As a result, we have to make it clear that if we are hit, we are going to hit them back. That's called deterrence. It's an effort to get your enemy to understand that destroying you, he will destroy himself and I think we have to do it, even with a range of states that might use the terrorist network against us.
Let's go to Sheryl from New York. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
SHERYL: Good evening, Mr. Keyes. I'm actually concerned with who leaked this nuclear planning report. This breach of security should be investigated. It seems to coincide with the Democrats' partisan sniping at the president's foreign policy. Thank you very much.
KEYES: Well, Sheryl, in this particular case, I have got to say, I'm not sure, as I read the tea leaves, first, there wasn't any kind of chagrined reaction to the report. In fact, administration officials were out kind of explaining it and what seems to be a fairly well prepared fashion. That suggest to me that maybe its being out there isn't entirely accidental. But who knows?
Thanks for your feedback. Next, my outrage of the day, arising in a context that raises the surprising question as to how the Red Cross, the American Red Cross, regards this new era of patriotism.
And if you want to make even more sense, sign up for your free daily news letter at our Web site at KEYES.MSNBC.COM. Each day in your mailbox, you'll get show topics, my weekly column and links to my favorite articles of the day.
I'll be right back with the outrage of the day. Stay right there.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: And now for my outrage of the day. Out in California, a local official of the American Red Cross excluded the Orange County High School of the Arts choir from singing at a celebration in honor of folks who had volunteered for the American Red Cross. They were going to sing a trilogy that involved “America the Beautiful”, “The Prayer of the Children”, “God Bless the U.S.A.”
They were barred from performing it because this official said they were going to mention God and prayer in their songs and that was inappropriate. Can you imagine this? Now this is an organization founded on a patriotic basis, depending on the impulse folks have to serve God by helping their fellow man, telling these kids they couldn't celebrate the volunteerism that results with prayer and God. Now, the official national Red Cross issued a supposed apology that said this was a mistake. I don't think it was just a mistake. I think it was an outrageous wrong, not only to these kids, but to the very spirit the American Red Cross depends on for our cooperation.
That's my sense of it. Thanks for being with us today. Lester Holt is up next. I'll see you tomorrow.
Tonight, we're going to talk about two aspects of the situation we find ourselves in in the war on terrorism. In the first half hour, we're going to be dealing with an issue that came up over the weekend having to do with the relevance of our nuclear weapons targeting policy to the whole environment of the war on terrorism, the axis of evil. What's the appropriate way to try to deal with the potential threat of the abuse of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists against the United States?
And the half hour after that, we're going to take a look at issues that arise in the context of American immigration policy. We learned today, for instance, that two months before September 11, the federal government granted visa upgrades to two of the hijackers, Mohamed Atta, and Omar Al-Shehhi. The upgrades were needed so that they could take flying lessons. And guess what? They got — the flight school just got the notice today that the upgrades had been approved. Well, better late than ever.
Meanwhile, today the House of Representatives votes to ease immigration restrictions. So, first the INS proves that they're incompetent, and then the House gives them more power. This makes a lot of sense. We'll be talking about that in the second half hour.
But first, over the weekend, everybody was talking about the paper that was leaked in the media, which detailed some changes, potential changes, the thinking about changes, in the targeting policy for America's nuclear weapons and overall in the kind of weapons we are producing, the kind of research we are doing, all aimed presumably at trying to refit our nuclear policy for the challenges of the present terrorist environment, the terrorist war that we are fighting.
From NBC News, military analyst William Arkin who came out with this, they told us that the Bush administration has actually ordered the Pentagon to draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against at least seven countries — Russia, the axis of evil, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, and also China, Libya, and Syria.
The so-called nuclear posture review, which was delivered to Congress earlier this year, said weapons could be used in three situations: against targets which cannot be destroyed by conventional weapons; in retaliation on an attack on Americans with weapons of mass destruction involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; or in the event of a surprising military development.
Now, these revelations have cause add bit of a stir in some quarters as folks react either for or against this perceived possible change in our nuclear policy, some people believing that we are lowering the threshold in terms of the possible use of nuclear weapons and making the world more dangerous. Other people believing we're trying to establish a regime of deterrence that obviously would help to make the world safer for Americans if it would enlist the help of some of these rogue regimes in preventing the acts of terrorism which might then result in their destruction. We are going to be talking about the pros and cons of this issue this evening.
Up front, Frank Gaffney, founder and president for the Center for Security Policy, also an assistant secretary of defense for international security in the Reagan administration. He wrote about this subject in today's “Washington Times” in an article that was entitled “Adults Address the Unthinkable.” Frank, welcome back to MAKING SENSE. Appreciate your coming tonight.
FRANK GAFFNEY, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY: Thank you. Always a pleasure, Alan.
KEYES: We obviously have seen a bit of a stir as this paper and the thinking that's involved in it has come before the public. What's all the fuss about here?
GAFFNEY: It's a fuss that was calculated, I think, by Bill Arkin, the fellow you mentioned, who leaked this classified report, got access to it. It was leaked to him. And he in turn passed it to the “LA Times” and others.
Arkin is a guy who has periodically done this in the past to inflame international and, to some extent, domestic opposition to nuclear weapons. He comes from a school that says we shouldn't have nuclear weapons, we don't want us or ideally anybody else to have them, but let's start with the one that is we have.
There's another school — we ought to be clear about this — I think the Clinton administration epitomized it — which says, well, we ought to have nuclear weapons, but we don't want to do anything to maintain them or to assure that they remain safe and reliable for the future.
And then there's the Bush administration, which I think to its credit has said, wait a minute, let's take a mature, adult approach to this. We believe we do need nuclear weapons. We believe that they play an important role in maintaining our security and deterring aggression against us. Let's think through, as you said in your opening, how in the 21st century we may find ourselves challenged.
We may find ourselves threatened even in ways vastly more devastating than what we saw on September 11. And let's figure out how to make sure that our nuclear deterrent posture addresses those threats to the extent it can and we maintain that deterrent posture for the long haul.
KEYES: Now, obviously some elements of this policy that is being talked about shouldn't surprise anybody. China, Russia, powers that are potentially hostile, armed with nuclear weapons, clearly we would have to have some kind of a plan to respond to an attack that came from those quarters in spite of what may be the state of our relations, since this is obviously contingency planning.
GAFFNEY: Right.
KEYES: I think what might catch the attention of folks, though, is the fact that we are thinking about targeting a second-level tier of states, some of whom are a part of the axis of evil. Explain your thought about what the possible thinking might be behind that targeting of these second-tier axis of evil-type states?
GAFFNEY: Well, as I said, in keeping with the idea that we're looking at a very different world in the 21st century than the one we knew, say, in the old Cold War, we're looking at different actors, each of whom has some kind of weapon of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and/or nuclear or at least atomic weapons, and each of whom is getting the means to deliver such weapons over longer and longer distances with ballistic missiles or other means.
These are states with whom we might find ourselves in conflict. They are all to varying degrees involved in terrorism. They have sponsored it. They are providing technology, weapons of mass destruction, missile and other technology, to state sponsors of terrorism. They are working amongst each other in ways that could be very injurious to our interests.
And I think what the administration has said, not let's go attack these people, or not let's go decide how we're going to attack them tomorrow, but if we found ourselves, God forbid, in a circumstance where it may be possible to prevent a horrible act of aggression against us or our friends or interests, let's think through now before that moment arises what we can do to prevent that from happening, including possibly the use of nuclear weapons.
KEYES: Aren't we also though — because I think when you combine it with the axis of evil rhetoric, there is a certain implication that if a terrorist somehow attacked the United States, we're going to look around the world and hold certain states responsible on a prima facie basis. Doesn't that provide them with a motive for using the contacts and connections they may have in the terrorist underworld to try to prevent such an assault since it might result in serious damage to themselves?
GAFFNEY: It could, Alan. Look, I think one of the thing that is we learned from September 11 is people determined to do us harm may be indifferent not only to the loss of their own lives but to the loss of others' lives.
The hard part about deterrence is that this is no science. This is at best a black art. I like to think of it as an insurance policy. You do what you can to prevent evil people from doing what they might be able to do to you.
And it's a hard call. It involves very difficult judgments. And I can assure you neither President Bush nor I think any other president wants to go to nuclear war, wants to ever use these things. But there may well be circumstances in which it is the least of the evils confronting us. And I think the president is wise to assure that we have the capability and that we can have it in the future in an appropriate way.
This requires modernization of our arsenal. It requires testing of our arsenal. It requires having an infrastructure to support our arsenal. These are all steps that the Bush administration has understand are needed, the Clinton administration didn't want to pay any attention to. But at the end of the day, he doesn't want to use these things. And I hope he won't ever have to.
KEYES: Well, one of the questions I think naturally occurs to me as well is when you're thinking through these very difficult and challenging and in some ways unthinkable possibilities, one always wonders what's the alternative. If we don't try to structure some kind of regime of deterrence with a credible threat that puts people on notice of their own danger, then what exactly is it that might be there to discourage this kind of attack against the United States? I don't think these folks who are critical and kind of chagrined really address what is the heart of this strategic challenge because you have got to try to defend our people against this possibility.
GAFFNEY: I think you do, too. Many of them, the Arkins of the world, if you will, offer up as the alternative arms control, arms control with regimes that have nothing but contempt for the very idea of law at home in their domestic environments to say nothing of international law.
KEYES: Right.
GAFFNEY: This is a fraud.
KEYES: Right. We're running out of time. But I must say regime that aren't even very susceptible to the logic of deterrence are hardly going to be susceptible to the logic of arms control.
GAFFNEY: Absolutely.
KEYES: It makes no sense. Thank you, Frank.
GAFFNEY: Thank you.
KEYES: Appreciate your being with us this evening.
Next, we're going to get together with a panel of experts to get to the heart of this matter. And we're going to look at these questions. First, the one I put to Frank Gaffney in the beginning. What's all the fuss about? Isn't this a necessary element of a deterrence policy aimed at trying to establish some kind of structure to discourage harm to our people? And, finally, what is, in fact, the alternative to trying to establish such a regime of deterrence?
Plus, I want to know what's on your mind. Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA, 1-866-KEYES-USA.
First, though, does this make sense? In Vermont, in response to the fact that there have been moves supportive of homosexuality, some folks have introduced in the state legislature a bill barring teachers from teaching about homosexuality in a positive way in the public schools. This apparently is stalled, it's held up, by the way, in a Republican-controlled education committee because they are saying some of the Republicans — it's near election time — are saying, “Well, it is not the appropriate time to “do this.”
I ask them, when is the appropriate time to take steps that might protect susceptible children from teachings that could very well be contrary to their parent's desires to distort their own understanding? If you don't do it now, how are you going to protect both the innocence and the understanding of our young kids?
I think standing on the sidelines so you can get reelected may make sense to you. But does it make sense to those kids?
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
REP. J.D. HAYWORTH (R), ARIZONA: Because we are a nation at war, this House and this government should seriously consider a moratorium on immigration.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
REP. VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR. (I), VIRGINIA: If we pass legislation like this, the southwestern United States could become like Quebec. We do not need separatist movements in this country. We need to stand for the United States of America as it is today.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
KEYES: Some contentious moments in Congress today before the House voted to ease restrictions that would allow some foreigners stay in the United States as they seek residency. Now, we're going to be debating this issue in our next half hour against the backdrop of the revelation that the INS has just notified the flight school that trained some of the terrorists that flew their planes into the World Trade Center that their visas have been upgraded. Looks like the bureaucracy hasn't caught up with the times.
Meanwhile, our chat room is humming tonight. Omar Yach (ph) says, “We are losing moral high ground with each new target we try to rationalize.” And you can join in right now at chat.msnbc.com.
Now, however, we get to the heart of the matter. We're talking about the flurry of interest, attention, discussion, debate that surrounds the revelation that there's a contemplated change in our nuclear policy, a retargeting of our nuclear weapons possibly, a change in the production schedules, a change in the kind of emphasis in terms of research with respect to our nuclear arsenal to upgrade and modernize, as the administration I think would contend this, of course, to suit the needs of the 21st century. Others see it as a dangerous drift toward a world that would be more dangerous in nuclear terms.
Joining us for this discussion, Cliff May, president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, the think tank formed after 9-11 in response to the threat of terrorism. Also with us, Joe Cirincione, director of the Nonproliferation Project, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank. And Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan.
Gentlemen, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CLIFF MAY, PRESIDENT, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY: Thank you, Alan.
JOE CIRINCIONE, DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE: Thank you, Alan.
KEYES: First, I want to go to Lawrence Korb and really ask the question that I asked Frank Gaffney. As I have watched this and develop and so forth and so on, part of me, I have got to confess, looks at it in a context that seems to me perfectly natural that one would be looking at one's nuclear policy and trying to suit it to the requirements of the somewhat more complex and challenging situation. What's all the fuss about with respect to this paper and the thinking that's involved in it?
LAWRENCE KORB, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: Well, I think the fuss is about those things that you put up when you talked to Frank Gaffney at first, the criteria for using them. We're going to use them against targets that are not susceptible to non-nuclear. We're going to use them under circumstances of our own choosing. So, in addition to the normal deterrence or the retaliation, you're now adding two new criteria, which are very, very, very nebulous and would make it more likely that you would use weapons.
For example, when you say against target that is are not susceptible to non-nuclear devices, what exactly do you mean? Or this catch-all phrase “in the event of unexpected military developments.” And once you do that, you make it much more likely that other countries in the world who have renounced going for nuclear weapons are going to get them. And we risk breaking the taboo against using nuclear weapons ever since the American attacks on Japan some 57 years ago.
And that's what all the fuss is about because rather than making the United States more secure, it's actually made it less secure because a big danger to us is nuclear proliferation.
KEYES: Joe Cirincione, in light of the fact that we live in a world in which nuclear terrorists make totally out of their own kind of peculiar, irrational illogic, they may ignore what seems to us to be the logic of deterrence or the threshold of nuclear weapons and so forth and so on. Aren't we living in a world where we can't calculate in the same linear fashion that might have been appropriate in the era of the Cold War? And don't we need to have a structure and posture that makes it clear that we're flexible enough to meet the kind of threats that may emerge in the 21st century?
CIRINCIONE: It is more difficult to calculate deterrence and to calculate the threats. You're absolutely right, Alan.
But you have got it backwards about the role that nuclear weapons have in this. We are the most powerful military country in the world. We have overwhelming conventional superiority. We're demonstrating it again.
You want to teach a lesson in deterrence? Look at what happened to al Qaeda. That is concrete deterrence.
So, we want to minimize the chance at another country can acquire a nuclear weapon to offset our conventional superiority. It is directly in our interest to have fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer countries with them.
That's why this policy review is such a mistake because it expands the number of nuclear weapons, the types of nuclear weapons, the production capabilities of these nuclear weapons, and the missions for nuclear weapons. If other countries did what we are saying we're going to do, we would label them dangerous rogues.
The test of any policy is how would we feel if another country adopted it? I think we would feel in a very unsafe situation.
KEYES: Joe Cirincione, is this something that we're kind of imposing out of a willful act, as I think Joe was just saying? Or are we looking at a world in which we're faced with a complex range of threats in trying to make sure that our nuclear posture not only is responsive to those threats but actually at some level reestablishes a regime of deterrence, vis-a-vis these regimes that may not be as susceptible as, say, the old Soviet Union was to the linear logic of deterrence?
MAY: Well, look, I don't think that deterrence is something we can count on. We're not targeting any nations. What we're doing is looking at the nations, the rogue nations and the terrorist organizations, that are targeting us and trying to think what we can do about it, yes, in terms of deterrence, but also in terms of retaliation.
It is vital that we have this within our arsenal and that it be clear that we may use it. But, for example, Joe just said, and I think very wrongly, that we've shown al Qaeda what can be done when they do things to us. We know for a fact, Alan, that al Qaeda — they're still out there, after all, we've only destroyed about 20 percent of them worldwide — that they believe that 9-11 was a great triumph, as they call it.
The New York raid as they call it, had broad goals and aspirations. It rang the bells of restoring Arab and Islamic glory.
We have a difficult situation here. Don't forget what we see here is contingency planning, not operational planning. It's thinking about what we might have to do at some point. And we shouldn't rule out using any weapon in our arsenal against the suicide bombers and the kamikaze pilots and all the others who are sworn to kill infidels, to kill us.
KEYES: Well, aren't we, though, Cliff, if we go down this road, possibly encouraging other states to imitate what we're doing, and in that way — and I think this is the point Joe was trying to make — upsetting what had been supposedly our efforts at nonproliferation?
MAY: I think that is a false argument. I really do. What we're saying is that, look, there are some nations who are going to be hostile towards us. That's OK. But if they sponsor terrorism, they are our enemies. And if they sponsor terrorism to develop weapons of mass destruction, they are at war with us.
We are not going to allow terrorist sponsoring nations to have weapons of mass destruction. If that seems unfair, I say so be it. This has nothing to do with the war against terrorism. Let's get that out of the way right away.
CIRINCIONE: It has everything — the nuclear posture review was done before September 11. The positions that are in this review were prepared by conservative analysts, some of whom you know very well, a year ago.
There have always been people who have been arguing to develop new, smaller, more usable nuclear weapons, who wanted to use these weapons in combat situations even when they don't involve any nuclear weapons on the other side. They have always been held in check by the responsible adults in the Department of Defense and in the White House. The responsible adults seem to be out to lunch at this point and have let the nuclear nuts run the show.
MAY: Joe, what would you have us do, tell all the terrorists in the world, “Don't worry, no matter what you do to us, we will never use these weapons?”
(CROSSTALK)
KORB: Let me get in here a second if I can. Nobody is arguing that we shouldn't deter or retaliate. The question is, should we use them, according to this document, against target that is are not susceptible to non-nuclear weapons regardless of the circumstance? The other is when you confront surprising military developments, that means you can use them anytime. This is a false argument, Cliff. Nobody...
MAY: Look...
KORB: ... is against what you're saying. But the fact of the matter is, and Joe is right, I don't know where in the heck the adults were when people were doing this. You know, when I worked for Reagan and it leaked that some of the people working for us were saying nuclear war could be fought and won and it got out, Reagan got up and said, “No, no, that can't happen.” And this is what Bush needs to do. He needs to get up and say, “Well, wait a second, we obviously would use them for deterrence and retaliation, but not on these other criteria, nor...”
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Wait, hold on a second, just if I may express a thought, because here is where I think the problem is. I think, Lawrence, you're assuming a symmetry that used to exist and no longer exists between the two sides in this situation.
KORB: No, no...
KEYES: Hold on. We are dealing with a world in which you have rogue states. You have terrorist networks. You have some folks like the folks within the Osama bin Laden network who aren't susceptible to the logic of deterrence at all. They're ready to give their lives. They don't care what the consequences are for other innocent people. When we are struck and living in a context where that kind of thing can strike us at any time, don't we have to have an arsenal flexible enough to meet that kind of threat?
KORB: No, no, what we're talking about here is the criteria on which you're going to use them. You're mixing two things. The criteria there, when you talk about surprising military developments, or you say because the target is not susceptible to non-nuclear weapons, we're going to break that threat? That's the key thing. Nobody's talking about...
MAY: Lawrence, you're making obviously a good point. And the language there of surprising developments is not very clear. But, again, this was a contingency plan that was leaked, not an operational plan that was announced.
As for targets that have been hardened indeed, if we knew, for example, that Osama bin Laden was way down in a bunker somewhere and there were a precision weapon that we could use to get him and also limit collateral damage, wouldn't you want to do that?
KORB: Not with a nuclear weapon, because you can't.
MAY: You...
KORB: You cannot — listen, I used to fly for the Navy. And we used to load these nuclear weapons. You cannot limit the damage, nor — what you've done now is you've broken the threshold, and everybody will be free to use them.
CIRINCIONE: Right. That's exactly the point. You don't want to make the world safe for nuclear weapons because if we use them to get our terrorists, why doesn't India need a nuclear weapon to go get their terrorists? How about Israel? Why don't they adopt a new nuclear weapon to go get their terrorists? And suddenly you've broken down...
MAY: Israel and India already have nuclear weapons.
CIRINCIONE: Right. And they would never use them.
MAY: Well, we hope that nobody will use them. What we hope most of all is that the rogue states and the terrorists won't use nuclear weapons first against us.
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: ... because I listen to you, I think one thing is clear, though. We do seem to have a consensus that if the objective is deterrence, then there is an appropriate need not only for nuclear weapons but for a structure, for targeting, for weapons appropriate to making that point of deterrence. The deterrence, of course, actually is only credible if your enemy thinks that you're going to be effective in actual use.
And against a certain range of states, including what I understand if I hear correctly, that second tier of rogue states that might possibly be connected with the terrorist networks that would deliver weapons of mass destruction by terroristic means, deterrence is still appropriate there. But the question seems to arise, if I'm listening to the discussion rightly, based on whether or not we are going to initiate the breaking of the nuclear threshold in ways not related to an attack on the United States.
(UNKNOWN): Right.
KEYES: And there I think I would have to agree with Lawrence Korb and Joe that in the context of the logic of deterrence, flexibility makes sense. If we're just going to announce to the world we're going to start throwing nuclear weapons around because it is a more appropriate way to do business we could otherwise do, I think that would be a serious and wrong message given all the work we've put into trying to establish a regime of nonproliferation.
It would encourage other countries faced with exactly the same problem to be careless in their use of nuclear weapons. I don't think we want to do that.
And if this is just a planning document, I think they ought to plan on structure of deterrence and what's needed to maintain it, not on the structure that might send the wrong message about our own willingness to use nuclear weapons in an environment that is not about deterrence.
I don't know, Cliff. I think just it would be dangerous to send that signal.
MAY: I think you don't want to send the signal you're going to throw them around. But you also don't want to send the signal there's no way you'll use them or develop specific weapons with great precision for specific use. The good news in this document is that Russia used to be on our list of nations that we thought we might need to lose nuclear weapons about. It no longer is. Let's hope that in a few years Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya are no longer on this list either.
(CROSSTALK)
CIRINCIONE: Yeah, Russia is on the list. They're still on the list.
KORB: They are on the list.
CIRINCIONE: And most of our weapons are still targeted against Russia.
KEYES: I think that is a misunderstanding. Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being with me tonight and I think obviously a lively and critical debate against a backdrop of something that is I think an ever-increasing matter of concern.
CIRINCIONE: Thank you for having the debate.
KEYES: Really appreciate it.
I think that it's an ever-increasing matter of concern to us, obviously, because in the context of the war on terrorism, there is a new meaning for our homeland population in terms of the possible assault with nuclear weapons. How we can keep this inchoate structure of rogue states, terrorist networks, semi-rational states and organizations from moving against the United States I think is one of those challenges that must preoccupy our policymakers.
In that sense, I think thinking about the unthinkable becomes something that we as Americans have to show a greater understanding and comprehension of so that we give space to our policymakers to develop the flexible response that is will be required to keep us safe in a world that is no longer susceptible to the sort of bipolar linear logic of the old Cold War mutual-assured-destruction kind of thinking.
Well, next, on the very day that Congress gives the INS greater power, the flight school thattrained the 9-11 hijackers has received clearance to give them flying lessons. Good thing they're dead, isn't it?
Doesn't it make you wonder if the bureaucracy hasn't caught up yet with what's happened, maybe we better make sure we don't give them the power to make something else bad happen, or at least to not take the action that might help to prevent it. Anyway, we're going to be debating that in the next segment.
And later, what's on your mind on any topic? Call me at 1-866-KEYES-USA.
You're watching MSNBC, the best news on cable.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Welcome back to MAKING SENSE. I'm Alan Keyes. The INS last week sent out letters to the two terrorists who piloted the airliners into the World Trade Center. Notifying them that they were welcome to stay longer in America. They upgraded their visas so they could go to the flying school.
One of the letters was addressed to the late Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the attack. Here's MSNBC's Robert Hager.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
ROBERT HAGER, MSNBC CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): This is Rudy Decker, he owns the flying school in Venice, Florida, where hijackers Mohammed Attaand Marwan Al-Shehhi trained. It was Atta who flew the plane into Trade Center Towers one, and Al-shehhi who flew into Tower two. That was six months ago.
So, imagine Dekker's surprise this weekend, when he got a routine notification in the mail from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that Atta and al-Shehhi have been approved for student visas to study at his flying school.
RUDI DEKKER, FLIGHT SCHOOL OWNER: The flight schools didn't do anything wrong. The government needs to look at itself, and look at the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) what they can change so this would not happen anymore.
HAGER: So how could INS just now be telling the flight school that two terrorists, responsible for nearly 3,000 deaths, and both dead themselves for six months now, have been approved for student visas?
(on camera): INS admits it's embarrassing, but explains it like this. It says when Atta and al-Shehhi first applied to be upgraded from visitors' visas to student visas two summers ago, there was nothing in the records then to raise suspicions. So the upgrade was routinely approved a year later, months before the terrorist attacks. So the INS says it's just a formal notification to the flying school, that was delayed and has only now arrived.
(voice-over): Arrived this weekend in an envelope from the INS student school processing center in London, Kentucky, postmarked this March 5. Typical of INS, says a critical congressman.
REP. ELTON GALLEGLY (R), CALIFORNIA: And our frustration has turned to anger in many cases, with an agency that has been less than functional for a long time.
HAGER: But INS points out the delayed notification is of no real consequence, just a bizarre foul-up, caused by old processing equipment and a huge backlog of data to be entered into it. The agencies is now spending $34 million to speed up its student visa notification system. But too late to prevent this mistake. A system that just now failed to recognize the name Mohamed Atta, which has now become one of the most infamous names in the history of terrorism.
Robert Hager, NBC News, Washington.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
KEYES: So, I have to tell you. It's the last point that particularly bothers me that after all this time, one would have expected that the INS, along with every other government agency and bureaucracy would have been alerted to these names, would have gone through their records with a fine-tooth comb to find out what they knew about these people and what interaction they had with them. Judging by this snafu, the INS didn't do it. And the fact that it didn't raises questions about whether or not we are, in fact, in this environment of challenge to our security dealing with an immigration system that meets our needs. Now against this backdrop of a reminder of the bureaucratic snafus, the difficulties, the out dated organization that really isn't up to the task of screening individuals in light of our security requirements, we now face a Congress that has just passed a piece of legislation in the House that would actually provide for an extension, a grace period, that would allow folks who are in this country illegally, in various ways in violation of the terms of their visas and so forth to have time so they can get their paperwork done we're told between now and November and regularize their status, and so forth.
Against the backdrop of that security concern, is now the time to be relaxing our vigilance, relaxing restrictions, giving the INS more latitude in terms of who stays in the United States? Or would it be wiser at this point to tell a lot of these folks it's time to go home? Joining us now to talk about these questions, Representative Tom Tancredo, Republican of Colorado and chairman of the House Immigration Reform Caucus, who is against easing the restrictions and Stephen Moore, a senior fellow at the Cato institute, a Washington-based libertarian think tank. He is also president of the Club for Growth, an organization that helps elect candidates who support limited government and lower taxes.
Now, Steven, I know out of deference — Congressman Tancredo, I would start with you. But I want to start with Stephen, because I obviously prejudiced the environment just a little bit in a way that I introduced the topic. And if I actually did not want to put you on the spot, I mean it does seem as if we're in a situation where we'd want to be tougher and more restrictive for the not in terms of how we deal with immigration policy so that possibly through that screening process we might get to some of these sleemer cells. Maybe even inadvertently kick some people out of the country who intend to do us harm. Why relax our vigilance now?
STEPHEN MOORE, CATO INSTITUTE: Well, first of all, on your previous segment on the screw ups at the INS, the INS is one of the bureaucractically inept agencies we have in government. I mean the INS makes the IRS, which is another agency you don't like too much, seem competent by comparison. So I agree with you. We need a total overhaul of the way we administer the immigration laws.
What happened tonight, I think, was a pretty common sense measure. It did two things, Alan. It basically said we're going to beef up our border security to make sure that illegal immigrants cannot come into the country, as easily as they've been able to in the past. But it also says, look, the ones who have been here for five or 10 years who have been paying taxes, Alan, who have not gone on welfare, who have been working here, let's make them Americans.
They're Americans in every way, Alan, except for the fact they don't have green cards and I think it is common sensical, I think its humane, it's allowing families to stay together. We all believe in family values. I think it is a sensible policy, coupled with getting tough on the border and really putting teeth in our border patrol.
KEYES: Representative Tancredo, is Steve right there in terms of the compromise that was worked out here, trading off tougher measures against this amnesty for some individuals?
REP. TOM TANCREDO (R), COLORADO: There's only one problem with that. And the part of the bill that he refers to as being toughening, you know, in fact, it was. There was a great part of that bill that did, in fact, toughen the laws with regard to especially student visas. The only problem is, we passed that bill about a month ago. No, excuse me, in December. We passed that bill in December. It is now sitting in the Senate. It was HR-3525, exactly the same bill.
Now, one wonders, why in the world would we pass the bill again? Why would we even bring it up again? Well, there's where another word you used earlier could come into play: sleeper. Because the sleeper in this arrangement is amnesty, or extension of 245-I, which was tagged on to this recreated bill, which we have already passed. It was done so that it would confuse the issue and give people cover so when they voted for this piece of junk, they would be able to say, ahh, I'm sorry, I thought I was voting to toughen the law. We've already passed this bill.
This was an underhanded way to push this particular issue of amnesty. I am disappointed, of course, in my colleagues. But I'm disappointed in the White House for actually pushing this issue. It is bad policy. It's bad politics.
KEYES: Now, Stephen Moore, on the larger question of amnesty, aren't we, in fact, destroying the integrity of our immigration laws if we do these periodic amnesties in various ways that seem to send the signal that people who cheat on the system are actually going to just have to wait, because if they wait long enough, get away with it for long enough, we're going to regularize their status and let them stay?
We've done it now often enough that this is no longer an exception. It is becoming the kind of rule that cheaters can count on. What about all the folks who obey the laws? Aren't they going to get quite upset because they sat in line for 10, 15 years while these other people get to jump the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) by cheating? Won't we just encourage a general destruction of respect for our immigration laws?
MOORE: Well, I think there is something to that. There's no question about it, Alan. We don't want to encourage illegal immigration by saying come in now illegally and then you can get amnesty later.
This is more of a legalization program for people who would be eligible otherwise, Alan, people who basically have a — either a family connection or an employer who wants to hire them in the country. I think also, if you couple this, again, with the tough teeth in terms of the border patrol, I think it makes it a very sensible policy.
The fact of the matter is, Alan, these people aren't leaving. They've been here for five, 10, in some cases, 15 years. They have family here. They've been working. I think it's kind of nonsensical to think that somehow they're going to leave after 15 years being in a country.
TANCREDO: Steven...
MOORE: The other thing to remember, though, is this idea that somehow, this is tied to terrorism is nonsensical. I mean, the fact is George W. Bush, who's the biggest hawk in terms of defending our country against terrorism, is for this bill and thinks it makes a lot of sense both politically and as a policy matter as well.
KEYES: Well, I think he may want to little something to take with him to Mexico.
TANCREDO: Yes. I think he's leaving on the 22nd to see the president of Mexico and wants to give him a gift. But the reality is, of course, it does have national security implications. Just to call something ludicrous does not it make, no matter how often you say it.
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Let the record...
TANCREDO: I'll tell you exactly how. We are going to turn — no. The process is this. If you are here under certain conditions, and by the way, the thing Stephen left out in that explanation of who these people are, they would be otherwise eligible. This is the one true thing about every single one of them that you're going to talk about here or that are going to become eligible under this bill. They are here illegally. Whether they have overstayed their visa or whether they came across the border without our permission. One way or the other, they're here illegally. That is the bottom line.
We are rewarding that behavior and we are supposed to be a nation of laws. Of course, this is an absolute antithesis of that. It is sending the wrong signal to everybody around the world. If you wait, if you do it the right way, if you fill out the paperwork, if you wait in line to come in, you're a sucker. What you should do is sneak into the country, wait under the radar screen for long enough and we'll give you amnesty.
Now the reason why it is a national security issue is because these people will apply. Guess who tries to figure out whether or not their application is valid and whether the information that they have provided is accurate? Guess which agency has that task?
MOORE: Tom, they're already here. They're here already.
(CROSSTALK)
TANCREDO: Back up. Back up. That's exactly right. And they can operate a heck of a lot more freely by being here legally. Can't they?
(CROSSTALK)
Therefore, you are legalizing, potentially legalizing people who are here to do us harm.
MOORE: Most of the people we're talking about are not Muslims. They're not Arabs.
TANCREDO: So what? So what? How many do you need? How many do you need to be here? Is one too many? How about two? How about three? How about four?
(CROSSTALK)
KEYES: Stephen, wait a second. Wait a second. I used to do this work when I was in the government, in the state department.
TANCREDO: Right.
KEYES: And I have to tell you that the resentment that exists among folks who are out there, because all of the criteria you talked about with relatives and so forth, there are people by the thousands and tens of thousands waiting to get in this country who satisfy those criteria, but who have acted honestly, haven't broken the law, watching folks who did otherwise go to the head of the line and jump the cue, violates every idea of American fairness.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming in today with a lively discussion and, obviously, one that arouses a lot of intense interest. We'll see how it develops as this whole matter is considered in the Senate and further on.
Later, my outrage of the day. But first, I'm going to hear what's on your mind. So call us at 1-866-KEYES-USA. We'll be right back to see you make some sense.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: Now we're going to find out what's on your mind. Let's go first to Christopher from New Jersey. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CHRISTOPHER: How are you doing, Mr. Keyes?
KEYES: Very good.
CHRISTOPHER: I just want to say that I don't think anyone should really be shocked about the existence of this nuclear weapons agenda because it seems that even in times of peace, that it's part of the department of defense's job to have a full range of what if scenarios for any of our military capabilities.
KEYES: I think that's true. I think one of the things that a lot of people don't want to think about, for instance, is the fact that we might get into a situation where our military forces, for their survival, would have to use tactical nuclear weapons. That's a scenario that always used to come up, especially in the context of overwhelming numbers, such as we might face from the Communist Chinese in certain places, for instance.
So, I think you're right, in terms of contingency planning, not in terms of policy because I think we want it to be our policy that we won't break the threshold. But in terms of what we might face at some point, we might have to do what we have to do to survive.
Let's go to Chris from Illinois. Chris, welcome to MAKING SENSE.
CHRIS: Good evening.
KEYES: Hi.
CHRIS: Wouldn't it, by American policy, make us a rogue nation with this nuclear posturing that we're doing?
KEYES: Why do you think so? I don't understand. We are not attacking other countries or threatening to attack other countries without provocation. There's a part of this that's retaliatory in the context of a possible terrorist strike and part of it that is contingent so that our forces will be prepared to meet whatever contingencies might arise in, of course, of an all-out war where we're defending ourselves. How is that rogue? It's actually just part of our defense thinking, isn't it?
CHRIS: Well, it seems sort of like a baiting technique and it's like saying if Saddam was to say, you know, well, we have got these weapons, we'll use them if we have to. We would then call Iraq a rogue nation.
KEYES: I don't think so. I think what we say about Saddam Hussein is that he has actually threatening to use them against us. As a result, we have to make it clear that if we are hit, we are going to hit them back. That's called deterrence. It's an effort to get your enemy to understand that destroying you, he will destroy himself and I think we have to do it, even with a range of states that might use the terrorist network against us.
Let's go to Sheryl from New York. Welcome to MAKING SENSE.
SHERYL: Good evening, Mr. Keyes. I'm actually concerned with who leaked this nuclear planning report. This breach of security should be investigated. It seems to coincide with the Democrats' partisan sniping at the president's foreign policy. Thank you very much.
KEYES: Well, Sheryl, in this particular case, I have got to say, I'm not sure, as I read the tea leaves, first, there wasn't any kind of chagrined reaction to the report. In fact, administration officials were out kind of explaining it and what seems to be a fairly well prepared fashion. That suggest to me that maybe its being out there isn't entirely accidental. But who knows?
Thanks for your feedback. Next, my outrage of the day, arising in a context that raises the surprising question as to how the Red Cross, the American Red Cross, regards this new era of patriotism.
And if you want to make even more sense, sign up for your free daily news letter at our Web site at KEYES.MSNBC.COM. Each day in your mailbox, you'll get show topics, my weekly column and links to my favorite articles of the day.
I'll be right back with the outrage of the day. Stay right there.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
KEYES: And now for my outrage of the day. Out in California, a local official of the American Red Cross excluded the Orange County High School of the Arts choir from singing at a celebration in honor of folks who had volunteered for the American Red Cross. They were going to sing a trilogy that involved “America the Beautiful”, “The Prayer of the Children”, “God Bless the U.S.A.”
They were barred from performing it because this official said they were going to mention God and prayer in their songs and that was inappropriate. Can you imagine this? Now this is an organization founded on a patriotic basis, depending on the impulse folks have to serve God by helping their fellow man, telling these kids they couldn't celebrate the volunteerism that results with prayer and God. Now, the official national Red Cross issued a supposed apology that said this was a mistake. I don't think it was just a mistake. I think it was an outrageous wrong, not only to these kids, but to the very spirit the American Red Cross depends on for our cooperation.
That's my sense of it. Thanks for being with us today. Lester Holt is up next. I'll see you tomorrow.